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Individual Levels of Bias and Immigration Policies in the United States: A Test and Extension of the Dual Processing Model of Bias

Lorraine Phillips

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INDIVIDUAL LEVELS OF BIAS AND CURRENT IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE
UNITED STATES: A TEST AND EXTENSION OF THE DUAL PROCESSING MODEL OF
BIAS

by

Lorraine M. Phillips

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2017

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Lorraine M. Phillips

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in
satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

Individual levels of bias and immigration policies in the United States: A test and extension of the Dual Processing Model of bias

by

Lorraine M. Phillips

Advisor: Maureen O'Connor, Ph.D., J.D.

The present study was a test and extension of the Dual Process Model of bias on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy in the United States. The Dual Process Model predicts that people who score higher on either the Social Dominance Orientation scale or the Right Wing Authoritarian scale will hold more negative attitudes toward immigrants, particularly if immigrants are viewed as a threat. A sample of 315 participants from across the United States was recruited using Amazon's M Turk site. This study used a combination of attitudinal measures, policy scales, and experimental vignettes. The study found that the Dual Process Model can both predict which participants will hold anti-immigration attitudes and which participants support more restrictive immigration policy. This study also found that the Dual Process Model was better at predicting which participants will hold anti-immigration attitudes than it was at predicting which participants will support restrictionist policy. Furthermore, evidence of the double additive effect of the Dual Process Model was found. The types of threats people high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale are sensitive to are the same for people high on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale and vice versa. Finally, this study showed the

reliability of the Dual Process Model to predict attitudes and policy choices across different dependent measures.

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Individual levels of bias and immigration policies in the United States: A test and extension of the Dual Processing Model of bias

Immigration policy has always been fraught with conflict in the United States, with the challenge to balance concerns for inclusion and exclusion as a continuing theme. U.S. immigration policy historically favored individuals of European descent who are similar ethnically, linguistically and culturally to many people already living in the United States (Lee & Ottati, 2002). In the last 50 years, due to the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (the Hart-Cellar Act¹), the numbers of immigrants choosing to move to the United States from developing countries² has outpaced those coming from European nations. These “new” immigrants are racially, ethnically and culturally different from the majority of Americans, which can make integration particularly challenging for them (Bobo, 2000; Cohn, 2015; Oliver & Wong, 2003; Zong & Batalova, 2017) and acceptance by some natives nearly impossible.

With an increase in both legal and illegal immigration to the U.S., local policies on the state, county and city level, both in support of and in opposition to immigration, have increased as well (Kim & Garcia, 2008; Steil & Vasi, 2014; Varsanyi 2010). How one feels towards new arrivals can have a lasting impact on public policy decisions, elections and the criminal justice system (Glenn, 2011; Steil & Vasi, 2014). The present study examines the determinants of public attitudes towards immigration and how those attitudes impact criminal justice policy, while also

¹ The Hart-Cellar Act abolished the national quota system that had been in place since the 1920s. The new system created a seven category preference system that emphasized the importance of family unity and occupational specificity (Kanstroom, 2007). Numerical restrictions on visas were set at 170,000 persons per year not including the immediate family members of U.S. citizens.

² There is no one definition of a developing country but the United Nations defines a developing country as having a low standard of living, an undeveloped industrial base and a low Human Development Index that includes poverty, literacy, education and life expectancy (Development, 2011). In 2009 approximately 38.5 million people in the United States were foreign born and of those, approximately 34 million were born outside of Europe in many countries that are classified as being “developing countries” according to U.N. standards (Grieco & Trevelyan, 2010).

addressing some of the methodological gaps in the research. Can we identify determinants of attitudes towards immigrants so as to distinguish between the influences of realistic versus symbolic threats and thereby more precisely assess the link between public attitudes and attitudes towards policy? Duckitt's (2001) Dual Process Model (DPM) of bias provides a framework for the present study. The Model proposes that underlying personality traits of an individual interact with how they are socialized in combination with their worldview producing their ideological attitude, Social Dominance Orientation or Right Wing Authoritarianism, which in turns produces prejudice based on perceived threats.

This paper will provide context for considering the connections between individual attributes and immigration policy, by presenting immigration rates and policies in a historical perspective. It will then introduce more contemporary public attitudes about immigrants and the primary sociological variables that contribute to these opinions. The concept of intergroup bias, specifically the theories of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) will be discussed to assist in understanding these relationships from a psychological perspective. Both theories explain how individual personality traits interact with sociological variables to produce our attitudes about the world. More specifically, threat theory will provide a lens through which specific emphasis can be placed on issues of immigration. How threat theory interacts with Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism to produce individual attitudes towards immigrants will be examined within the context of the Dual Process Model of Bias.

A significant contribution of this study is to test whether Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism can predict support for or against restrictionist immigration policy. To date there have been many studies looking at the relationship between Social

Dominance Orientation, Right Wing Authoritarianism and the development of negative attitudes toward immigrants (see Constant, Kahanec & Zimmerman, 2009; Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998; Mayda, 2006; O'rourke & Sinnott 2006, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994; Thomsen, Green & Sidanius, 2008). However few studies have tested the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation, Right Wing Authoritarianism and the development of attitudes towards contemporary immigration *policies* in the United States. The present study uses two steps to test the applicability of the Dual Process Model. First participants' levels of bias, their perception of immigrants as threats, attitudes toward immigrants and attitudes towards immigration policy are tested using a series of scales. The second step is an experimental manipulation of variables within two vignettes. The first vignette is about the right of police officers to inquire about a person's immigration status during a routine traffic stop in which the ethnicity of the driver was manipulated across conditions. The second vignette is about whether a young adult who was brought to the United States without authorization by her parents should be deported. In this vignette, the amount of trouble the adult has been in with the criminal justice system was manipulated across conditions. These two methods provide different ways of testing the ability of the Dual Process Model of Bias to predict participants' attitudes towards contemporary U.S. immigration policy.

U.S. Immigration policy yesterday and today

Scholars acknowledge that competition between American-born residents and new arrivals has always been a part of our national debate. Today, both the number of new arrivals and the shift in the type of immigrant from white European to predominantly people of color may be partially responsible for an increase in contemporary nativist feelings (Cohn, 2015; Massey & Pren, 2012; Zong & Batalova, 2017). Feelings of competition with new arrivals

represent a reaction to threats that influence attitudes towards immigrant groups and government policy (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Gouveia, 2010; Hood & Morris, 1997; Huntington, 2004; Newman, 2013).

With the passage of the Hart-Cellar Immigration Act of 1965 both the rate of immigration increased from the lows of the 1940s-1960s and the places from where new arrivals emigrated shifted from predominately European countries to countries in Asia and Latin America. The 1965 act replaced immigration laws that centered on the national origins system, favoring people from Europe, with a system organized around family reunification and labor needs (Massey & Pren, 2012). The change in the law shifted the composition of new immigrants from countries in Europe to those in Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America (Bean & Bell-Rose, 1999; Massey & Pren, 2012; Waldinger & Lee, 2001). These new immigrants have transformed the racial and ethnic identity of the United States from primarily a White/African-American society to a multi-racial/ethnic/cultural country (Alba & Nee, 2003; Cohn ,2015; Zong & Batalova, 2017). Immigrants today tend to be members of minority groups who are younger, economically more disadvantaged, less well educated, more likely to compete in the lower-wage job markets, and have more children than American-born citizens (Ayers, Hofstetter, Schnakenberg, & Kolody, 2009). These characteristics differ from what some studies suggest the American public prefers in new arrivals. Hainmuller and Hopkins (2015) found that respondents favor immigrants who are educated, highly skilled, speak English, have employment plans and have never entered the country before without authorization. These results mirror earlier work by Hainmuller and Hiscox (2010), who found participants, regardless of their own education and employment status, prefer high skilled immigrants over low-skilled immigrants.

Based on U.S. Census data from the last thirty plus years, the foreign-born population in the United States has increased from 6 percent (14.1 million individuals) of the total U.S. population in 1980 to 8 percent (19.8 million individuals) in 1990, 11 percent (31.1 million individuals) in 2000 and, 13 percent (40 million) of the total U.S. population in 2010 (Batalova & Lee, 2012). Of the 40 million noncitizens in the United States today, Homeland Security estimates that 11.5 million of these people are in the country without proper documentation (Batalova & Lee, 2012; Homeland Security's Year Book, 2015).

The maintenance of national sovereignty is a power vested in the federal government, the enforcement of immigration law is a federal responsibility (Aleinikoff, 2002; Rodriguez, Chishti, Capps, & St. John, 2010). Controlling who can enter the country and then who can stay is a powerful discretionary tool that defines just who belongs in the national community (Bosniak, 1994; Kanstroom, 2007).

Notwithstanding that immigration regulation is a federal responsibility, the United States has a history of local communities and states also enacting immigration policy (Manheim, 1995). States have the right to adopt policies that affect immigrants living in their jurisdiction, but they cannot make policy that affects the entry and exit of new arrivals (Varsanyi, 2010). Many of these laws aim to curb immigrant rights, like placing hiring and housing restrictions upon them, while fewer are designed to expand their rights (Brooks, 2011; Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010).

While some local and state attempts to enact immigration law have been unsuccessful³, states continue to enact policies.⁴

U.S. immigration policies have sought to balance the concerns of different political, economic, social, racial and ethnic groups in the United States while preserving a particular vision of national identity (Tichenor, 2002). Americans have struggled with the conflicting identity of being a nation of immigrants and a nation that values the notion of being an American (Huntington, 2004; Walzer, 1983). In a 2010 Gallup poll, most respondents indicated that immigration was a good idea and many were sympathetic towards the plight of undocumented immigrants living in the United States (Morales, 2010). At the same time, many of those polled were also concerned about the effects undocumented immigrants have in their lives, in particular, the competition for resources. These opinions about immigrants mirror an opinion report conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2014. Over half of those polled stated that immigrants strengthen the country rather than threaten traditions; however, those who politically lean center right or identify as being politically conservative, see immigrants as a burden. In their eyes, immigrants take jobs, housing and health care from native born citizen and threaten U.S. culture (Beyond red vs. blue, 2014). Many people believe that immigrants are strong working individuals focused on family values (Keeter, 2009); some also feel, however, that immigrants hurt America because new arrivals abuse social services, fail to pay their share of taxes, do not assimilate to American culture and may be involved with terrorists. In turn, many Americans

³ Several federal courts have blocked portions of restrictionist immigration policies in states such as Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina and Utah (Brown, 2011). At the time of writing this defense the Supreme Court has struck down many provisions of the Arizona's SB1070 law but upheld the provision requiring the police to check the immigration status of anyone they suspect is in the United States without authorization.

⁴ The National Conference of State Legislatures publishes a mid-year and end-year report about all the state laws and policies that are passed concerning immigration, migrant and seasonal workers, refugees and undocumented immigrants. Please see the following web-site for the most updated report at <http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants.aspx>

support stricter immigration laws and seem unconcerned about the effects these policies have on the undocumented immigrants, themselves, or other members of their community (Saad, 2010).

Recent polls about immigration reveal an upswing in positive attitudes towards immigrants. In a January 2017 poll (Gates, 2017), 41% of Americans were satisfied with the current level of immigration, which is the highest satisfaction level reported since Gallup started to ask this question in 2001 (Gates, 2017). As of June 2017, about half of Americans polled believed immigration has a positive effect on the social and economic landscape of the United States, rather than hurts the US economy (Swift, 2017). In addition, more Americans in 2017 than in 2007 believe that immigrants have a positive effect on the country from culture to taxes to social and moral values (McCarthy, 2017). Nevertheless, there is a split along party lines -- the majority of Republican respondents were dissatisfied by current immigration levels and wanted to see a decrease, while those who identify with the Democratic party had more favorable view of immigrants.

Feeling threatened by new arrivals is not a new reaction nor are the responses by the government. One only needs to look back at the history of the United States to see parallels between the country's past and present. From the first federal deportation law passed in 1798 to give President Adams the power to deport foreigners he deemed dangerous⁵, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, or the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act which changed what Ngai (2003) calls cultural nationalism into racial nationalism, new arrivals have always been perceived as a threat.

⁵ The Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 was a set of four laws designed to provide the federal government with more strength in case of a war with France. The first was the Naturalization Act of 1798, which increased the residency time requirement for someone to become a naturalized citizen to 14 years, the second was the Alien Act which gave the President the power to deport any alien deemed a danger to the United States during peacetime, the third was the Alien Enemies Act which allowed for the arrest, imprisonment, and deportation of any alien subject to enemy power, and the final act was the Sedition Act that stated that any treasonable act was a misdemeanor subject to a fine and imprisonment (Zolberg, 2006).

In the last twenty-five years, immigration law and criminal law have become blurred into what Stumpf (2006) has coined “crimmigration.” The scapegoating of undocumented immigrants as the cause of many social problems, such as increases in the average cost of medical care, welfare expenditures, housing assistance, and in school overcrowding has become a familiar narrative that many people espouse (Dunn, 2009). Being in the United States without proper documentation is not a crime in and of itself, rather it is the actions that undocumented immigrants must take in order to come to the United States, live and work that are criminal offenses; for instance using someone’s social security number to get a job or driving a car without a driver’s license. As more restrictionist immigration policies are enacted, the likelihood that an undocumented immigrant engages in illegal behavior increases as well (Nevins, 2002).

Historically, immigrants faced xenophobia and racism that had little to do with their legal status in the country (Decker, 2010; Dunn, 2009; Ngai, 2003). Peoples’ attitudes toward immigrants are more complex than simple concern with legal status. Social context and patterns of contact are important keys to understanding how people perceive the levels of immigration and the immigrants themselves (Hood & Morris, 1997).

Public attitudes towards Immigrants: Resurgence of nativism?

Historically, new arrivals have been met with varying degrees of acceptance. Today, the majority of new arrivals to the United States are ethnically, culturally and linguistically different from many native-born Americans. Because immigrants tend to be minority group members, they could be viewed by members of the public as violating American values (Ayers, Hofstetter, Schnakenberg & Kolody, 2009); as a result, people could engage in permissible racism and discrimination without fearing social reprimand (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996; Short & Magana, 2002; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock & Kendrick 1991). Being an ethnic minority person who

believes in traditional American values such as liberty and freedom may not be enough for someone to be considered a “real” American by those in the majority (Schildkraut, 2003).

American identity has been associated with being of European White descent rather than being an ethnic minority no matter how well one assimilates (Dasgupta & Yogeewaran, 2011). This result, referred to as the American=White, has been replicated in numerous studies (See Devos & Mohamed, 2014; Devos, Gavin, & Quintana, 2010, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).

Many Americans perceive a unique American culture into which new arrivals should assimilate to, but do not.

Some native-born Americans assume that immigrants do not want to be a part of American culture, therefore, defining them as out-group members, without necessarily understanding what might prevent immigrants from assimilating or integrating (Kunst and Sam, 2014). In effect, people may be creating scapegoats and scenarios in which unnecessary conflict or misunderstandings may arise (Bourhis, Montaruli, El-Geledi, Harvey & Barrette, 2010). For instance, in many communities, particularly rural communities for which immigration is a relatively new phenomenon (Fennelly & Federico, 2008), the disappearance of family farms and businesses, and the expansion of housing and schools may have little to do with immigration but may get linked to an increase in immigration. Instead of community members seeing these changes as a natural evolution of their community they see it as a loss of identity, symbolized by the most visible, the newly arrived immigrant community (Fennelly & Federico, 2008). Scholars point out how candidate Donald Trump among others was able to capitalize on these shifts using immigration as a scapegoat for the economic and social evolution that many communities have experienced (Huber, 2016). Without being able to explain how, President Trump blamed

immigrants for why people are economically depressed, culturally challenged and have been forgotten by globalization (Huber, 2016; Ngai, 2017; Snower, 2016).

Perceptions and attitudes about the effects immigrants have on one's way of life have a direct impact on how people perceive immigration in general. The more likely people are to view immigrants as a threat to their well-being the more they support restricting immigration (Bucerius, 2010; Gouveia, 2010; Leong, 2008). Education often mediates this relationship. Several studies have found that the more educated people are, the less likely they are to support restrictive immigration policies and the more likely they are to view immigration in a positive light (Burns & Gimpel, 2000, Citrin, Green, Muste & Wong, 1997; Hood & Morris, 1998; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Schmuck & Matthes, 2015). One reason offered for why educated people are more accepting of immigrants is that they are less likely to compete with new arrivals in the labor market (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). Other studies find that it is not the economic advantage that an education provides that make highly educated people more sympathetic to immigrant issues but that their education makes them more tolerant and civically aware (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). Other scholars have argued that education produces citizens who are more accepting of others and progressive in their politics (Sorensen & Krahn, 1996). Self-identified political liberals who are educated are more likely to support immigration and often equate restrictionist immigration policy with race and ethnicity; they view restrictionist policy as an expression of inequality and discrimination, something that they do not support regardless of the issue (Citrin, Reingold & Green, 1990).

In addition to education levels, personal economic conditions also play a role in how people perceive immigration. Those who are not economically secure, are more likely to support restrictionist immigration policy (Citrin et al., 1997). Historically, when the public perceives that

the economy is doing well, immigration is not a focal concern; but, during times of economic depression, immigration, particularly illegal immigration, becomes an important issue for the public (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Diaz, Saenz, & Kwan, 2011; Lapinski, Peltola, Shaw & Yang, 1997; Ngai, 2003).

By focusing on perceived threats, such as economic uncertainty, native-born Americans might find it easier psychologically to discriminate against a group because they are trying to preserve resources not because they are anti-immigrant (Short & Magana, 2002). People can have restrictionist feelings towards immigration because of the perception that immigrants are draining the health care system, taking jobs, speaking a language other than English, or, in the case of undocumented immigrants, breaking the law. The problem is that many of the reasons that people use to justify their feelings towards immigration, for example, personal economic conditions (Citrin et al., 1997), have little to do with what is actually happening to them. For instance, many people cite job competition as a reason they oppose immigration, yet they might not actually be the people who compete with those new arrivals for jobs (Ayers et al., 2009). Traditionally, other immigrant groups or members of the African American community are more likely to compete with new arrivals over jobs, housing, education and social services. Despite this competition, these groups are less supportive of restrictive immigration policies compared to white Americans (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001).

Recent media attention has focused on a nativist public discourse in which residents have expressed a growing resentment towards immigrants (Alvarez & Butterfeld, 2000; Fennelly & Federico, 2007). The focus on restrictive attitudes and policies towards immigration has created an atmosphere in which it appears that only those affected by these policies, immigrants and their families, oppose restrictive policies. However, is this true? Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008)

argue that only issues that can harm the public become part of the public discourse, which may explain why there is more attention given to opponents of immigration than to those who support it. This discourse might be adding to the “false consensus effect” in which people overestimate the support for their opinion (Marks & Miller, 1987). On immigration, the over-representation of conservative views may lead those who support more restrictionist policies to become more politically involved and more vocal. Effectively, they may perceive that everyone shares their opinion.

Confounding the issue is the intense political atmosphere in which immigration is discussed and debated. Politicians walk a tightrope between portraying themselves as friendly to legal immigrants and demonstrating that they are fighting against illegal immigration. In California, for example, Republicans tend to support anti-immigration legislation which boosts their support from native voters but can hinder their campaigns by alienating new voters, their families, and communities (Neiman, Johnson & Bowler, 2006). While not all Republicans are anti-immigrant and not all Democrats are pro-immigrant, many pundits and journalist portray it this way (Neiman, Johnson & Bowler, 2006). Presenting immigration as a policy issue determined by party loyalty can make it difficult for people who are trying to gather trustworthy information about political issues to make decisions and form opinions (Sidanius, Mitchell, Haley & Navarre, 2006). Support for immigration may be a proxy for other variables and may have more to do with a person’s ideological orientation than their political party (Chandler & Tsai, 2001). Gimpel and Edwards (1999) write that public opinion has little to do with political affiliation and that it tends to be the politicians and leaders of the parties who are more divided about immigration than the general public. Nevertheless, studies conducted in areas of the country where there have been high levels of both legal and illegal immigration, such as

California and Arizona, have shown a partisan divide between Republicans and Democrats in their support for immigration with Republicans more strongly supporting restrictive-type legislation (Morris, 2000; Tolbert & Hero, 1996).

The influence of the media, politics, education, and economics are all important macro-level variables necessary in understanding how the public develops and expresses their attitudes about immigration. Yet, personal psychological motivations may be equally important if we are to understand how overall attitudes about immigrants as people are formed, and in turn, how public opinion relates to immigration policy. Racial and ethnic stereotypes have an effect on public policy. If one does not believe that immigrants hold any value, one is more likely to support restrictive immigration policy (Burns & Gimpel, 2000). In turn, many of these policies will affect not only people who are undocumented immigrants but also legal residents and citizens who are presumed to be in the country illegally. The intersection between sociological/macro conditions and individual personal attributes is crucial to study. Focusing attention on the personal/psychological variables that could be affecting perceptions of immigrants is critical to a full understanding of the issue. Intergroup bias theory provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding how people perceive others in their world and can provide insight into people's attitudes toward immigration.

Intergroup bias: A theoretical framework for understanding perceptions about immigration

Intergroup Bias is the systematic tendency to evaluate one's group or its members more favorably than persons in a non-membership group (Brewer, 1979; Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002). Bias is an interpretive judgment that behaviors, attitudes or cognition are unfair,

illegitimate, or unjustifiable in the sense that it goes beyond the objective requirement or evidence of the situation. Bias is contextual in nature, often being expressed through stereotypes (Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). In-group bias can occur when one favors one's own in-group, devalues the out-group, or both (Lee & Ottati, 2002).

Attribution theory works in tandem with intergroup bias theory in that human beings offer external attributes to undesirable behaviors of in-group members and internal attributes to out-group members. For instance, if my son (a child living in New York City) cheated on his math exam, he did so because of the pressure his school puts on good grades (external attribute), while if your son cheated on an exam, (a child living in a small town in upstate New York) I might believe that your son does not value education the way people in NYC do, he cheated because he is deviant and a liar (internal attribute). In-group identification can be as minor as wearing the same color shirt as others in a group or being the fan of the same sports team, to belonging to the same ethnic group, speaking the same language, or living in the same neighborhood, state or country.

Holding biases against others is an attitudinal expression of prejudice while acting on those attitudes would be discrimination. Allport (1954) introduced the idea of the “generalizability of prejudice” (p. 73), in which people prejudiced against one group tend to be less favorable towards other groups as well, irrespective of who that group is and what their relationship is to the in-group. For instance, a person who holds negative attitudes towards people with disabilities is more likely to have negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Allport (1954) proposed the concept that prejudice should be thought of as a “trait of personality” (p. 73), which means that it is important to understand the characteristics of a person that make them more likely to be prejudiced (Duckitt, 2006).

Two prominent theories of intergroup bias are Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), introduced by Altemeyer in 1981, and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), introduced by Sidanius and Pratto in 1999. Both Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation appear to be strong predictors of individual reasons for prejudice as well as predictors of generalized prejudice (Altemeyer 1998, Duckitt, Wagner, Pleiss & Birum, 2002, Whitley, 1999). Numerous studies have found that Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation can explain up to 50% of the variance in generalized prejudice with no other psychological variables adding to the model (Ekehammar et al., 2004; McFarland, 2003).

Both Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation are thought of as scales that measure social attitudes and ideology rather than personality. This difference is an important distinction. Your personality is made up of characteristics (personality traits) that lead to consistent patterns of behavior across time and situation (Ajzen, 2005). If you are out-going today, you will probably be out-going ten years from now. This does not mean that you will not have days when you are feeling more introverted, but for the most part, you are boisterous in most social situations (Burger, 2008). Unlike personality, attitudes are expected to change with experience (Fazio, 1986). Attitudes are thought of as situational judgments that encompass an emotional, behavioral and cognitive response (Ajzen, 2005; Fazio, 1986). Attitudes are a targeted evaluation of something or someone, and, while thought of as being relatively stable, are more malleable to change than personality traits. Attitudes can change quickly once events arise and new information about a person or issue becomes available (Ajzen 2005). For instance, you may like your friend's new beau until you find out that he or she is cheating on your friend. You are a friendly outgoing person to people that you meet. Finding out your friend is being cheated

on will not change your underlying personality trait (being an extrovert), but it will change your attitude and evaluation of that beau, making you less friendly to that person.

There is little empirical support that either Right Wing Authoritarianism or Social Dominance Orientation are measures of personality (Duckitt 2001 & 2006; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje & Zakrisson, 2004; Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 1999; Perry & Sibley, 2012). There is, however, empirical evidence that both Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation are sensitive to situation manipulations suggesting they are attitudinal in nature (Altemeyer, 1988; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Jugert & Duckitt, 2009; Sales, 1973; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003).

Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation can predict prejudicial attitudes but through different contextual pathways. People who are high in Social Dominance Orientation are concerned with hierarchical relationships between groups while people high in Right Wing Authoritarianism are concerned with submission to the authority of the dominant group expressed through conformity and conventionalism (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Thomsen, Green & Sidanius, 2008).

Right Wing Authoritarianism

Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) describes the attitudes people express based on their view that the world is a dangerous place (Altemeyer, 1981). Individuals who are higher in Authoritarianism need little situational pressure to submit to authority figures (Altemeyer, 1988, 1996). Right Wing Authoritarianism is the re-conceptualization of Adorno, Brunswick, Levinson and Sandord's (1950) authoritarian F scale. Altemeyer's research suggested that only three of the original facets of authoritarianism introduced on the F scale (authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism) are unique attitudinal dimensions. The first facet,

authoritarian submission, is the submission to authorities who are perceived to be legitimate and established. These can include anyone from parents to clergy, teachers, police officers, politicians or anyone deemed a person in power (Altemeyer, 1981).

The second facet is authoritarian aggression, which is general aggression directed at people who are sanctioned by authority figures as being deserving of that attention. The target of aggression can include people seen as unconventional members of society, for example, individuals who are homeless, social deviants, homosexuals (see the work of Tsang & Rowatt, 2007) or conventional targets of discrimination like certain minority groups or women (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, Christopher & Wojda, 2008; Rowatt, Franklin & Cotton, 2005). James-Benjamin (2006) found a relationship between participants who endorsed war, punishment for law breaking and corporal punishment with Right Wing Authoritarianism, particularly authoritarian aggression.

The third facet of Right Wing Authoritarianism is conventionalism, which is a high degree of adherence to social conventions. People high in Right Wing Authoritarianism are more comfortable following the status quo that has been established by authority figures and endorsed by other members of society. Altemeyer (1996) found, in countless studies with college students, that those higher in Right Wing Authoritarianism tend to support actions that would limit the civil rights of others, especially those deemed as challenging the status quo. This result has been mirrored in several studies. Those high in Right Wing Authoritarianism have been shown to support increased surveillance by the government to keep track of community members (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes and Moshner, 2005), and post-9/11, supported efforts to increase the war on terror and deport various members of the population including Arabs, Muslims, and first generation immigrants (Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich and Morgan, 2006). As

terrorist attacks have increased, people high in Right Wing Authoritarianism support additional restrictions on civil rights (see, e.g., Crowson, 2008; Kossowska, Trejtowicz, de Lemus, Bukowski, Van Hiel & Goodwin, 2011). While an expression of one's attitudes does not necessarily translate into action, the mood of the populace can create an atmosphere that promotes totalitarianism in extreme conditions (Altemeyer, 1996).

Right Wing Authoritarianism is malleable to social conditions and does not mean that in every situation people who score higher on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale will follow authority figures blindly; they are just more likely to do so, with minimal protest (Altemeyer, 1988). The power of those deemed authority figures is immense in that they can direct those high in Right Wing Authoritarianism to focus their aggression on individual targets. People who score higher on the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale are more willing to change their opinion in conference with people in positions of power based on what those people in power tell them. This adherence to authority could have both positive and adverse effects (Altemeyer, 1988). Individuals who follow authority figures are not ostracized for having differing opinions, thus saving themselves from emotionality of the situation; but, this blind adherence to authority can be detrimental as well. By not questioning the beliefs of those in power they are more likely to support behavior, attitudes, and policies that are biased in nature.

People who score higher on the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale do not believe in criticizing authority figures and frown upon those who do. Individuals who challenge conventional norms are perceived as not having a valid position, even when an authority figure breaks the laws that individuals who score higher on the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale espouse, e.g., when politicians engage in extra-marital affairs, or sports figures arrested for domestic violence (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996). Individuals who score higher on the Right

Wing Authoritarian scale believe in strict punishment, which includes physical punishment of children. In general, they believe in capital punishment and discourage penal reform (Benjamin, 2006; Fodor, Wick, Hartsen & Preve, 2008). People who score higher on the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale tend to be religious and believe in God's Law (see Johnson, Rowatt, Barnard-Brak, Patock-Peckham, LaBourff & Carlisle, 2011; McAdams & Albaugh, 2008). They tend to believe that people should not decide what is moral and immoral because authority figures have already done this for them (Altemeyer, 1988). High Right Wing Authoritarian individuals believe in traditional roles for men and women, frown upon homosexuality (see Eunike, 2008, Stones, 2006; Tsang & Rowatt, 2007) and believe most sexual behavior, even between married couples, is immoral.

For people who score high on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale, the social norm established and dictated by authority figures is the ideal. Everyone should strive to live by these social norms, and when that social code is broken, that is just more evidence to the authoritarian that the world is a dangerous place (Altemeyer, 1988, 1996). People who score high on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale are sensitive to what they perceive as threatening behavior and dangerous people (Dallago & Roccato, 2010). Butler (2009) found that participants who scored higher on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale are more fearful of the world than those who scored low on the scale. This fear includes everything from general failure to fear of interpersonal situations and, ultimately, participants who score higher on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale are most fearful of social deviants. This fear of the world and of those who are different is expressed as prejudice towards members of the community who are different, including immigrants.

Individuals who score high on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale are patriotic and believe their way of life is correct. They are staunch supporters of the idea that there is a distinct national heritage in the United States which should be respected. They do not believe that customs change with culture or that someone else's culture is as good as theirs. The way other people live is just wrong (Altemeyer, 1996). Cohrs and Stelz (2010) found that across 155 samples with 38,522 participants, individuals who scored high on either the Social Dominance Orientation scale or the Right Wing Authoritarian scale held anti-immigration attitudes. People who scored higher on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale are especially prejudiced towards immigrants when they believed that immigrants commit crime and do not benefit the economy. Hovey, Rojas, Kain, and Magana (2000) found that people who score higher on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale showed significant support for restrictionist immigration policies.

Right Wing Authoritarianism is a good measure for explaining why people who fear social threats are biased towards new arrivals. Immigrants represent something that is different, and that difference is interpreted as something dangerous. When coupled with a political atmosphere that treats immigration as a social threat, people who score higher on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale would be expected to hold more restrictionist immigration attitudes. Even if immigrants are legally present in the country, those high in Right Wing Authoritarianism who hold anti-immigration positions perceive these individuals as defying authority figures who set the norms for our society

Social Dominance Theory

Social dominance theory was introduced by Sidanius and Pratto (1999) as both a macro and micro theory of intergroup relations. The theory proposes that people have a need to live within a hierarchy, whether or not their social group dominates another group (Hewstone, Rubin

& Willis, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Social dominance orientation is the extent of preference for group-based dominance and inequality (Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006). The higher your Social Dominance Orientation, the more comfortable you are with inequality on a personal level as well as on a societal level. People who belong to higher status groups have higher level Social Dominance Orientations than those in lower-status groups, whether the group is defined by gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation (Sidanius, Liu, Shaw & Pratto, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

A person's individual power, or lack thereof, is based on the power, prestige, and privilege that are socially assigned to the groups one belongs to such as race, religion, clan, tribe, lineage, ethnicity, gender, age or social class (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). While individuals may enjoy power and prestige based on their talents and achievements, their power and hence position within the social hierarchy are still dependent on the social groups to which they belong. Members of dominant social groups enjoy a disproportionate amount of positive social value, which includes political power, wealth, and leisure as well as access to resources such as food, housing, healthcare, employment, and education. Alternatively, individuals who belong to subordinate groups experience a disproportionate amount of negative social value, which includes sub standard housing, food, healthcare, and education. Subordinate group members also suffer more punishment and stigmatization on the individual and institutional level (Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006). Most forms of group and individual discrimination, such as racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, classism, and nationalism, are different manifestations of the same human need to create group- based hierarchies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Social dominance theory proposes the idea that hierarchies are built around a trimorphic power structure in which men dominate women, adults dominate children and for which the third

hierarchy is dependent on the social construction of power within a society, for instance; one race may dominate another, or one social class may dominate another (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Those who are in the dominant group can change into members of a subordinate group and vice versa depending upon the political and philosophical milieu of the society at any given time. While coercion and violence are used to maintain hierarchies, these hierarchies are the result of discrimination and biases across both micro and macro levels and are maintained through legitimizing myths (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Legitimizing myths are consensually held values, attitudes, beliefs, stereotypes and cultural ideologies. There are two types of legitimizing myths: hierarchy enhancing legitimizing myths and hierarchy attenuating legitimizing myths. Hierarchy enhancing myths provide a moral and intellectual rationalization for maintaining the social hierarchy and the continuation of oppression and inequality (Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006). Examples of such myths include personal rationalizations for racism, sexism and nationalism as well as political and/or philosophical policies such as the belief in retributive justice, Protestant work ethic, Manifest Destiny and the Divine Rights of Kings (Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006; Sidanius, Mitchell, Haley, Navarret, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). These myths justify beliefs that inequality is fair, natural, moral and legitimate. Hierarchy attenuating myths are justifications for social inclusion and the elimination of hierarchies. Examples include socialism, communism, universalism, and the Universal Rights of Man (Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The potency of these myths is tied to how well the ideas are shared within society by both dominant and subordinate group members (consensually), how much these myths are linked to other institutions, ideologies, religions, and philosophies (embeddedness), and how truthful or moral these myths seems to be (certainty). The more widespread and accepted these

myths, the easier it is for a society to maintain social inequality without the use of physical coercion (Jost, Glaser & Mosso, 2001; Sidanius, Levin, Federico & Pratto, 2001).

Legitimizing enhancing and legitimizing attenuating myths are expressed in many ways. On the micro level, aggregated individual discrimination is the simple, daily and sometimes unknown acts of discrimination of one person against another⁶ (Kteily, Sidanius, & Levin, 2011; Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Conversely, personal acts of kindness and generosity would be the expressions of legitimizing attenuating myths. On the macro level, institutions can either promote inequality or conversely promote group cohesion. Legitimizing enhancing institutions, which promote inequality, can be public or private and will engage in both conscious and unconscious discrimination. Coercion and violence are often used by these establishments to keep the status quo. The level of what Sidanius and Pratto (1999) called “systematic terror” will depend on the degree of social upheaval. Institutions may engage in official terror for which violence is legally and publicly sanctioned by the government. An extreme example of this would be Nazi Germany. Semi-official terror occurs when institutions and individuals within those institutions engage in violence that is not officially sanctioned by the state. In these cases, the government is aware of the violence but turns a blind eye to it until forced to recognize it. An example may be a police department that knows some of its officers

⁶ First coined by Pierce (1970) and then extended in the work by Sue (2010), legitimizing myths on the micro-level are also known as microaggressions. Microaggressions are comments or actions that unintentionally and unconsciously express biased attitudes towards a member of a minority group. Unlike overt acts of bias, microaggressions are perpetrated by people in the dominant group who often intend no offense by the statements and behaviors. Microaggressions affirm stereotypes about minority group members and position the dominate group as normal and the minority group as not. Microaggressions can be statements, behaviors or even ignoring members of subordinate groups. Examples of microaggressions include statements like “Wow you play soccer very well for a girl”, “You’re Chinese, I bet you did not even have to study for the Math test”, “You’re pretty for a chubby girl!”; and behaviors: a teacher who continues to mispronounce the names of students after being corrected numerous times, a Latino man who is last to be served at a bar even though he was the first to make contact with the bartender. For a full list of examples of macroaggression see Sue, Capodilupo, Torino, Bucceri, Holder, Nadal and Esquilin (2007).

use force to secure confessions; or, unofficial terror perpetrated by private groups and individuals that fall outside of the official government. American militia groups and the Ku Klux Klan are examples of these types of groups. Groups that perpetuate legitimizing attenuating myths promote egalitarian ideals of group inclusion, an example of which would be a multicultural school system.

Another way that legitimizing myths affect group hierarchies is through a collaborative intergroup process called behavioral asymmetry. While individual behavior varies, for the most part, people act as expected within their social groups. It is important to understand that this includes not only how dominant group members act but how subordinates actively participate in their subordination (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Behavioral asymmetry involves several processes. Asymmetrical in-group bias occurs when subordinates favor dominants over their group members. This does not mean that subordinate group members do not exhibit some level of in-group favoritism, rather it is the idea that dominant groups will show higher levels of ingroup favoritism than subordinate groups. The second element of behavioral asymmetry is self-debilitation. Self-debilitation occurs when subordinates engage in behavior that is destructive to in-group members. This behavior contributes to their subordination; for example, ethnic and racial minority group members who participate in gang activity might be seen by members of the dominant group as an example of a community that cannot control itself and be punished more harshly. Hence, behavioral asymmetry, as well as individual and institutional discrimination form a feedback loop onto legitimizing myths, whereby the behaviors of subordinate group members provide the evidence for those myths. This is the final element of behavioral asymmetry, ideological asymmetry; ideologies that help keep the status quo. While an element of Social Dominance theory is the idea that subordinate group members contribute to their

subordination, it is much easier for dominant group members than for subordinate group members to accept legitimizing enhancing myths than subordinate group members (Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999)

As stated above, Social Dominance Orientation is both a macro and micro level theory of intergroup relations. People who score high on the Social Dominance scale view the world as a competitive jungle, an eat-or-be-eaten kind of world where they are the consumers (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, 2006; Pratto & Shih, 2000; Van Hiel, Cornelis, & Roets, 2007). People who are high in Social Dominance see the world as a zero-sum game in which if your group gains my group must lose (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). They value power and achievement instead of collectivism and universalism (Cohrs, Kielmann, Moschner, Maes 2005; Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2005). They are tough-minded (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, duPlessis & Birum 2002) and score lower on measures of being agreeable (Akarmi & Ekehammar, 2006). It is not uncommon for those who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale to exhibit implicit prejudice as well as discrimination towards others even when they participate in professions and activities associated with empathy, such as law enforcement and teaching (Backstrom & Bjorlund, 2007; Brandes & Crowson, 2009; Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, Ryan, Bizumic & Subasic, 2007).

While often compared to political and social conservatism, Social Dominance Orientation is not the same thing. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) maintain that Social Dominance Orientation is the need for a person to maintain group dominance and inequality no matter what the political structure. However, studies have demonstrated a correlation between support for politically conservative candidates and a higher score on the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Matthews, Levin & Sidanius, 2009; Rios-Morrison & Ybarra, 2009). Conservative political

organizations are more likely to maintain the social hierarchy that people who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale want to maintain, thus the relationship between the two.

With respect to immigration, people who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale may not have a problem with immigrants per se provided that the new arrivals maintain their subordinate position in society. Hodson and Costello (2010) found the expression of prejudiced attitudes in participants who view immigrants as less than human. When immigrants try to assimilate to the dominant culture rather than maintain cultural isolation, people who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale find this problematic (Guimond, De Oliveira, Kamiesjki & Sidanius, 2010; Levin, Matthews, Guimond, Sidanius, Pratto, Kteily, Pitpitan & Dover, 2011; Thomsen, Green & Sidanius, 2008). Under this view, immigrants are different and should realize their place in the social hierarchy.

Origins of Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation

The psychological development of either Right Wing Authoritarianism or Social Dominance Orientation is not well understood. Little evidence suggests they are purely genetic in nature but rather they derive from a combination of biology and socialization (Duriez & Soenes, 2009). Most work on the development of Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism has focused on socialization by close relations. Some parents may teach their children attitudes favorable to a higher level of Social Dominance Orientation by emphasizing that the only way that you can get ahead in life is at the expense of others and that it is natural that some groups are better off than others. Conversely, those who score high on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale have been socialized to respect and maintain social order (Altemeyer, 1998).

Cultural evidence suggests that Social Dominance Orientation develops through socialization in egalitarian versus anti-egalitarian environments (Poteat, Espelage & Green, 2007). For instance, children raised in cultures in which the father has the greatest decision-making power have a higher level of Social Dominance Orientation than children who come from more gender neutral families and cultures (Sidanius & Pena, 2003). Duriez, Soenens, and Vansteenkiste (2008) found that both Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation are transmitted across generations from parent to child. Specifically, Social Dominance Orientation is positively related to parental goal promotion in which parents who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale promote materialistic, aggressive social goals and extrinsic goals that keep the status quo of social hierarchies in place. In turn, parents who score high on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale promote beliefs in which we should stick to current societal values and not be open to change. While people who score high on either the Social Dominance Orientation or Right Wing Authoritarian scales exhibit feelings of prejudice, studies have found that the development of high scores on each scale has different origins, which should be thought of as different cognitive, motivational systems (Duriez et al., 2008 & 2009; Duckitt 2001).

This body of work suggests that Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism can be influenced by outside sources, making them malleable to events occurring in one's environment. Traditional models of Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation do not address the specific pathway from having a particular view of the world to expressing prejudice and discrimination. Empirical work has demonstrated that both Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation are sensitive to social conditions (Altemeyer, 1988; Chatard & Selimbegovic, 2008; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Guimond,

Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Kriendler, 2005; Sales, 1973; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003). Likewise, these studies have found that while the expression of prejudice and discrimination is similar for people who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale and Right Wing Authoritarian scale, the pathways behind their bias are different, suggesting that people are reacting to different kinds of threats. For instance, in times of high political turmoil, the scores of individuals taking the Right Wing Authoritarian scale go up (Doty, Peterson & Winter, 1991). Understanding what these different threats are and how they interact with Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism to produce prejudicial attitudes may be the key to understanding how people perceive immigration and the policies governing it.

Realistic and Symbolic Threat Theory

Realistic Threats

Rooted in the classical works of Blalock's (1962) Racial Threat Theory⁷, LeVine and Campbell's (1972)⁸ study of ethnocentrism and Sherif's (1966)⁹, Realistic Conflict Theory, Realistic and Symbolic Threat theory states that when two groups are in competition for scarce resources the success of one group threatens the success of another group, which results in

⁷ Blalock (1962) developed the Racial Threat Theory to explain how discrimination-based policing policies develop. When competition for resources exists, people tend to view this competition in terms of the racial majority versus minority interests. When the majority feels that their position and resources are being challenged by the minority group, they put pressure on institutions like the police to impose harsher sanctions designed to punish the minority group and maintain the status of the majority group.

⁸ In their work on ethnocentrism LeVine and Campbell (1972) identified 23 facets of culture they believe differentiate between behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions that the in-group hold from those in the outgroup creating an us-versus-them mentality. If the in-group is truthful then the out-group are liars. Leaders of the in-group can engage in the same behaviors that leaders of the out-group do but the out-group leaders will always be wrong while the in-group leader will always be right. Likewise in-group members can engage in the same deviant behaviors as out-group members but the punishment for in-group members should be different than the out-group.

⁹ Sherif (1966) developed the Realistic Conflict Theory in which bias develops when one group feels that they are competing over limited resources against another group. Groups can be competing over real or perceived resources. Hostile feeling towards the out-group will develop when the perception is that the only one group will be the winner (zero-sum game).

negative out-group feelings. The resources may be tangible, like food, territory, and wealth, or they may be issues of power and control. Realistic threats create a sense of zero-sum gain because of the scarcity of resources; if your group gains a resource, then my group will lose that resource. When goals are different, groups can live together, but when the goals are the same, the relationships between the groups will deteriorate. Similar group members will be attracted to one another; then feelings of solidarity will increase, and the distinction between us vs. them will widen.

A more contemporary take on realistic threats focuses on the perception of threat (Stephan and Stephan, 2000). For instance, a person who either loses their job to an immigrant or who perceives that they might lose their job to an immigrant has experienced a realistic threat. Historically, support for or against immigration has mapped onto both real and perceived threats to Americans, such as the economy; when the economy is doing well, immigration is not seen as a threat, but in times of economic recession, immigrants are perceived as real economic threats (Citrin, Green, Muste & Wong, 1997).

Symbolic Threats

Symbolic threats are threats to the values, morals, attitudes, beliefs, and worldview of the dominant group (Rios-Morrison & Ybarra, 2009; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). The in-group believes in the moral rightness of their value system (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). This view of symbolic threats has its roots in symbolic racism and modern racism theories introduced by Kinder and Sears (1981), in which the way European-Americans treat African Americans is an expression of their belief that African Americans violate the traditions and values of most whites which include self-reliance, individualism, and the Protestant work ethic. White Americans do not want to appear racist, but they may not support a policy that would promote

racial equality. Kinder and Sears (1981) initially developed their theory to explain relationships between White and Black Americans, but it has been extended to explain how people feel towards ethnic groups, body types and homosexuals (Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006). As proposed by Stephan and Stephan (2000), a symbolic threat does not have to be a violation of the white Protestant work ethic but can be a threat to any central value of the in-group. In the case of immigration, speaking one's native language, displaying a flag from their home country or sending money back to people in their countries of origin would be examples of symbolic threats.

Realistic and Symbolic threats as they relate to immigration

Both realistic and symbolic threats are essential to the conceptualization of how Americans view immigration. Several scholars have found a powerful link between threat and attitudes towards immigration (see Costello & Hodson, 2011; Duckitt, 2001, 2006; Esses et al., 1998; Hitlan, Carillo, Zarate & Aikman; Stephen, Ybarra & Bachman, 1999). Realistic and symbolic threats can be experienced independently of one another or in tandem.

As noted above, realistic threats are perceived or experienced threats to resources, power, and control. People who felt that they had the same skills set as Mexican immigrants, felt more threatened by those immigrants (Zarate, Garcia, Garza and Hitlan, 2004). Similarly, slightly more than half of the people surveyed by the Kaiser Foundation in 2004, believed that immigrants had taken jobs away from Americans (realistic threat), yet the vast majority had not lost their job nor had a family member lost a job to an immigrant. Both studies are examples of participants experiencing realistic threats. In other studies, symbolic threats are center stage in how participants form their attitudes toward immigrants. Romero (2011) found that participants saw Mexican immigrant women as being unable to raise loyal U.S. citizens and that these

children would succeed in the United States at the expense of white American children. Parks-Yancy, Shih, DiTomaso, and Post (2009) conducted 240 interviews with white Americans centered on how they think about immigrants and public policy. They concluded that white Americans think of immigrants as being different racially, culturally and linguistically and that symbolic threat best explained their feelings.

Realistic and symbolic threats can work in concert with one another to affect the attitudes people have towards immigrants (Pereira, Vala, and Costa-Lopes, 2009). The pathway from prejudice to opposition to the immigration is amplified for participants who reported experiencing either a realistic or symbolic threat because of immigration (see, e.g., Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan and Martin, 2005). There is, therefore, a connection between prejudice and feelings toward immigrants and that the power of that relationship is amplified when people feel threatened by immigrants (Duckitt, 2005; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Esses; 1998).

How do Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism interact with threats?

In 2001, Duckitt proposed a Dual Process Model (DPM) of bias (see Figure 1). In the Model, Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation have different psychological and social causes, yet they produce similar prejudicial thoughts. Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation are expressions of a different set of values and motives (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). In his model, Duckitt (2001) proposed that the underlying personality traits of an individual interact with how they are socialized along with their world

view¹⁰ producing their ideological attitude (either Right Wing Authoritarianism or Social Dominance Orientation) which in turns creates prejudice based on perceived threats.

Figure1.

Duckitt (2001) Causal Model of Dual Process of Prejudice.




Figure 1 A causal model of the impact of personality, social situation, and worldview on the two ideological attitude-value dimensions of Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and their impact on outgroup attitudes mediated through perceived threat from the outgroup or competitiveness toward the outgroup.

Duckitt (2001) proposed that people who have a high Right Wing Authoritarianism orientation have been socialized to view the world as a dangerous and threatening place and that they have a personality in which they socially conform to authority figures. Duckitt (2001) provides two pathways to the development of higher scores on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale. In this first pathway socialization and personality interact to produce a worldview in which the world is a dangerous place; as a result, these individuals produce higher scores on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale which leads to prejudice when the person perceives a threat. In the

¹⁰ According to Koltko-Rivera (2004), a worldview is a set of beliefs and assumptions about the world that describes reality, one's total outlook on life, society and institutions. A worldview is the lens to understand reality and self. A worldview defines what people, experiences, behaviors and relationships are good and which are bad. A worldview dictates how life should be lived, and which goals should be pursued. A worldview can include assumptions that cannot be proved but which order the way a person lives.

second pathway, socialization and personality interact without producing a dangerous worldview but still create an individual who scores high on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale which also leads to prejudice when a threat is perceived. For persons who have high Right Wing Authoritarian orientations, prejudice is rooted in perceived threats against both their individual security and the collective security of their in-group. These people have a need to follow the status quo. Because group competition and prejudice have traditionally been present, it is okay for it to continue. Ultimately a person who is high in Right Wing Authoritarianism prefers to follow the status quo because that is the safer road. They will submit to authority and to the ways things are.

Individuals who are socially dominant have an underlying personality trait of being tough-minded, and they have a worldview in which the world is a competitive jungle and for which we are all playing a zero-sum game in which if you gain anything it is at the expense of me. Because the world is a competitive jungle, these individuals will express prejudice when they perceive competition for their group dominance. In Duckitt's model, high Social Dominance Orientation people react negatively to groups low in power and status that could compete with the dominant in-group. Hence while Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation might predict prejudice towards the same groups of people, they could also predict prejudice against different groups as well, since triggered by various types of threats (Duckitt, 2005).

Dual Process Model and Evidence of Threat

Early work on Dual Process Model focused on the relationship between how a person who scores high on the Right Wing Authoritarian or Social Dominance Orientation scale

perceives threats which produce negative attitudes. Duckitt (2005) and Duckitt and Sibley (2007) found that Right Wing Authoritarianism predicted negative attitudes towards those deemed socially threatening, such as rock stars and drug dealers, (symbolic threats) but not towards those who are considered socially subordinate (housewives and the physically disabled). Conversely, Social Dominance Orientation predicted negative attitudes toward those considered socially subordinate, housewives and the physically disabled, (realistic threat) but not towards those deemed socially threatening (rock stars and drug dealers); both Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation predicted negative attitude towards social groups deemed both socially subordinate and threatening, for example, feminists (symbolic and realistic threat). Essentially Right Wing Authoritarianism predicts prejudice against dangerous groups (socially threatening but not subordinate), while Social Dominance Orientation predicts prejudice towards derogated groups (socially subordinate but not threatening) and both predict prejudice against dissident groups (socially threatening and possibly subordinate- for example, protesters in Occupy Wall Street). These results mirror what is found in a longitudinal study of Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation on the dimension of generalized prejudice whereby high scores on the Right Wing Authoritarian and Social Dominance Orientation scales predicted different forms of prejudice (Asbrock, Sibley & Duckitt, 2010). Thomsen, Green, and Sidanius (2008) found high Right Wing Authoritarianism predicts ethnic persecution of and aggression towards immigrants when they are described as not assimilated to the host nation's values hence a threat to social order and values. Conversely, people high in Social Dominance Orientation supported aggression towards immigrant group members when they are described as wanting to assimilate and thus represented a threat to social hierarchy.

Duckitt's (2001) model supports the work of Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong (1998) that tested the effect of perceived competition by immigrants on attitudes towards immigrants. Esses et al., (1998) found that people who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale respond to threats they perceive as being competitive in nature, but that source of competition is different from that which Duckitt (2006) tested. In their model of Instrumental Group Conflict, people who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale express more negative feeling towards immigrants who represent competition for resources. So rather than their status being salient, it is their potential to obtain resources that are important. High Social Dominance Orientation participants felt that if a person gets a job, (in their study a newly arrived immigrant from a fictitious island); this is a loss for the dominant group. The need to maintain a hierarchy is critical in keeping the dominant group on top. Providing support for immigrants, i.e., job training, English classes, health care, housing assistance, was not valued because this would make them more of a threat since they are now seen as real competition, whereas providing direct assistance such as food stamps was endorsed because this is considered as a way of keeping people dependent (Esses et al., 1998). In this same study, competition had no effect on individuals who scored high on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale, which lends support to Duckitt's (2001) work that Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism are attitudinal expressions that are affected by different types of threat. Mirroring the results of Esses et al. (1998) in which group status was not salient but resource competition was for people who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale, Cohrs and Asbrock (2009) found no experimental support for the interaction between the low status of a group of competition and levels of Social Dominance Orientation. It could be that the descriptors used to illicit competition (hard working, ambitious and achievement-orientated) were not salient enough to overcome

cultural prejudices that have little to do with competition; yet, people who scored higher on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale expressed more prejudice against those they perceived as disturbing the social order and security of the status quo. In a meta-analysis of how levels of Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation affect attitudes towards immigrants in different countries outside of the United States, Cohrs and Stelzl (2010) found that high Right Wing Authoritarianism levels were a good predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes in countries where immigrants are perceived as increasing the crime rate and not benefiting the economy, thus disrupting social order and security. Cohrs and Stelzl (2010) also found that high levels of Social Dominance Orientation predicted negative attitudes toward immigrants in countries where unemployment was quite high; unemployment is an example of a competitive threat.

Recent work has focused on testing the theoretical underpinnings of the Dual Processing Model in which the interaction between personality and worldview produce levels of Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation that, when primed with particular types of threats, create prejudicial attitudes. Sibley, Duckitt, Berghm Osborne, Perry, Asbrock, Robertson, Armstrong, Wilson, and Barlow (2013) examined how individual differences interact with the environment to predict levels of prejudice in unique ways. Participants' world view was assessed, and then the participants were primed with a threat that would directly motivate their prejudicial attitudes, e.g., how many immigrants were residing in their community. Sibley et al. (2013), found that participants who believed the world to be a competitive jungle--a hallmark of people who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale—and, who live in affluent communities expressed negative attitudes toward immigrants living in their community. These participants were reacting to the threat of a successful new arrival which was challenging

resources and status. The researchers did not, however, find a relationship between a competitive worldview and the number of immigrants living in an economically depressed community. Competition for housing in these communities may not have been the type of threat to illicit a negative response. In the same study, Sibley et al. (2013) also found that people who believe the world to be dangerous, the worldview of individuals who score high on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale, saw immigrants as disrupting social stability and conformity, regardless of whether they (the participants) lived in an affluent community with immigrants or an economically depressed neighborhood. The real and perceived deviance from the cultural norms that new arrivals represent was a salient threat for these participants, producing negative attitudes toward immigrants.

While these studies have not yet determined the types of competitive threat to which people high in Social Dominance Orientation respond (low-status groups versus competition over resources), they have established that people who score higher on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale and the Social Dominance Orientation scale do perceive and express prejudicial attitudes based on different kinds of threats. A question for the current study is whether immigrants will trigger different kinds of threats for people who score higher on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale and Social Dominance Orientation scale and, if so, would this then elicit different decisions about immigration policies?

To date, there have been few studies that look at the intersectionality between the development of biased attitudes, and the impact on specific policy. Social psychologists study attitude formation, specifically the development of negative attitudes with the goal to change those attitudes. If policies are even addressed it is from a macro perspective; for example, the impact immigration has on schools overall, health care, and jobs; without testing specific policies

and how they impact individuals. This study is different in that both attitude formation is examined as well as the relationship those attitudes have to specific immigration policies.

Current study


The present study directly re-tested Duckitt's Dual Process Model (DPM) on the interaction between Social Dominance Orientation, Right Wing Authoritarianism, and threats as they relate to feelings towards immigrants. It evaluated whether people high in Social Dominance Orientation or Right Wing Authoritarianism express more bias toward immigrants than those low on either scale and test whether realistic and symbolic threats mediate the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation, Right Wing Authoritarianism and feeling towards immigrants and immigration policy.

In addition to re-testing the Dual Process Model as it relates to attitudes towards immigrants, this study examined whether the Dual Process Model can be extended to predict who will support anti-immigration policy (see Figure 2). As stated above, while people who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarian scales find immigrants threatening for different reasons, both groups have similar negative attitudes towards immigrants. This study hypothesized that these two groups of people would also have similar attitudes towards immigration policies. Additionally, this study examined the role an immigrant's legal status plays in justifying one's feelings towards immigrants and restrictionist policy. It is not uncommon for community members to express sympathy towards undocumented immigrants but in turn, mention the fact that they are here "illegally" as a reason why they support restrictionist policy. A key question remains whether people will support restrictionist policies that limit not only the rights of undocumented immigrants but also the rights of all individuals in the country. An example is whether participants will support laws

such as Arizona's SB 1070 in which the police can use their discretion to question a person's citizenship, thus forcing both noncitizens and citizens to provide that information. Thus would the perception of immigrants as a threat be more salient to some participants so that they would support policies that could limit their civil rights as well?

Figure 2.

Extension of Duckitt's (2001) Dual Process Model tested in the current study.



Methods

Participants completed a set of six survey measures that assessed their Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation level, and their attitudes towards immigrants and policies. After completing these survey measures, participants were asked to read two brief

vignettes and answer a series of questions about the vignettes. Finally, participants completed a brief demographic measure.

Participants

Amazon's MTurk

Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is an online recruiting website where you can recruit large numbers of participants by paying them a small amount of money, usually less than \$1.00, to complete a study. MTurk allows you to only offer your survey to particular participants based on country of origin, region, state, demographics, and completion rate of past MTurk work (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Participants who meet the qualifications for your study read a brief description of what you are asking them to do, how long it will take them to complete and how much compensation you are offering. If a participant is interested, they will click a link where more detailed instructions will be listed as well as directions for accessing your study. Interested participants will accept your "HIT," which is how MTurk tracks who has participated in what activity. Because in MTurk each worker ID must correspond to a unique credit card it is difficult for one person to take a survey multiple times (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). To further guarantee against this or against bots¹¹ being used, questions or authentication steps can be included that are difficult for a bot to answer is one solution (Crump, McDonnell & Gureckis, 2012). For example, using a Captcha question¹² or requiring your participants to enter a unique code on MTurk that you give to them at the end of your survey so that they may receive compensation reduces the chance of the same person participating more

¹¹ A bot, short for robot is similar to a computer virus or Trojan horse program that allows someone to access your computer to perform automatic tasks for them like sending email spam, blasting websites or taking surveys.

¹² Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart: Captcha- Requires the user to type a series of random numbers and letters into a box to verify that it is an actual person entering information and not a computer (Engber, 2014).

than once in a study. In this study, participants were required to enter their MTurk ID number and a unique code that was provided to them upon completion of the measure as well as answer a series of attention check questions throughout the measure.¹³

Participant recruitment

Using McDonald's (2015) definition to determine voter eligibility, participants interested in this study were asked to verify that they were at least 18 years old, that to their knowledge, they are eligible to vote and that they were U.S. citizens who lived in the 50 states (participants entered their zip code on the survey). Provided that they met the qualifications for participation, they were directed to a link to the consent form and study. During the month of April 2016, 360 participants completed the study.

Addressing self-selection bias

This study was not immune to possible self-selection bias. Self-selection bias is when research participants decide whether to participate in your study based on a vested interest whether it be the subject matter and/or compensation for their time (Olsen, 2008). Since participants are self-selecting, the results may not be an accurate representation of the target population of interest in a study (Olsen, 2008). This study was described on the MTurk page as follows "The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between attitudes and immigration policy in the United States. You will be asked a series of questions about yourself and your opinions. The survey should only take you about 20 minutes to complete. Remember your answers will be used to say something important about public policy." In this study, self-

¹³ The attention check questions in the study asked participants to select a specific answer to a question. For example a question would read "If you are reading this questions, please select number 5 as your answer"

selection bias could mirror those who, motivated by the subject material, might likely vote for a politician or on a ballot initiative about immigration policy and civil liberties. With respect to compensation, while some MTurk participants do complete surveys as a revenue source, the small amount of money offered, along with attention checks built into the measure, provide researchers with a level of confidence that their participants are actively engaged in their study (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). In this study, participants were paid \$.50 for completing the survey, and there were attention check questions built into the measure. Data were collected from 360 participants, with a final sample of 315. Forty-five participants were eliminated due to threats to the authenticity of their responses, either because they were duplicate participants, they failed to answer most survey questions, they failed to pass built-in attention checks or some combination of these reasons. The final 315 participants were spread equally amongst the nine study conditions.¹⁴

Design and Procedure

At the start of each survey, participants read a description indicating that this would examine people's perceptions and attitudes about people living in the United States and about various governmental policies. Interested participants accepted my "HIT" and were directed to the consent form and study materials via a web link. Once on the study site, each participant read and electronically signed a consent form. If a participant had any specific questions about the consent form, they could press a tab that sent an email to me indicating their need for clarification (none did so). The first screen asked participants initial screener questions to see

¹⁴ Data was collected in waves. The first collection included all 360 participants. MTurk allows you to set a target goal for how many participants you want in each condition. During the first wave, 40 participants were collected in each condition for a total of 360. The anticipation was that some responses might have to be eliminated in each condition. The goal was to have 35 participants in each condition. As participants were eliminated, those conditions that required additional respondents were opened back up on MTurk. More data was not collected due to time and funding.

whether they would be eligible to vote. Participants who met voter eligibility were given access to the study. If they were ineligible for the study, they were thanked and redirected back to the MTurk site.

Description of Measures

Right Wing Authoritarianism

Each participant completed Altemeyer's (2007), Right Wing Authoritarian scale (see Appendix A) which consists of 22 statements rated on a Likert-type scale ranging from -4 (strongly disagree) to +4 (strongly agree). Positively worded items were reverse coded so that higher scores indicate greater levels of Right Wing Authoritarianism (see Appendix A for full scale). The responses for the items when totaled can range from 20-180 with a Cronbach's alpha¹⁵ of .90.

Social Dominance Orientation

Each participant completed Pratto and Sidanius's (1999), Social Dominance Orientation Scale SDO 6. The scale consists of 16 statements, rated on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (see Appendix B for full scale). Positively-worded items were reverse coded so that higher scores indicate greater levels of Social Dominance Orientation. The responses for the items when totaled and averaged can range from and Social Dominance Orientation score of 1 to 7. When initially tested, Pratto et al. (1994) found over 12 independent samples with an average Cronbach's alpha of .83.

¹⁵ Cronbach's alpha is a measure of internal consistency of a scale. If all items on a scale are measuring the same concept, the Cronbach's alpha will be higher. The higher the alpha the more reliable your measure is. A scale can produce a Cronbach's alpha between 0 and 1. The closer to 1 the more reliable a scale is.

Attitudes Towards Immigrants

Based on items used by Danso, Sedlovskaya, and Suanda (2007), a modified version of their 28-item scale on immigration attitudes were given to all participants (see Appendix C). This new scale assesses respondents' perceptions of immigrants and the effect they have on the country. All but two of the original items from the Danso et al. (2007) scale were used on this measure. The statements not used here were moved to the survey on immigration policy (*Legally admitted immigrants who can't find jobs should be sent back to their country and Legal immigrants who have been convicted of serious crimes should be sent back to their countries*). In addition to the 26 questions from Danso et al. (2007), four additional questions were added by the author (questions 7, 14, 24 and 30) to construct a 30-question measure called the Attitudes Toward Immigrants scale. Participants' responses to the statements were measured on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Scores on the measure could range from 30 to 210. Positively-worded items were reversed coded so that higher scores indicate more unfavorable attitudes towards immigrants.

Intergroup Competitiveness Scale

To test the results of Duckitt's (2006) model in which people who score higher on the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale and people who score higher on the Social Dominance Orientation scale respond to different kinds of threats, participants took Duckitt's (2006) Group Competitiveness scale that specifically identifies immigrants as the source of competition (see Appendix D). When originally introduced, Duckitt (2006) used six different groups of people as sources of threat on this scale (rock stars, drug dealers, physically disabled, housewives, unemployed, and feminists). Subsequently, Duckitt (2001, 2006) has used the scale to measure

the level of competitive threat people feel from immigrants. Dependent upon the group, the scale produced Cronbach's alphas between .75 to .89.

Realistic and Symbolic Threat Scales

Using the scale developed by Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman (1999), the 15-item measure was used to capture the symbolic and realistic threats posed by the perceived differences between participants and immigrant groups (see Appendix E). Participants' responses to the statements were measured on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). Scores on the measure could range from 15-150. Positively-worded items were reverse coded so that higher scores indicate more threat attributed to immigrants. The 15-item scale used in this study was originally used to test perceptions of Asian, Cuban and Mexican immigrants. The first seven questions measure realistic threats and have a Cronbach's alpha of 0.80 for Asian immigrants, 0.81 for Cuban immigrants and 0.82 for Mexican immigrants. The last eight items measure symbolic threats with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.46 for Asian immigrants, 0.71 for Cuban immigrants and 0.68 for Mexican immigrants. Stephan et al. (1999) argue that despite some low Cronbach alphas the scale is still acceptable. The variation in reliability is due to the attitudes that participants hold towards certain ethnic and racial groups rather than a problem with the measure.

Immigration Policy Scale

Based on current immigration policies either proposed or in place in states, municipalities and the federal government, a 35-item measure was developed by the author to capture participant agreement with various immigration policies (see Appendix F). Participants' responses to the statements were measured on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Scores on the measure could range from 35-210. Positively

worded items were reversed coded so that higher scores indicate more support for restrictionist immigration policies. Upon analysis of the data collected the measure produced a Cronbach's alpha of .927. Using Principal Component Analysis,¹⁶ initial inquiry suggests that this measure can be reduced in size. However, both for the purposes of Principle Component Analysis and Factor Analysis more subject samples need to be collected.

Immigration Policy Vignettes

Participants were randomly assigned to read two vignettes (see Appendix G). The first vignette described an interaction between a police officer and "person M" who does not have proper identification on their person when pulled over for a broken tail light. Person M's country of origin was manipulated. A third of the participants read a vignette in which person M was from Mexico, another third of participants read a vignette in which person M was from Ireland, another third read the vignette in which Person M was from Korea. Participants were asked what the police officer should do in the situation considering the information in the vignette.

The second vignette described a situation in which Person A learns that they are not a U.S. citizen. Person A is described as a hard-working college student who wants to devote their career to working with military personnel. The vignette manipulates Person A's involvement with delinquent and criminal acts. Participants were asked whether Person A should be deported or given a pathway to citizenship.

¹⁶ Principal Component Analysis is used to summarize information from a set of variables and reduce them to a fewer number of components. Factor analysis is designed to test an existing theory or if you wish to test a theoretical model of latent factors causing observed variables.

Demographic Measure

Participants completed a basic demographic survey which measured relevant demographic variables that map onto attitudes towards immigration including education level, employment status, race, ethnicity, gender, immigration status, and residency (see Appendix H).

Results

Scale information

Three hundred and fifteen participants answered a series of questions on six different scales: Right Wing Authoritarian Scale (RWA), Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO), Attitudes Towards Immigrants Scale (ATI), Intergroup Competition Scale (ICS), Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale (RST), and the Immigration Policy Scale (IPS). Table 1 lists the means and standard deviations of each scale, and the correlations between those scales.

The Right Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA) produced a mean score of 72.25 with a standard deviation of 38.31. This sample produced an average score lower than what is generally found in other samples which produce average scores of around 90 (Altemeyer, 2006). However, the large standard deviation does indicate considerable variability in the sample with some people being very authoritarian and others are not. The Social Dominance Scale (SDO) produced an average of $M=2.82$ and SD of 1.33. In piloting their scale, Sidanius & Pratto (1999), found that Social Dominance Orientation scores ranged from a low of $M=1.85$ with an $SD=0.64$ for Bay Area California voters and a high of $M=2.49$ with an $SD=0.88$ for Stanford University students.

The mean scores on the Intergroup Competition and the Realistic Symbolic Threat scales falls within the midpoint without a large amount of variation. The Attitudes Towards

Immigrants and Immigration Policy scales also fall within the midpoint; however, there is a great amount of variability seen in the standard deviations of both scales.

Correlations were found between all the scales. This was expected and provides preliminary evidence of the presence of the original Dual Process Model's ability to predict attitudes towards immigrants as well as the extension to predict attitudes towards policy.

Research Question #1: Test of Duckitt's (2001) Dual Process Model on attitudes towards immigrants and on attitudes towards immigration policy

A series of hypotheses addressed the replicability and extension of Duckitt's Dual Process Model for predicting attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy. People high on either the Right Wing Authoritarian or Social Dominance Orientation scale have been shown to have more negative attitudes towards immigrants, but the path from those attitudes to opinions on policy decisions had not been explored. Based on that literature, several hypotheses were tested.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 1: Will a person's Social Dominance Orientation level affect their attitudes towards immigrants and their support for restrictionist immigration policy? This hypothesis was analyzed by conducting two simple linear regressions, one between *Social Dominance Orientation* levels and participant scores on the *Attitude Toward Immigrants* and the second between *Social Dominance Orientation* levels and participant scores on the *Immigration Policy Scale*.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 1: Linear Regression 1. A simple linear regression was calculated to predict a participant's score based on Social Dominance Orientation score. A significant regression was found ($F_{(1,314)} = 112.935, p < .001$), with an $r = .515$, for which

26.50% of the variance in a participants' Attitudes Towards Immigrants score can be explained by their Social Dominance Orientation score. Participants' predicted Attitudes Towards Immigrants score is equal to $59.853 + 15.998$. Participants' average Attitudes Towards Immigrants score increased by 15.998 points for each point increase in Social Dominance Orientation score.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 1: Linear Regression 2. A second simple linear regression was calculated to predict a participants' Immigration Policy score based on Social Dominance Orientation score. A significant regression was found here as well ($F(1,314) = 80.33, p < .001$), with a $r = .452$ for which their Social Dominance Orientation score can explain 20% of the variance in a participants' Immigration Policy score. Participants' predicted Immigration Policy score is equal to $89.486 + 10.254$. Participants' average Immigration Policy score increased by 10.254 points for each increase in Social Dominance Orientation score.

To compare the influence of Social Dominance Orientation on each attitude (immigrant and immigrations policy), the respective regression coefficients were compared using the formula recommended by Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and Piquero (1998). A significant difference was found with a $z = 16.52, p < .01$. Social Dominance Orientation levels had more of an influence on Attitudes Towards Immigrants levels than on Immigration Policy scores. Please see Tables 2-4 for t test and z-score results.

Research Question 1, Hypothesis 2: Will a person's Right Wing Authoritarianism level affect their attitudes towards immigrants and their support for restrictionist immigration policy? This hypothesis was analyzed by conducting two simple linear

regressions, one between *Right Wing Authoritarianism* levels and participant scores on the *Attitudes Towards Immigrants Scale* and the second between *Right Wing Authoritarianism* levels and participant scores on the *Immigration Policy Scale*.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 2: Linear Regression 1. A simple linear regression was calculated to predict a participants' Attitudes Towards Immigrants score based on Right Wing Authoritarianism score. A significant regression was found ($F(1, 314) = 199.821$, $p < .001$), with an $r = .625$. for which 39% of the variance in a participants' Attitudes Towards Immigrants score can be explained by their Right Wing Authoritarianism score. Participants' predicted Attitudes Towards Immigrants score is equal to $56.336 + 0.673$. Participants' mean Attitudes Towards Immigrants score increased by 0.673 points for each point increase in Right Wing Authoritarianism score.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 2: Linear Regression 2: A second simple linear regression was calculated to predict a participants' Immigration Policy score based on Right Wing Authoritarianism score. A significant regression was found here as well ($F(1, 314) = 128.929$, $p < .001$), with a $r = .540$ for which 29% of the variance in a participants' Immigration Policy score can be explained by their Right Wing Authoritarianism score. Participants' predicted Immigration Policy score is equal to $187.671 + 0.426$. Participants' average Immigration Policy score increased by 0.426 points for each point increase in Right Wing Authoritarianism score.

Using the formula recommended by Paternoster et al. (1998), for finding the difference between regression coefficients, a significant $z = 19.98$, $p < .01$ was found. Right Wing Authoritarianism levels had more of an influence on Attitudes Towards Immigrants levels than on Immigration Policy scores.

Using the formula recommended by Paternoster et al. (1998), for finding the difference between regression coefficients a significant $z = 8.59, p < .01$ was found. Social Dominance Orientation levels had more of an influence on Immigration Policy scores than did Right Wing Authoritarianism. The same result was found on the Attitudes Towards Immigrants scale as well $z = 10.18, p < .01$

Research Question 1, Hypothesis 3: Will there be a difference between people who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale and those who score high on the Right Wing Authoritarianism in their support for certain immigration policies?

Overall the total unstandardized regression coefficient for Right Wing Authoritarianism did not have the same influence on predicting scores on the Immigration Policy scale as the Social Dominance Orientation; the same pattern held for each question. While both Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation were predictive of responses on every item except one of the Immigration Policy scale, Social Dominance Orientation was more influential overall than RWA. The one question that was non-significant for Right Wing Authoritarianism, but significant for Social Dominance Orientation was that “Both private and public employers should be required to hire employees who are bilingual.” Please see Table 4 for full results.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 4: Will people high in Social Dominance Orientation have higher scores on the Intergroup Competition scale than those high in Right Wing Authoritarianism?

A simple linear regression was calculated to predict a participants' Intergroup Competition score based on Social Dominance Orientation score. A significant regression was found ($F(1, 313) = 81.598, p < .001$), with a $r = .455$ for which their Social Dominance Orientation score can explain 21% of the variance in a participants' Intergroup Competition

score. Participants' predicted Intergroup Competition score is equal to $116.05+3.56$. Participants' average Intergroup Competition score increased by 3.56 points for each point increase in Social Dominance Orientation score. A second simple linear regression was calculated to predict a participants' Intergroup Competition score based on Right Wing Authoritarianism score. A significant correlation was found here as well ($F(1, 313) = 122.83, p < .001$), with a $r = .531$ for which 28% of the variance in a participants' Intergroup Competition score can be explained by their Right Wing Authoritarianism score. Participants' predicted Intergroup Competition score is equal to $15.67+0.14$. Participants' average Intergroup Competition score increased by 0.14 points for each point increase in Right Wing Authoritarianism score.

Using Paternoster et al. (1998) formula for finding the difference between regression coefficients a significant difference was found $z = 8.67, p < .01$. Social Dominance Orientation levels had more of an influence on Intergroup Competition than did Right Wing Authoritarianism.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 5: Do people who have higher scores on the realistic and symbolic threat scale or the intergroup competition scale have more negative attitudes toward immigrants and support more restrictionist policies?

Table 5 shows the results of how each scale predicted scores on the Attitudes Towards Immigrants scale (ATI). Table 6 shows the same regression results with the dependent variable now being Immigration Policy Scale. Based on the regression analyses people who have higher scores on the realistic and symbolic threat scale or the intergroup competition scale have more negative attitudes toward immigrants and support more restrictionist policies.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 5: Which scale is more influential? All four predictor variables significantly predicted scores on the Immigration Policy scale as well as the Attitudes

Towards Immigrants scale, please see Tables 5 and 6. The remaining question is which scale is most influential in making those predictions on each respective DV. Simply looking at the unstandardized coefficients is not the best method since each scale is slightly different. Using Paternoster et al.'s. (1998) formula for comparing regression results across scales the following was found in Tables 7 and 8. All four scales (Social Dominance Orientation, Right Wing Authoritarianism, Intergroup Competition and Realistic Symbolic Threat) were good at predicting which participants would have negative attitudes towards immigrants and support restrictionist policy, but the Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale was the best at making said predictions.

Comparisons were also conducted between each scale and its influence on each DV. For instance, is the Realistic Symbolic Threat scale more of an influence on Attitudes Towards Immigrants or Immigration Policy scale? As noted earlier, both Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) have more of an influence on Attitudes Towards Immigrants scores rather than Immigration Policy scale. This result remains true for the other four scales as well ($SDO z=3.04$; $RWA z=4.08$; $ICS z=9.242$; $RST z=6.47$)

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 6: Does a participants' attitudes toward immigrants predict their attitudes toward immigration policy? A simple linear regression was calculated to predict a participants' Immigration Policy score based on Attitudes Towards Immigrants score. A significant regression was found ($F(1, 313) = 781.17, p < .001$), with a $r = .845$ for which 71% of the variance in a participants' Immigration Policy score can be explained by their Attitudes Towards Immigrants score. Participants' predicted Immigration Policy score is equal to $53.63 + .62$. Participants' average Immigration Policy score increased by 0.62 points for each point increase in Attitudes Towards Immigrants score.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 7: Does a participants' attitude towards immigration policy predict their attitude towards immigrants? A simple linear regression was calculated to predict a participants' Attitudes Towards Immigrants score based on their Immigration Policy score. A significant regression was found here ($F(1, 313) = 781.17, p < .001$), with a $r = .845$ for which 71% of the variance in a participants' Attitudes Towards Immigrants score can be explained by their Immigration Policy score. Participants' predicted Attitudes Towards Immigrants score is equal to $-32.01 + 1.16$. Participants' mean Attitudes Towards Immigrants score increased by 1.16 points for each point increase in Immigration Policy score.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Does the Realistic Symbolic Threat, and Intergroup Competition scales mediate the relationship between Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation to Attitudes Towards Immigrants and Immigration Policy scale? A series of mediation analyses were run to test the pathways between Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism to Attitudes Towards Immigrants and the Immigration Policy scale. The Dual Process Model suggests different pathways for Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism. To test for mediation, the four-step approach introduced by Baron & Kenney (1986), was employed. Step 1 is to conduct a simple linear regression between the IV and DV. Step 2 is to carry out a simple linear regression between the IV and Mediator. Step 3 is to conduct a simple linear regression between the mediator to DV. The purpose of these first three steps is to establish that these relationships are statistically significant. If any of these relationships are non-significant, one can conclude that mediation is not necessary (Baron & Kenney, 1986). The final step of the mediation analysis will be to conduct a multiple regression with the IV and mediator predicting the DV. If the regression coefficient between the IV and DV is zero, there is full mediation, and if the

regression coefficient between the IV and DV has been reduced from the original regression equation, partial mediation occurred.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 1: Social Dominance Orientation to Intergroup Competition to the Immigration Policy Scale. The mediational hypothesis was supported, please see Figure 3. The predictor variable Social Dominance Orientation was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (Intergroup Competition; $r=.455$, $F(1,313) = 81.60$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (Immigration Policy Score); $r=.452$, $F(1, 313) = 80.33$, $p < .001$. Additionally, Intergroup Competition was significantly related to Immigration Policy Score; $r=.779$, $F(1, 313) = 482.42$, $p < .001$. A multiple linear regression was performed to test for mediation with Social Dominance Orientation and Intergroup Competition as predictor variables and Immigration Policy as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.786$, $F(2, 312) = 3252.97$, $p < .001$. Intergroup Competition's relationship with Immigration Policy remained significant even while controlling for Social Dominance Orientation; $Beta = .723$; $t = 18.41$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation and Immigration Policy Score was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .123$; $t = 3.14$, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .452$, $t=8.96$ $p<.001$). These results suggest partial mediation.

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 2: Right Wing Authoritarianism to Intergroup Competition to Immigration Policy. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full set of scores. The predictor variable Right Wing Authoritarianism was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (*Intergroup Competition*; $r=.531$, $F(1,313) = 122.83$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (Immigration Policy Score); $r=.540$, $F(1, 313) = 128.93$, $p < .001$). Additionally, Intergroup Competition was significantly related to Immigration

Policy Score; $r=.779$, $F(1, 313) = 482.42$, $p <.001$. A multiple linear regression was performed to test for mediation with Right Wing Authoritarianism and Intergroup Competition as predictor variables and Immigration Policy as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.793$, $F(2, 312) = 264.314$, $p <.001$. Intergroup Competition's relationship with Immigration Policy remained significant even while controlling for Right Wing Authoritarianism; $Beta = .685$; $t = 18.41$, $p <.001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Right Wing Authoritarianism and Immigration Policy Score was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .176$; $t = 4.34$, $p <.001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .540$, $t=11.36$ $p<.001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 4).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 3: Social Dominance Orientation to Intergroup Competition to Attitudes Towards Immigrants. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full data set as well. The predictor variable Social Dominance Orientation was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (*Intergroup Competition*; $r=.455$, $F(1,313) = 81.60$, $p <.001$) and the outcome variable (*Attitude Towards Immigrants*; $r=.515$, $F(1, 313) = 112, 94$, $p <001$). Additionally, Intergroup Competition was significantly related to Attitudes toward immigrants; $r=.900$, $F(1, 313) = 1328.83$, $p <.001$. In order to test for mediation, a multiple linear regression was conducted with Social Dominance Orientation and Intergroup Competition as predictor variables and Attitudes towards immigrants as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.904$ $F(2, 312) = 701.051$, $p <.001$. Intergroup Competition's relationship with Attitude towards immigrants remained significant even while controlling for Social Dominance Orientation; $Beta = .859$; $t = 32.54$, $p <.001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation and Attitudes towards immigrants was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .101$; $t =$

3.84, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .515$; $t = 10.63$, $p < .001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 5).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 4: Right Wing Authoritarianism to Intergroup Competition to Attitudes Towards Immigrants. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full set of scores. The predictor variable Right Wing Authoritarianism was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (*Intergroup Competition*; $r = .531$, $F(1, 313) = 122.83$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (Attitudes toward immigrants); $r = .624$, $F(1, 313) = 199.821$, $p < .001$. Additionally, Intergroup Competition was significantly related to Attitudes towards immigrants; $r = .900$, $F(1, 313) = 1328.833$, $p < .001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Right Wing Authoritarianism and Intergroup Competition as predictor variables and Attitudes toward immigrants as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r = .916$, $F(2, 312) = 814.712$, $p < .001$. Intergroup Competition's relationship with Attitudes towards immigrants remained significant even while controlling for Right Wing Authoritarianism; $Beta = .791$; $t = 29.55$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Right Wing Authoritarianism and Attitudes towards immigrants was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .204$; $t = 7.62$, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .624$, $t = 14.14$, $p < .001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 6).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 5: Right Wing Authoritarianism to Realistic Symbolic Threat to the Immigration Policy scale. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full set of scores. The predictor variable Right Wing Authoritarianism was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (*Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale*; $r = .470$, $F(1, 313) = 88.547$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (*Immigration Policy Score*); $r = .540$, $F(1, 313) = 128.93$, $p < .001$. Additionally, Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale was significantly related

to Immigration Policy Score; $r=.736$, $F(1, 313) = 370.312$, $p < .001$. A multiple linear regression was conducted with Right Wing Authoritarianism and Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale as predictor variables and Immigration Policy as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.768$, $F(2, 312) = 224.894$, $p < .001$. Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale's relationship with Immigration Policy remained significant even while controlling for Right Wing Authoritarianism; $Beta = .619$; $t = 15.09$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Right Wing Authoritarianism and Immigration Policy Score was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .249$; $t = 6.078$, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .540$, $t=11.36$ $p<.001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 7).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 6: Right Wing Authoritarianism to Symbolic Threats to the Immigration Policy Scale. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full set of scores. The predictor variable Right Wing Authoritarianism was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (*Symbolic Threats*; $r=.410$, $F(1,313) = 63.164$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (*Immigration Policy Scale*); $r=.540$, $F(1, 313) = 128.93$, $p < .001$). Additionally, Symbolic Threats was significantly related to Immigration Policy Score; $r=.687$, $F(1, 313) = 279.946$, $p < .001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Right Wing Authoritarianism and Symbolic Threats as predictor variables and Immigration Policy as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.743$, $F(2, 312) = 192.585$, $p < .001$. Symbolic Threats relationship with Immigration Policy remained significant even while controlling for Right Wing Authoritarianism; $Beta = .560$; $t = 13.482$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Right Wing Authoritarianism and Immigration Policy Score was weaker in this analysis ($Beta =$

.311; $t = 6.078, p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .540, t=11.36 p<.001$).

These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 8)

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 7: Right Wing Authoritarianism to Real Threats to the Immigration Policy Scale. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full set of scores. The predictor variable Right Wing Authoritarianism was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (*Real Threats*; $r=.476, F(1,313) = 91.59, p <.001$) and the outcome variable (Immigration Policy Score); $r=.540, F(1, 313) = 128.93, p <.001$. Additionally, Real Threats were significantly related to Immigration Policy Score; $r=.698, F(1, 313) = 298.207, p <.001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Right Wing Authoritarianism and Real Threats as predictor variables and Immigration Policy as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.737, F(2, 312) = 185.888, p <.001$. Real Threats relationship with Immigration Policy remained significant even while controlling for Right Wing Authoritarianism; $Beta = .571; t = 13.126, p <.001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Right Wing Authoritarianism and Immigration Policy Score was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .269; t = 6.178, p <.001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .540, t=11.36 p<.001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 9).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 8: Social Dominance Orientation to Realistic Symbolic Threat to the Immigration Policy Scale. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full set of scores. The predictor variable Social Dominance Orientation was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (*Realistic-Symbolic Threat Scale*; $r=.353, F(1,313) = 44.533, p <.001$) and the outcome variable (Immigration Policy Score); $r=.452, F(1, 313) = 80.33, p <.001$. Additionally, the Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale was significantly

related to Immigration Policy Score; $r=.736$, $F(1, 313) = 370.312$, $p < .001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Social Dominance Orientation and the Realistic Symbolic Threat scale as predictor variables and Immigration Policy as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.764$, $F(2, 312) = 219.082$, $p < .001$. The Realistic Symbolic Threat scale's relationship with Immigration Policy remained significant even while controlling for Social Dominance Orientation; $Beta = .659$; $t = 16.881$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation and Immigration Policy Score was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .219$; $t = 5.623$, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .452$, $t=8.96$ $p < .001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 10).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 9: Social Dominance Orientation to Symbolic Threats to the Immigration Policy Scale. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full set of scores. The predictor variable Social Dominance Orientation was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (*Symbolic threats*; $r=.315$, $F(1,313) = 34.432$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (*Immigration Policy Score*); $r=.452$, $F(1, 313) = 80.33$, $p < .001$. Additionally, Symbolic threats was significantly related to Immigration Policy Score; $r=.687$, $F(1, 313) = 279.946$, $p < .001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Social Dominance Orientation and the Symbolic threats as predictor variables and Immigration Policy as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.731$, $F(2, 312) = 178.579$, $p < .001$. The Symbolic threat's relationship with Immigration Policy remained significant even while controlling for Social Dominance Orientation; $Beta = .605$; $t = 14.849$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation and Immigration Policy Score was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .262$; $t =$

56.421.623, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .452$, $t=8.96$ $p<.001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 11).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 10: Social Dominance

Orientation to Real Threats to the Immigration Policy Scale. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full set of scores. The predictor variable Social Dominance Orientation was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (Real threats; $r=.349$, $F(1,313) = 43.535$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (Immigration Policy Score); $r=.452$, $F(1, 313) = 80.33$, $p < .001$. Additionally, Real threats were significantly related to Immigration Policy Score; $r=.698$, $F(1, 313) = 298.207$ $p < .001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Social Dominance Orientation and the Real threats as predictor variables and Immigration Policy as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.733$, $F(2, 312) = 1181.006$, $p < .001$. The real threat's relationship with Immigration Policy remained significant even while controlling for Social Dominance Orientation; $Beta = .616$; $t = 14.979$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation and Immigration Policy Score was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .237$; $t = 56.421.623$, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .452$, $t=5.759$ $p<.001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 12).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 11: Right Wing Authoritarianism

to Realistic Symbolic Threat to Attitudes Towards Immigrants. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full set of scores. The predictor variable Right Wing Authoritarianism was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (Realistic Symbolic threat scale; $r=.470$, $F(1,313) = 88.547$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (Attitudes toward immigrants); $r=.624$, $F(1, 313) = 199.821$, $p < .001$. Additionally, Realistic Symbolic threats

were significantly related to Attitudes towards immigrants; $r=.816$, $F(1, 313) = 623.699$, $p < .001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Right Wing Authoritarianism and Realistic Symbolic threat as predictor variables and Attitudes toward immigrants as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.860$, $F(2, 312) = 444.883$, $p < .001$. Realistic-symbolic threat's relationship with Attitudes towards immigrants remained significant even while controlling for Right Wing Authoritarianism; $Beta = .671$; $t = 20.53$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Right Wing Authoritarianism and Attitudes towards immigrants was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .309$; $t = 9.464$, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .624$, $t=14.14$ $p < .001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 13).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 12: Right Wing Authoritarianism to Symbolic Threats to Attitudes Towards Immigrants. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full set of scores. The predictor variable Right Wing Authoritarianism was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (Symbolic threat scale; $r=.351$, $F(1,313) = 43.875$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (Attitudes toward immigrants); $r=.624$, $F(1, 313) = 199.821$, $p < .001$. Additionally, Symbolic threats were significantly related to Attitudes towards immigrants; $r=.775$, $F(1, 313) = 469.906$, $p < .001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Right Wing Authoritarianism and Symbolic threat as predictor variables and Attitudes toward immigrants as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.845$, $F(2, 312) = 388.111$, $p < .001$. Symbolic threat's relationship with Attitudes towards immigrants remained significant even while controlling for Right Wing Authoritarianism; $Beta = .624$; $t = 20.53$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Right Wing Authoritarianism and Attitudes towards immigrants was weaker in this analysis

($Beta = .369$; $t = 11.093$, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .624$, $t=14.14$ $p<.001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 14).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 13: Right Wing Authoritarianism to Real Threats to Attitudes Towards Immigrants. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full set of scores. The predictor variable Right Wing Authoritarianism was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (Realistic threats); $r=.477$, $F(1,313) = 91.59$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (Attitudes toward immigrants); $r=.624$, $F(1, 313) = 199.821$, $p < .001$. Additionally, Realistic threats were significantly related to Attitudes towards immigrants; $r=.770$, $F(1, 313) = 456.779$, $p < .001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Right Wing Authoritarianism and Realistic threats as predictor variables and Attitudes toward immigrants as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.824$, $F(2, 312) = 44330.342$, $p < .001$. Realistic threat's relationship with Attitudes towards immigrants remained significant even while controlling for Right Wing Authoritarianism; $Beta = .612$; $t = 16.783$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Right Wing Authoritarianism and Attitudes towards immigrants was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .333$; $t = 9.138$, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .624$, $t=14.14$ $p<.001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 15).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 14: Social Dominance Orientation to Realistic Symbolic Threat to Attitudes Towards Immigrants. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full data set as well. The predictor variable Social Dominance Orientation was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (Realistic-Symbolic Threat Scale; $r=.353$, $F(1,313) = 44.533$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (Attitude Towards Immigrants ; $r=.515$, $F(1, 313) = 112, 94$, $p < .001$).

Additionally, Realistic-Symbolic Threat Scale was significantly related to Attitudes toward immigrants; $r=.816$, $F(1, 313) = 623.699$, $p < .001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Social Dominance Orientation and Realistic-Symbolic Threat Scale as predictor variables and Attitudes towards immigrants as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.851$ $F(2, 312) = 410.606$, $p < .001$. Realistic-Symbolic Threat Scale relationship with Attitude towards immigrants remained significant even while controlling for Social Dominance Orientation; $Beta = .725$; $t = 22.82$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation and Attitudes towards immigrants was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .259$; $t = 8.165$, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .515$; $t=10.63$, $p < .001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 16).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 15: Social Dominance

Orientation to Symbolic Threats to Attitudes Towards Immigrants. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full data set as well. The predictor variable Social Dominance Orientation was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (*Symbolic Threat Scale*; $r=.315$, $F(1,313) = 34.432$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (*Attitude Towards Immigrants* ; $r=.515$, $F(1, 313) = 112, 94$, $p < .001$). Additionally, Symbolic Threat Scale was significantly related to Attitudes toward immigrants; $r=.775$, $F(1, 313) = 469.906$, $p < .001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Social Dominance Orientation and Symbolic Threat Scale as predictor variables and Attitudes towards immigrants as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r=.826$ $F(2, 312) = 334.175$, $p < .001$. Symbolic Threat Scale relationship with Attitude towards immigrants remained significant even while controlling for Social Dominance Orientation; $Beta = .680$; $t =$

20.21, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation and Attitudes towards immigrants was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .301$; $t = 8.941$, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .515$; $t = 10.63$, $p < .001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 17).

Research Question 1: Hypothesis 8: Mediation analysis 16: Social Dominance

Orientation to Real Threats to Attitudes Towards Immigrants. The mediational hypothesis was supported using the full data set as well. The predictor variable Social Dominance Orientation was significantly related to both the proposed mediator (*Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale*; $r = .349$, $F(1, 313) = 43.535$, $p < .001$) and the outcome variable (*Attitude Towards Immigrants*; $r = .515$, $F(1, 313) = 112.94$, $p < .001$). Additionally, Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale was significantly related to Attitudes toward immigrants; $r = .770$, $F(1, 313) = 456.779$, $p < .001$. To test for mediation, I conducted a multiple linear regression and entered Social Dominance Orientation and Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale as predictor variables and Attitudes towards immigrants as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant; $r = .814$, $F(2, 312) = 305.786$, $p < .001$. Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale relationship with Attitude towards immigrants remained significant even while controlling for Social Dominance Orientation; $Beta = .673$; $t = 19.15$, $p < .001$. Most importantly, the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation and Attitudes towards immigrants was weaker in this analysis ($Beta = .280$; $t = 7.971$, $p < .001$) compared to the direct relationship ($Beta = .515$; $t = 10.63$, $p < .001$). These results suggest partial mediation (see Figure 18)

Analysis of Vignettes

Vignette #1 Should the police officer ask the driver for proof that they are in the United States with authorization?

Vignette #1: Research Question 1: Did the ethnicity or country of origin of the driver affect participant response to whether the police officer should ask Person M for proof of citizenship or legal residency? This hypothesis was analyzed using a Chi-Square test of independence. Overall, 112 participants believed the officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency (*Ireland n= 37, Korea n= 39 and Mexico n= 36*) and 203 participants who said that the officer should not ask for the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency (*Ireland n= 55, Korea n= 73 and Mexico n= 75*). A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between whether a police officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency and the country the driver was from. There was no significant difference between the expected number of participants who thought the officer should ask for proof of citizenship or legal residency and the observed number, nor was there a significant difference for the country of origin. See Table 9 for demographic variables.

Vignette# 1: Research Question #2: Did the ethnicity or country of origin of the driver effect why participants indicated the police officer should ask the person for proof of citizenship or legal residency? For the 112 participants who thought the police officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency, a chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between why the officer should ask for identification and the driver's country of origin. There was no significant difference between the expected number of participants who thought the officer should ask for proof of citizenship or legal residency and the observed number because of the participant's country of origin. There were no correlations between why the police officer should ask and any demographics or scale, hence no need for a logistic regression to predict whom the people are who say everyone should be asked versus because he or she is an immigrant. Over half the sample stated that the reason a

police officer should ask for proof of citizenship or legal residency is that this should be done for all drivers who lack identification ($n=59$); not just those the police officer believes is an immigrant ($n= 53$).

Vignette #1: Research Question #3: Do participants who think the police officer should ask all drivers for proof of citizenship or legal residency differ from those who believe the officer should only do so when they suspect the driver is an undocumented immigrant on any of the six scales (Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, Realistic Symbolic Threat, Intergroup Competition, Attitudes Towards Immigrants or the Immigration Policy Scale) in the Dual Process Model ? When the 112 participants who were compared on all 6 scales using an independent t-test, there were no significant differences between participants who said everyone should be asked vs. those who thought the police officer should suspect that the driver is an immigrant.

When the 112 participants were compared to the rest of the sample who did not believe the officer should ask for identification, however, there were several significant differences (see Table 11). Specifically, the 112 participants producing higher mean scores on all six scales. Finally, for those participants who thought the police officer should query driver because the person might be an undocumented immigrant, many reasons were given including lack of driver's license, no official identification, driver did not know their social security number, and/or the car's registration and insurance were in someone else's name. None of the participants stated that it was because the driver was born outside of the United States.

It should be noted, that when a chi-square test is larger than a 2x2 table, the source of statistical significance becomes unclear. In order to make the interpretative process clearer when there is statistical significance, the most recommended technique is to collapse data where one

can (Sharpe, 2015). For all other contingency tables where this was not possible, the adjusted standardized residual was used¹⁷ (Sharpe, 2015).

Vignette #2: What should happen to a college student who finds out they are not authorized to be in the United States?

Vignette #2: Research Question #1: Does the student's prior criminal history (juvenile delinquency, juvenile delinquency with a pending DUI charge or no trouble) affect a participant's recommendation about whether Person A should be deported as opposed to receiving a green card or citizenship? Participants who read the vignette in which Person A had minor infractions with the police were hypothesized as more likely to be recommended for deportation than the target who was described as an ideal college student. This hypothesis was analyzed using a Chi-Square test of independence. See Table 9.

In looking at the adjusted residuals, the target student who was never in trouble was recommended for citizenship or a pathway to citizenship far more often than would have been expected and was recommended for deportation far less often.

For the student who was in minor trouble as a juvenile, the observed rates for whether she should be deported, given citizenship or a pathway to citizenship did not differ. However, for the student who had been in trouble both as a juvenile and now had received a DUI many more participants recommended deportation over a pathway to citizenship than what was expected. This indicates that how the student behaved plays a role in whether participants believed she should be deported.

Vignette #2: Research Question #2: Do any of the variables measured in the six scales (Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, Realistic Symbolic

¹⁷ According to Agresti (2007) an adjusted standardized residual having absolute value that exceeds about 2 when there are few cells or about 3 when there are many cells indicates lack of fit of H₀.

Threat, Intergroup Competition, Attitudes Towards Immigrants or the Immigration Policy Scale) differentiate those participants who decided that the student should be given citizenship, a pathway to citizenship or be deported in the Dual Process Model?

In order to test whether there were any significant differences in how participants who decided that the student should be given citizenship, a pathway to citizenship or deportation scored on the six scales a series of ANOVAs were performed. See Tables 11 and 12. All six analyses produced significant results.

A significant difference was found for the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale, $F(2, 311) = 12.93, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that people who wanted the student to be given immediate citizenship had the lowest mean Right Wing Authoritarianism score and those who wanted the student to be given a pathway to citizenship had a moderate mean Right Wing Authoritarianism score. Finally, participants who wanted the student to be immediately deported had the highest mean Right Wing Authoritarianism score.

The Social Dominance Orientation scale was also significant, $F(2, 311) = 15.95, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that the Social Dominance Orientation levels for participants who wanted the student to be deported were significantly higher than the Social Dominance Orientation scores of people who wanted the student to be given a green card and for those who think the student should be given immediate citizenship.

The Attitudes Towards Immigrants scale was significant as well, $F(2, 311) = 32.04, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that people who wanted the student to be given immediate citizenship had the lowest mean Attitudes Towards Immigrants score; those who wanted the student to be given a pathway to citizenship had a moderate mean Attitudes Towards

Immigrants score, and, those who wanted the student to be immediately deported had the highest mean Attitudes Towards Immigrants score.

The Intergroup Competition scale was also significant, $F(2, 311) = 26.891, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that people who wanted the student to be given immediate citizenship had the lowest mean Intergroup Competition score, that individuals who wanted the student to be given a pathway to citizenship had a moderate mean Intergroup Competition score, and those who wanted the student to be immediately deported had the highest mean Intergroup Competition score.

The Realistic Symbolic Threat scale was significant, $F(2, 311) = 32.613, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that people who want the student to be given immediate citizenship had the lowest mean Realistic Symbolic Threat score, that individuals who want the student to be given a pathway to citizenship had a moderate mean Realistic Symbolic Threat score, and the participants who want the student to be immediately deported had the highest mean Realistic Symbolic Threat score.

The Immigration Policy scale was significant, $F(2, 311) = 49.355, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that people who want the student to be given immediate citizenship had the lowest mean Immigration Policy score that individuals who want the student to be given a pathway to citizenship had a moderate mean Immigration Policy score and the participants who want the student to be immediately deported had the highest mean Immigration Policy score.

Chi-square analysis of Vignette #1 and Vignette #2

How participants answered the question whether the police officer should ask the driver for identification in vignette #1 was related to what they thought should happen to the student in

vignette #2 (see Table 13). The expectation was that many more people would recommend the student be given citizenship or a pathway to citizenship than what was expected while conversely, the model predicted that fewer people would recommend deportation than what was observed.

For participants who did not think the police officer should ask for identification in the first vignette, many more people than expected by the model recommended citizenship or a pathway to citizenship for the student while fewer recommended deportation.

Structural Equation Modeling

A series of structural equation models were tested to see if the pathway Duckitt (2006), initially proposed is present in this study. Structural Equation Modeling would have added further support to what was found via regression and mediation analyses. While all of the models showed promise, ultimately none met the testing parameters needed for a valid Structural Equation Model to be reported. This is due to the relatively small sample with respect to the number of factors required for analysis.

Exploratory Results

The following series of analyses are exploratory and are not a direct test of the above research questions and hypotheses.

Significant demographic variables

Participants' gender. Of the 315 participants that completed this study, 126 were males (40%), 186 were females (59%), and 3 participants preferred not to answer (1%). These results are slightly different from the percentage of voters in 2012 election reported by the Roper Report

polling data (47% of the electorate were men, and 53% were women). There was no significant difference between how males and females responded on any of the 6 scales. (see Table 14).

Participants' age. Of the 315 participants, 313 provided their age. The average of age of participants in the study was 40.35 with an *SD* of 13.20 with a range of ages from 18-73. Males on average were 39.40 years of age with an *SD* of 12.93, $n= 125$, and women were 41.17 years of age with an *SD* of 13.38, $n= 185$. There were no significant differences between the average age of participants ($t(308) = -1.16, p > .05$) or the way they scored on any of the scales.

Participants' race and ethnicity. The majority of participants in this study indicated that they were white (81.9%) while approximately 74% of U.S. voters reported that they were white during the 2012 election according to the U.S. Census. Likewise, 13% of the voting populace stated that they were African American in 2012 while in this study only 6.3% of the participants were African American. Asians were 3% of the voting public in 2012 and 4.1% of the current study population. Unlike the Census, participants in this study were given the option to indicate if they were Native American or of Mixed Race- hence that data cannot be compared.

Furthermore, participants were asked if they were Latino/a, not as a race but as ethnicity. In the current study, 18 participants (5.7%) indicated that they are of Latino/a heritage. When asked by the Census, 8% of the voting populace stated that they were Latino/a as their race; not ethnicity. This distinction is important since many people are of Latin descent who are white, Native American, Asian and African American. (see Table 15 for frequencies).

ANOVAs were performed on each of the six scales to see if there was a significant difference between how the average scores compared across different races. Table 16 lists the means and standard deviations for the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Attitude Toward Immigrants (ATI).

Participant scores on the Attitudes Toward Immigrants scale were significantly different between some of the groups. Levene's test indicated unequal variances ($Levene = 3.35, p = .01$), so the Welch F test was used ($F(4, 29.08) = 3.77, p = .01$) in place of the standard ANOVA. A Games-Howell post hoc test indicated that Asian Indian participants differed significantly $p < .05$ from White participants; meaning that White participants had more negative views of immigrants compared to Asian Immigrants.

There were no significant differences between participants with different races and their scores on the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale or the Social Dominance Scale.

Table 17 lists the means and standard deviations for the other three scales: Intergroup Competition Scale, Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale, and the Immigration Policy Scale. Both the Intergroup Competition Scale and the Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale produced significant differences between racial groups.

Participant scores on the Intergroup Competition were significantly different between White participants and Asian Indian Participants. Levene's test indicated unequal variances ($Levene = 3.50, p < .01$), so the Welch F test was used $F(4, 28.79) = 5.90, p = .01$. A Games-Howell post hoc test showed that White participants perceive immigrants as more of a competitive threat than Asian Indians do.

The Realistic Symbolic Threat scale also produced significant results. Levene's test indicated unequal variances ($Levene = 2.68, p = .03$), again the Welch F test was used ($F(4, 29.022) = 3.49, p = .02$). A Games-Howell post hoc test showed a significant difference between Asian Indian participants and White participants $p < .05$. White participants perceive immigrants as more of a threat than Asian Indians do.

Participants' marital status. The means, standard deviations, and frequencies for participants' marital status on all six scales can be found in Tables 18 and 19. The only scale in which there was a significant difference between participants marital status was the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale $F(5, 309) = 2.425, p = .035$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that married people differed significantly $p < .05$ from those who have never married, producing higher Right Wing Authoritarianism scores than those who have never married.

To test if Right Wing Authoritarianism does predict being currently married or widowed versus never married, separated or divorced a binary logistic regression was run.¹⁸ For the 307 participants who provided a response to whether or not they are or have been married a test of the full model against a constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors as a set reliably distinguished between those who have children from those who do not ($\chi^2 = 6.66, df=1, p = .01.$), with a Nagelkerke's R^2 of .03 indicating a weak relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 57.5% (42.45 for being married and 71.3% for not being married). The Wald criterion ($Wald= 6.60, df= 1, p=.01$) demonstrated for each increase in a participants' Right Wing Authoritarianism score the likelihood of being married increased by 1.00 time.

Participants' parental status. The means, standard deviations, and frequencies for participants' parental status on all six scales can be found in Tables 20 and 21. The only two scales that there was a significant difference between participants parental status was the Right Wing Authoritarianism and Intergroup Competition scale. The Right Wing Authoritarianism scale produced a significant ANOVA of $F(2, 312) = 10.52, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test

¹⁸ Currently married participants and widowed participants were collapsed together (yes to marriage) and never married, separated and divorced participants were collapsed into another category together (no to marriage). Participants who preferred not to say were dropped from this regression model.

showed that people with children were significantly different $p < .01$, from people without children, and those who prefer not to answer. Having children seems to raise one's Right Wing Authoritarianism level.

To test if Right Wing Authoritarianism does predict having children a binary logistic regression was run. For the 305 participants who provided a response to whether or not they are a parent (participants who preferred not say were not included in the regression model) a test of the full model against a constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors as a set reliably distinguished between those who have children from those who do not ($\chi^2 = 21.234, df=1, p < .001.$), with a Nagelkerke's R^2 of .09 indicating a weak relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 62.1% (58.3% for having children and 65.8% for not having children). The Wald criterion ($Wald= 19.50, df= 1, p < .001$) demonstrated for each increase in a participants' Right Wing Authoritarianism score the likelihood having a child increases by 1.01 times.

The Intergroup Competition scale was the other significant scale for differences in parental status, $F(2, 312) = 3.97 p = 0.020$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that people with children were significantly different $p < .05$, from people without children, but not from those who prefer not to answer. This would make sense in light of the fact that children naturally make you think of whom and what is going to be competition.

Participants' political party identification. The means, standard deviations, and frequencies for participants' political party affiliation on all six scales can be found in Tables 22, 23, and 24. Several differences were observed with respect to participants' political orientations. For the Right Wing Authoritarianism, Levene's test indicated unequal variances ($Levene= 2.81, p = .008$), so the Welch F test was used $F(7, 40.13) = 18.47, p < .001$. A Games-Howell post hoc

test showed Democrats had significantly lower Right Wing Authoritarianism scores than Republicans, Independents and those who were not sure which political party they identify with.

The Games-Howell post hoc test also showed that Republicans had significantly higher Right Wing Authoritarianism scores than both Democratic and Libertarian voters.

The Social Dominance Orientation scale was also significant, $F(7, 307) = 5.021, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that Democrats differed significantly from Republicans. Republican had higher Social Dominance Orientation scores than Democrats.

The ATI scale was significant as well, $F(7, 307) = 12.47, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that Democrats had more favorable attitudes toward immigrants than did Republicans or Libertarians., while Republicans had the least favorable attitudes towards immigrants. Tukey HSD post hoc test also showed that Republicans differed from Democrats and from those with no political affiliation. Those with no political affiliation had the most favorable attitude towards immigrants while Republicans had the least favorable attitude.

Participants' religious status. The means, standard deviations, and frequencies for participants' religious affiliation on all six scales can be found in Tables 25 and 26. There were a few scales where there was a difference in participants' scale scores based on religiosity. The Right Wing Authoritarianism scale was the first significant scale. Levene's test indicated unequal variances ($Levene = 11.11, p < .001$), so the Welch F test was used $F(3, 39.81) = 30.41, p < .001$. A Games-Howell post hoc test showed that participants who attend religious services are significantly different from all other participants, having the highest average Right Wing Authoritarianism score.

The Attitudes Towards Immigrants scale was also significant, $F(3, 311) = 3.883, p = .01$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that people who are not religious are significantly different

from people who are not only religious but from those who are also religious and attend services. Individuals who are not religious had the most favorable view of immigrants while those who are religious but do not attend services had the least favorable view.

The Intergroup Competition scale was also significant, $F(3, 311) = 3.02, p = .03$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that people who are religious but do not attend services are significantly different from participants who are not religious. Participants who are religious but do not attend services view immigrants as more competition to them while participants who are not religious view immigrants as less of competition.

Finally, the Immigration Policy scale was significant as well, $F(3, 311) = 3.06, p = .03$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that people who are religious but do not attend services are significantly different from participants who are not religious. Participants who are religious but do not attend services support more restrictionist immigration policy than those who are not religious who support the least restrictionist policy.

The Intergroup Competition scale was significant, $F(7, 307) = 9.43, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that Democrats differed significantly $p < .05$ from Republicans, Libertarians and those who are not sure. Democrats felt less intergroup competition with immigrants than the other groups and Republicans felt the most competition. Tukey HSD post hoc test also showed that Republicans not only differ from Democrats but also from those with no political affiliation. Those reporting no political affiliation felt the least competition from immigrants compared to all voting groups while Republicans had the least favorable attitude.

The Realistic Symbolic Threat scale was also significant, $F(7, 307) = 6.517, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that Democrats are different from Republicans and

Libertarians. Democrats produced one of the lower Realistic Symbolic Threat scores while Republicans and Libertarians the highest. When the Realistic Symbolic Threat scale is divided into its two subscales, the symbolic scale was *significant* $F(7, 307) = 5.613, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that the only significant difference was between Democrats and Republicans, with Republicans viewing immigrants as a symbolic threat to their way of life much more than Democrats do. A slightly similar pattern was found with Realistic threats; $F(7, 307) = 5.91, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that Democrats were not only different from Republicans but Libertarians as well. Both Republicans and Libertarians viewed immigrants as real threats to themselves much more than those identifying as Democrats did.

Finally, the Immigration Policy scale was also significant $F(7, 307) = 9.32, p < .001$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed that Democrats differed significantly $p < .05$ from Republicans, Libertarians and those who were not sure; those identifying as Democrat reported supporting less restrictive immigration policy than the other groups while Republicans favored the most restrictive immigration policies. Tukey HSD post hoc test also showed that Republicans differed from both Democrats and those with no political affiliation and those affiliated with the Green Party. Those with no political affiliation and those in the Green Party favored the least restrictive immigration policy while Republicans favored the most.

Non-significant demographic variables

Several demographic variables produced non-significant results, meaning that there was no significant difference between the mean scores on any of the six scales between Latino and non-Latino participants (see Tables 27 and 28), participants who owned their homes compared to

those who rented (see Tables 29 and 30), participant citizenship status¹⁹, (see Tables 31 and 32), education level (see Tables 33 and 34), military experience (see Tables 35 and 36) and employment status (see Tables 37 and 38), participants' ability to vote (see Table 39 and 40) and whether or not participants have known someone who has been deported (see Tables 41 and 42).

Exploratory Analyses of Vignette #1- Creating a composite of which participant would most likely think the police officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency.

A binary logistic regression was conducted to see which variables best predicted which participant would want the officer to ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency. In addition to the series of chi-square tests conducted on categorical demographic variables, a series of correlations were carried out to determine which variables may have a relationship with the decision to ask about citizenship.

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between whether a police officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency and the marital status of participants. More married people compared to non-married people wanted the police officer to ask the driver for identification while more unmarried people compared to married people did not believe that the police officer should ask the driver for identification. (see Table 43)

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between whether a police officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency and if the participants have children. More participants with children thought the police officer should

¹⁹ Participants were all citizens but were asked if they were born in the United States, Born overseas to American citizens or Naturalized Citizens.

ask the driver for identification than those without, while more participants without children did not believe that the police officer should ask the driver for identification compared to participants with children. (see Table 44).

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between whether a police officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency and if the participant is Latina/o. More participants who are not of Latina/o though the police officer should ask for identification than Latino/as. This same pattern was the same for when participants did not think the police officer should ask for identification. These results are not surprising in light of the number of participants who are not Latina/o. What is significant is that the vast majority of the Latino/a participants (17 out of 18) did not think the police officer should ask the driver for identification. (see Table 45).

In looking at the adjusted residuals of the contingency table, it is participants with one or more years of college or those participants without a degree who are contributing the most to the overall significance of the model. The expectation was that many more of these participants would expect the police officer to ask for identification than what was found. Another group of participants with a larger adjusted residual level is participants with a professional degree. The expectation here is that far fewer of these individuals would want the police officer to ask for identification when in fact more were observed in the data set. (see Table 46).

In looking at the adjusted residuals of the contingency table, it is participants who identify as either Republican or Democrats that contribute most to the significant of the chi-square. Republicans are the largest group of participants who want the police officer to ask the driver for identification while Democrats are the largest group to believe that the police officer should not ask the driver for identification. (see Table 47).

Social Dominance Orientation, Right Wing Authoritarianism, Attitudes Towards Immigrants, Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat, and Immigration Policy Scales were all positively correlated with whether a police officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency citizenship along with participant age. (see Table 48).

Binary logistic regression. All variables that correlated or were found to have a relationship via chi-square to whether or not a police officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency were entered into the analysis. Variables that were not significant were removed from the model one by one until the final model with all significant results was produced. Four variables work in concert to predict whether a participant would recommend that the officer asks the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency: marital status, whether or not they are Latino, their Right Wing Authoritarianism score, and their Immigration Policy score.

For the 308 participants who provided a response to whether the officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship, a test of the full model against a constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors as a set reliably distinguished between those who say the police officer should ask for citizenship and those who say not ($\chi^2 = 131.344$, $df=4$, $p < .001$, Nagelkerke's r^2 of .47) indicating a moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 78.7% (85.6% for the police officer should not ask, and 66.4% for the police officer should ask). The Wald criterion ($Wald= 3.879$, $df= 1$, $p=.03$) demonstrated that when controlling for whether a person is Latino or not, Right Wing Authoritarianism and Immigration Policy Score; being married decreases the likelihood of a person wanting the police officer to ask for citizenship by 0.84 times. The Wald criterion also demonstrated ($Wald= 6.27$, $df= 1$, $p=.01$) that when controlling for marital status, Right Wing Authoritarianism and Immigration Policy score; whether being Latino or not increased the

likelihood of the officer asking by 5.15 times. Controlling for a person's marital status, being Latino and Right Wing Authoritarianism score, the Immigration Policy score increases the probability of the individual wanting the police officer to ask for citizenship by 1.05 times ($Wald=47.19, df=1, p<.001$). Finally, after controlling for marital status, being Latino and Immigration Policy score; a participants' Right Wing Authoritarianism scores increased the likelihood of an officer asking for proof of citizenship or legal residency by 1.01 times ($Wald=4.33, df=1, p=.04$).

Why does a participant think the driver is an immigrant?

Because the driver did not have a license. Fifty-three participants thought the police officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency because he might be an immigrant. These participants stated that one reason for this was a lack of driver's license.

There were only two demographic or scale variables that correlated to this reasoning. *Age* $r(51) = .390, p < .01$ and *housing* $r(51) = .321, p < .05$

A model was tested using both age and housing as a predictor variable. This model only showed significance for age. For the 53 participants who stated that the police officer should ask for proof of citizenship because the driver did not have a license the test of the full model against a constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors as a set reliably distinguished between those who say the police officer should ask for citizenship because there was no license and those who did not indicate this as a reason ($\chi^2 = 8.69, df=1, p = .003, Nagelkerke's r^2 of .221$) indicating a weak relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 77.4% (94.9% for the police officer should ask because there was no license and 28.6% for this was not a reason to ask). The Wald criterion ($Wald= 5.568, df= 1,$

$p=.018$) demonstrated that age increases the likelihood of a person wanting the police officer to ask for citizenship because of a lack of license by 1.083 times.

Because the driver lacked official identification. Only one demographic or scale variable correlated to this answer; U.S. Census *region* $r(53) = -.353, p < .01$. Participants living in the Western Census region²⁰ were more likely to state that the reason the officer should ask for proof of citizenship or legal residency is that the driver lacked official identification. A logistic regression of the full model against a constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictor is able to reliably distinguished between those who say the police officer should ask for citizenship because there was no ID and those who did not indicate this as a reason ($\chi^2 = 7.33, df=1, p =.007$. Nagelkerke's r^2 of .179) is indicating a weak relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 71.7% (94.3% for the police officer should ask because there was no ID and 27.8% for this was not a reason to ask). The Wald criterion ($Wald= 5.677, df= 1, p=.017$) demonstrated that living out west increased the likelihood of a person wanting the police officer to ask for citizenship because of a lack of identification by 0.371 times.

Because the driver did not know their social security number. There was only one demographic or scale variable that correlated to this reason, that the driver lacked a Social Security number or card; Social Dominance Orientation $r(51) = -.308, p < .05$. A logistic regression of the full model against a constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictor is reliable in distinguishing between those who say the police officer should ask for citizenship because there was no SS and those who did not indicate this as a reason ($\chi^2 = 4.83, df=1, p =.028$ Nagelkerke's R^2 of .136) indicating a weak relationship between prediction

²⁰ Western Census Region: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming

and grouping. Prediction success overall was 81.1% (97.6% for the police officer should ask because there was no SS and 18.2% for this was not a reason to ask). The Wald criterion ($Wald= 4.43, df= 1, p=.035$) demonstrated that Social Dominance Orientation decreases the likelihood that participant will state that the police officer should ask for identification because the driver lacks knowledge of their social security number by .526 times.

Because the driver did not have car registration or insurance in their name. As with the reasoning above of that, the driver lacks official identification, U.S. Census Region $r(51) = -.294, p < .01$ was the only variable that correlated with the response that the police officer should ask for identification because the driver lacked car registration and insurance. A test of the full model against a constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictor reliably distinguishes between those who say the police officer should ask for citizenship because there was no registration/insurance and those who did not indicate this as a reason ($\chi^2 = 4.87, df=1, p =.027$ Nagelkerke's r^2 of .120) indicating a weak relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 71.7% (97.0% for the police officer should ask because there was no ID and 30.0% for this was not a reason to ask). The Wald criterion ($Wald= 4.177, df= 1, p=.041$) demonstrated that living out west increases the likelihood of a person wanting the police officer to ask for citizenship because of a lack of registration or insurance by 0.371 times.

The number of reasons the participants gave for why the police officer should suspect the driver is an immigrant. After analyzing the different reasons participants gave as to why the police officer should ask for proof of citizenship or legal residency from the driver, the number of reasons provided by participants was compared to all demographic and scale variables. There was only one significant difference across all of these variables, U.S. Census Region. The

number of reasons given was significantly different from census region, to census region, $F(3, 49) = 5.02, p < .01$. Tukey HSD post hoc test showed people who live in the northeast ($M = 1.71$ $SD = 1.11, N=7$) provide many fewer reasons why the police officer should ask for proof of citizenship or legal residency than people who live out West ($M = 3.89$ $SD = 0.60, N=9$), participants in the Midwest ($M = 3.40$ $SD = 1.26, N=10$) and participants living in the South ($M = 3.30$ $SD = 1.27, N=27$).

Exploratory Analyses of Vignette #2- Creating a composite of which participant would most likely recommend deportation of the student.

A logistic regression was conducted to see which variables work in concert to best predict which participants would want the student deported, vs. issued a green card vs. given citizenship. In addition to the series of chi-square test conducted on categorical demographic variables, a series of correlations were performed to determine which variables to enter into the logistic regression.

In looking at the adjusted residuals, more participants who are Latina/o descent recommended citizenship or a pathway to citizenship than what was expected. Conversely, non-Latino/a participants were less likely to recommend citizenship or a pathway to citizenship. See Table 49.

According to the residuals, the most significant results contributing to the overall model are from those participants who identify as either being Democrats or Republicans. Democrats were more likely to recommend the student be given citizenship or a green card than what was expected and less likely to recommend deportation than what was expected. Republicans, on the other hand, were more likely to recommend deportation than what was expected and less likely to recommend citizenship or a green card than what was expected. (see Table 50).

In Table 51, many of the observed results are similar to the expected results. Some difference is found for participants who are not religious and who recommend citizenship, more of these participants responded I this way than what was expected. Another interesting result was that there were no participants who attend religious services that recommended citizenship for the student.

The amount of trouble the student got into, whether a participant is Latino/a, which political party a participant identifies with and how religious a participant is had significant chi-square interactions with what should be done with the student after finding out she was not a citizen. Finally, age, Social Dominance Orientation, Right Wing Authoritarianism, Attitudes Towards Immigrants, Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat, and Immigration Policy Scales all positively correlated with whether the student should be deported. See Table 52.

All variables that correlated to whether the student should be deported were entered into the logistic regression analysis along with all significant chi-square results. Variables that were not significant were removed from the model one by one until the final model with all significant results was produced. Two variables work in concert to predict whether a participant believes that the student should be deported; the amount of trouble the student has been in and their Immigration Policy score.

For the 308 participants who provided a response to whether the student should be deported a test of the full model against a constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors as a set reliably distinguished between those who say the student should be deported from those who disagree ($\chi^2 = 99.04, df=2, p < .001$..Nagelkerke's r^2 of .41) indicating a moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 83.1% (93.4% that the student should not be deported and 48.6% that the student should be

deported). The Wald criterion ($Wald= 20.15, df= 1, p<.001$) demonstrated that when controlling for Immigration Policy score, the more trouble the student got into the likelihood of a person wanting the student to be deported increased by 0.95 times. The Wald criterion also demonstrated ($Wald= 53.45, df= 1, p<.001$) that when controlling for how much trouble the student got into, Immigration Policy scores increased the likelihood of the participant wanting the student to be deported by .05 times.

Exploratory Question: Why should the student be deported, given a green card or citizenship? A multiple logistic regression was conducted only on the responses of participants who stated that Person A should be deported, using the same predictor variables from above but changing the dependent variable to the reasons why they think that he/she should be deported.

Participant Decision: Immediate deportation. Participants were asked under what condition the participant should be deported (immediately, held in custody to see a judge or electronically monitored while waiting for a hearing). For participants who thought that the student should be immediately deported the only correlation that was found between this response and any scale or demographic variables were for Immigration Policy; $r(72) = .364, p < .01$.

For the 74 participants who provided a response to whether the student should be deported immediately a test of the full model against a constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictor reliably distinguished between those who say the student should be deported immediately from those who disagree ($\chi^2 = 10.33, df=1, p = .001$. Nagelkerke's r^2 of .19) indicating a slight relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 73.6% (90% that the student should not be deported immediately and 36.4% that the student should be deported immediately). The Wald criterion ($Wald= 8.64,$

$df= 1, p=.003$) demonstrated that as a participant's, Immigration Policy scores increased the likelihood of the participant wanting the student to be deported immediately by .037 times.

There were no significant correlations or chi-squares results between the other two deportation choices a participant had (detained by ICE until a hearing and being electronically monitored) to warrant the exploration of a binary logistic regression.

A series of multiple logistic regressions were then conducted only on the responses of participants who stated that Person A should be given a green card looking at the reasons why participants think this would be the best choice.

Participant Decision: Green Card Reasons.

Because the student was under the age of 18 when coming to the United States. While there was not too much of a difference between the number of males and female participants who did not want to give the student a green card, females were much more likely to say that the student should get a green card because she was under the age of 18 when she came to the United States. See Table 53.

In looking at the adjusted residuals in Table 54 participants who were either working but not in their chosen profession and those participants who were not currently employed contributed the most to the statistical significance of the model. Starting with participants who were employed but not in their chosen profession, fewer than expected wanted to give the student a green card because she was under 18 when she came to the United States. For participants who are not employed, more than expected wanted to give the student a green card than what was expected

All variables that correlated to whether the student should be deported were entered into the analysis along with all significant chi-square results; please see Table 55. Variables that were not significant were removed from the model one by one until the final model with all significant results was produced. For the 222 participants who provided a response to whether the student should be given a green card because she was under the age of 18 when she came to the United States, a test of the full model against a constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictor reliably distinguished between those who say the student should be deported immediately from those who disagree ($\chi^2 = 23.64, df=3, p < .001$..Nagelkerke's r^2 of .14) indicating a slight relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 65.8% (81% that the student should not be given a green card and 44.6% that the student should get a green card). The Wald criterion ($Wald= 3.73, df= 1, p=.05$) demonstrated that when controlling for Immigration Policy score, and employment status, being a female increased the likelihood of wanting to grant the student a green card by 0.56 times. The Wald criterion also showed ($Wald= 6.64, df= 1, p=.01$) that when controlling for gender and Immigration Policy score, not being employed increased the likelihood of the participant wanting to give the student a green card by .41 times. Finally, the Wald criteria demonstrated ($Wald= 12.04, df= 1, p=.001$) that when controlling for gender and employment, Immigration Policy scores decreased the likelihood of wanting to grant the student a green card by .02 times.

Because the student was under the 18 when coming to the United States and is now a successful college student. Correlations and Chi-square for regression No demographic variables were significant via chi-square

All variables from Table 58 that correlated to whether the student should be given a green card because she was under the age of 18 when she came to the United States and is a successful

college student were entered into the logistic regression. Variables that were not significant were removed from the model one by one until the final model with all significant results was produced. For the 222 participants who provided a response to whether the student should be given a green card because she was under the age of 18 when she came to the United States and is a successful college student, a test of the full model against a constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictor reliably distinguished between those who say the student should be given a green card from those who disagree ($\chi^2 = 7.81, df=1, p < .005$. Nagelkerke's r^2 of .50) indicating a moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 71.2% (98.7% that the student should not be given a green card and 1.6% that the student should receive a green card). The Wald criterion demonstrated ($Wald= 7.44, df= 1, p < .01$) that Immigration Policy scores increased the likelihood of wanting to grant the student a green card by .02 times. This is different from the condition in which the student was under the age of 18 when brought to the United States. In that condition Immigration Policy decreased the chance that the student should be given a green card while here, it is not just that the student did not have a say in the immigration that is salient but that they have also demonstrated pro-social behaviors that for people who support more restrictionist policy, they are able to support a pathway to citizenship.

Because the student was under the 18 when coming to the United States, is now a successful college student and wants to work with military upon graduation. There were no significant demographic or scale variables that related to this reasoning for why the student should be given a green card.

Key Findings Summary

1. The Dual Process Model can predict which participants hold anti-immigrant attitudes.
2. The Dual Process Model can be expanded to predict which participants support restrictionist policy.
3. The Dual Process Model is better at predicting attitudes towards immigrants than it is at predicting attitudes towards immigration policy.
4. One-third of the participants believe that a police officer in the first vignette should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency, with half that group stating that the officer should suspect that the driver is unauthorized to be in the United States.
5. Two-thirds of the participants believe that the student in the second vignette should be given a pathway to citizenship if not outright citizenship. However, there were more participants than what was expected that recommend deportation when the student had a troubled past and more participants than expected who recommend citizenship for the college student who had never been in any kind of trouble.
6. There is consistency between participant responses to survey questions and how they answered questions about the vignettes. If a participant supports restrictionist policy via their scores on the Immigration Policy Scale, they are more likely to say that the police officer in the first vignette should ask for proof of legal status of the driver and that the student in the second vignette be deported.
7. Several demographic variables produced interesting results. For instance, education and employment had no impact on attitudes toward immigrants or policy while religious involvement and political affiliation did.

These key findings will be discussed at greater length in the Discussion section.

Discussion

Immigration is a complex issue. The current study illuminated some new directions for research and shed light on what role attitudes towards immigration play in the current political climate of the United States. There were many purposes to this study. The first purpose was to re-test the Dual Process Model of bias on immigration attitudes. The second purpose was to test whether the Dual Process Model of bias could be applied not just to attitudes towards immigrants, but to immigration policy as well. The third purpose was to experimentally gain a better understanding of how Americans view two different kinds of immigration policies, the ability of police to ask people about their legal status at traffic stops and what should be done with individuals who came to the United States without proper documentation when they were children. The final purpose was to get a snapshot of how people in the United States view immigrants and immigration policy in light of their demographic characteristics and attitudinal dispositions.

The Dual Process Model of Bias

This study found that both the Right Wing Authoritarian scale and the Social Dominance Orientation scale are still good predictors for assessing who is more likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes and support restrictionist policies. In testing the Dual Process Model on immigration, three unique pathways were found. First, support for the original model in which people high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale or the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale have unique pathways that reach the same ending based on the type of threat they perceive immigrants to be; people high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale see immigrants as competitive threats to their position and resources while people high on the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale view immigrants as threats to their culture and way of life.

The second pathway found the double additive pattern of the Dual Process Model, meaning that some people score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale that view immigrants not as just a competitive threat to their actual well-being but as a symbolic and cultural threat. Conversely, some people who score high on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale do not see immigrants as just a cultural threat but as a competitive threat as well. Essentially there is a cross-over effect in the types of threats that mediate the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation or Right Wing Authoritarianism to negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Evidence has been found in other studies of the double additive pattern happening earlier in the Dual Process Model²¹ from what was found in this study. Perry, Sibley, and Duckitt (2013) found that a Competitive Worldview gives birth to not only Social Dominance Orientation but Right Wing Authoritarianism and the Dangerous Worldview gives birth to not only Right Wing Authoritarianism but Social Dominance Orientation as well. Jost (2009), states that these two value systems; Competitive Worldview and a Dangerous Worldview can become interlaced and the threat to power and conformity would serve as motivation for both people high in Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism to prefer the maintenance of the status quo, thus meeting both their motivational needs. Worldview orientation was not studied in this project however evidence of the double additive pattern occurring later in the model was found.

The third pathway found is a direct route from Social Dominance Orientation or Right Wing Authoritarianism to negative attitudes towards immigrants. For some people, high levels of

²¹ If your turn to page 3 Figure 1 the Dual Process Model of Bias, the way a child is socialized and adopts a worldview precedes their development of Social Dominance Orientation or Right Wing Authoritarianism.

Social Dominance or Authoritarianism on their own breed anti-immigration attitudes without the person viewing immigrants as a threat to their culture, resources, or person.

Conventional wisdom dictates that in order to change the way people view immigrants, normalizing immigrants is the best method. However, the double additive finding in the Dual Process Model poses a new challenge. How do you respond to people who see immigrants as all types of threats no matter what their attitudinal disposition? This also raises a question as to whether the double additive pattern is sensitive to situational changes. It seems likely that one would see more of this cross over effect in times when immigration is framed as a threatening issue whether it be local conversations or on the national stage. In 2016 we saw the rise of President Trump who rode a wave of populism fueled by many promises, one being the crackdown on immigration. President Trump painted a picture of immigrants as terrorists and criminals invading the United States to cause trouble. While none of his rhetoric has been supported by fact, Trump was able to tap into concerns his base have about economic insecurity, cultural change, and globalization. Rather than offer real solutions, Trump as both a candidate and now as President peddles in scapegoating and rhetoric. Unlike other Presidential candidates who may have said they would be tough on immigration while walking a line of political politeness, Trump went right into the core of the argument, he promised a country in which he would deport 11 million people, build a huge wall that Mexico would pay for, ban Muslims, and end free trade deals. Could the double additive pattern found in the Dual Process Model be the results of the messaging that immigrants are a threat to *all* things American, not just an economic threat, but a cultural and a security threat? In a time when some voters do not trust the mainstream media and label facts they don't agree with as "fake news," it is important to understand the mechanism that shapes perceived and real threats. It begs the question as to

whether our new way of consuming information via the Internet, social media and cable news stations are adding to already existing fears through confirmation bias. It also begs the question as to how attitudes are translated into policy decisions that affect not only immigrants but fellow citizens as well.

The Dual Process Model of Bias and the ability to predict attitudes and policy

The second purpose of this study was to test whether the Dual Process Model could be used to not only predict the way people hold attitudes toward immigrants but how they would make decisions about immigration policy. As with attitude, the Dual Process Model was able to predict those who would support more expansive immigration policy versus those who would support more restrictive policy. As with attitude, the higher a person's score on either the Social Dominance or the Right Wing Authoritarian scales the more likely they would support restrictionist immigration policy. However, the ability for the Dual Process Model to predict policy choice was not as robust as it is in predicting attitude. Perhaps it is a matter of what you think you believe versus what that actually means. A contemporary example is the popular websites where you can take a poll on policy issues, and the site finds the candidate that best represents you.²² Sometimes the match you get is not the candidate you thought would best represent you. Studies going as far back as the 1950s (Downs, 1957; Holmberg & Oscarsson, 2004; Dahlberg & Hartevelde, 2016, Nordin, 2014) find that many voters lack information specificity and rely on what they believe the left-right ideology is to guide their decisions about policy; for example I may think that Democrats feel this way about taxes or healthcare and so do I, so I will support the Democratic-sponsored policy without actually knowing anything about

²² The website Isidewith.com is an example of one of these sites.

the actual policy. These mental shortcuts can lead some voters to vote against both their ideology and their own interests (Fowler & Margolis, 2014; Lau & Redlawsk, 1997). When participants answered questions on the Immigration Policy Scale the questions lacked any of those ideological cues that the public is used to having when making decisions about policy. Perhaps this is the reason that the Right Wing Authoritarian scale and the Social Dominance Orientation scale are better predictors of attitudes towards immigrants than policy about immigrants. This again raises the question about the power of politicians, pundits, and the choices people make to source their news surrounding immigration specifically, but public policy in general. Perhaps as divided as people's attitudes are towards immigration, their actual positions on policy are not and might be more centrist than one would assume.

Policy Vignettes

In addition to testing the Dual Process Model, the purpose of the present study was to experimentally test two types of immigration policies that have occurred in the United States. The first experiment was a test of Arizona's SB 1070 law in which a police officer may ask for a person's immigration status if they suspect the person is in the United States without authorization. Individuals who scored higher on either the Right Wing Authoritarian scale or the Social Dominance Orientation scale were more likely to be a part of the 30% that support a police officer asking for proof of citizenship or legal residency. About half of that 30% believed that the police should ask any driver who lacks proper identification for proof of citizenship or legal residency no matter whether or not the police officer believes that the person is an undocumented immigrant. These participants seem to make a clear distinction between right and wrong behavior for all, not just immigrants. This follows suit with what we know about people high in Social Dominance or Authoritarianism, in that they tend to be individuals who value the

law and a strict interpretation of it. The other half of the participants who support an SB 1070 like law, thought it was only necessary to ask for documentation from those people the officer suspected of being an unauthorized immigrant. When a composite was made of who would be the most likely to support SB 1070, it was a person who scored high on the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale as opposed to the Social Dominance Orientation scale. In light of the fact that people higher in authoritarianism are threatened by realistic and symbolic threats, rule breakers as Altemeyer terms it (2006), while people higher in social dominance are threatened by competitive threats, it makes sense that authoritarianism would be a predictor in this situation while social dominance is not. A driver presumed to be an immigrant with no identification may not be deemed a real competitive threat to people high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale, however for people high on the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale, the driver might be perceived as breaking social and legal rules.

An interesting findings was that while immigration has been painted as an ethnic or racial issue, there was no evidence in this study that participants were any more or less biased against the driver based on ethnicity. Participants were no more likely to say the police have a right to ask about citizenship if the driver was from Mexico, Ireland or Korea. While encouraging, it was strange that for those participants who did think the driver was an undocumented immigrant, none of them said it was because the person admitted to being born outside of the United States. It could be that these participants view the behaviors of the suspected undocumented immigrant as simple law breaking behavior. They are not being “anti-immigrant” or supporting any type of profiling by the police per se, but that begs the question, why not just say that officer should ask all drivers that lack identification for proof of citizenship or legal residency? Further inquiry into this is needed. While for many years undocumented immigration has been cast along ethnic lines

in which people from South and Central America cross the U.S. border without authorization, perhaps the public discussion surrounding refugees from the Middle East, President Trump's travel ban of people from Muslim majority countries and the influx of high-skilled immigrants from South East Asia has changed the schema people have of who an undocumented immigrant is. Studies comparing a driver from many different countries would be helpful in disentangling whether or not the public feel that race and ethnicity really do not matter when police are applying an SB 1070 type law.

The second policy vignette was a test of the Dream Act, which provides deportation protection to young adults who were brought to the United States by their families when they were under the age of 18. Participants could decide to recommend immediate citizenship, a pathway to citizenship or deportation to the person in the vignette, who is a college student, upon finding out that they are an undocumented immigrant. The experimental manipulation was the kind of legal trouble the student had engaged in (none, minor juvenile delinquency, minor juvenile delinquency and pending DUI). The majority of participants supported a pathway to citizenship if not outright citizenship for the student. However, people higher on the Social Dominance Orientation scale or the Right Wing Authoritarian scale were more likely to recommend deportation. An interesting result came in looking not at the scores on the Social Dominance Orientation scale or the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale but at political party affiliation. In this study people high on the either scale were more likely to identify as Republicans than as Democrats or any other political party. Republicans had the highest scores on all the scales indicating that they have the most negative attitudes towards immigrants, view immigrants as threats and support more restrictive policy. When the student in the vignette had been in minor trouble as a teen with a pending DUI, Republicans, regardless of their social

dominance or authoritarianism score (could be low or high), were much more likely to recommend deportation as opposed to a pathway to citizenship. This is important because this begs the question as to whether there is this idea of an “ideal” immigrant. It can be understood that citizens want certain qualities in adults immigrating to the United States, but this is a harder concept to define when we are speaking about a person who came to the United States unknowingly as a child. The only difference between a young adult who gets into trouble, but was born here, versus someone who was brought here as a child, is their place of birth. Is the reason one wants to deport that person because of their legal indiscretions, to punish them for their birth location, to punish their parents, or is it simply a question of that person being a law violator by coming to the United States without proper authorization? Understanding the context is important because the Republican Party seems to attract both people who are socially dominant and authoritarian. These two types of people at times share similar threat concerns about immigrants but at other times differ. In this case of the Dream Act young adults, authoritarians may be responding to the cultural threat of the immigrant who is violating normative rules by breaking the rule of law by coming into the country without authorization. Conversely, socially dominant people could be responding to the competitive threat that a successful college student poses. It is possible that in light of the double additive pattern found in the Dual Process Model, it may not matter what kind of threat the college student is to some socially dominant people and some authoritarian individuals.

Consistency

Another key finding in this study was consistency in participant responses. If a participant supports more restrictionist policy on the Immigration Policy Scale, they will be more likely to support an SB 1070 type law and less likely to support the Dream Act. Similarly, if

participants hold anti-immigration attitudes, in turn, they support restrictionist policy. This demonstrates a link between distinct attitudinal dispositions and public policy choices.

Demographic variables of interest

There were several demographic variables that had no significant impact on how participants scored on any of the six scales (Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, Attitudes Towards Immigrants, Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat, and the Immigration Policy scale); renting versus owning your home, how one became a citizen (Born in the USA, naturalized), education level, military experience, employment, being registered to vote or not, knowing someone who has been deported, and being of Latin descent or not. Many of these demographic variables were collected for exploratory purposes. While not significant, Latino participants produced lower means scores on all six scales while those who have or do serve in the military had some of the highest means scores of all six scales. This is a line of further inquiry to be explored with a larger participant pool. It was also surprising that neither education nor employment status produced any significant results. As discussed in the literature review, several studies have found a relationship between pro-immigration attitudes and increased education levels (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Chandler & Tsai 2001; Citrin, Green, Muste & Wong, 1997; Hainmueller & Hiscox 2007, Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Hood & Morris, 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), however Berg (2010), found that education alone is not a single salient variable but rather the intersectionality between race, class gender, social space, and education. In conducting multiple regression analyses in this study, this intersectionality of variables was not present but represents a line of inquiry for future studies.

In respect to employment, there was no significant difference between those participants who are employed compared to those who were not in terms of their attitudes towards

immigrants. Research has historically found that economic security is related to attitudes towards immigration. When the economy is doing well, people are more accepting of immigrants than when the economy is not doing well (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Diaz, Saenz, & Kwan, 2011; Lapinski, Peltola, Shaw & Yang, 1997; Ngai, 2003). Haimuller and Hicsox (2007) found that this perception of immigration remains the same whether respondents are employed or not when the economy is doing well. Perhaps in this study, the results that Haimuller and Hicsox (2007), found are being replicated. Data for this present study were collected during the late Spring and early Summer of 2016; post the Great Recession, a time that participants may have been feeling economically more secure and have more positive attitudes about immigration. Another explanation is that participants were asked whether or not they are employed and if employed, is it in their preferred profession (this was to assess possible competitive threat posed by immigrants). Perhaps instead of using employment as a proxy variable for economic security the question could have been asked differently and significant results would have been found.

Several demographic variables did have a significant relationship with the six scales, the first variable being age. Survey research has found that younger participants, specifically those considered Millennials²³ and Gen Xers, have more positive views on the impact immigrants have on the United States compared to Baby Boomers and those in the Silent Generation (Jones, 2016). Murray and Marx (2013) found in their study of attitudes toward immigrants that older participants reported greater perceived realistic and symbolic threats toward immigrants compared to younger participants. In this study, age showed a significant but weak predictive relationship to the Intergroup Competition Scale, the Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale, and the Immigration Policy Scale. The older a participant is, the higher their scores on these scales.

²³ Centennials were born after 1996, Millennials were born between 1977-1995, Generation X was born between 1965-1976, Baby Boomers were born between 1946-1964 and the Silent Generation was born before 1945.

Higher scores on the Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scale make sense in light of the limited literature on aging and immigration. The relationship between age and intergroup competition with immigrants could be the product of many different things; economic competition with respect to employment, social services as well as cultural competition.

Participants' race also produced significant results with the survey scales. The majority of participants in this study were white ($N=258$), however, on several of the scales white participants had significantly different results from Asian Indian participants ($N=13$). White participants compared to Asian Indian participants had more negative attitudes towards immigrants, view immigrants as a competitive threat as well as immigrants as realistic and symbolic threats to themselves. The literature is sparse on this topic, but demographic information on immigration rates may hold the key. In 2014, India was the leading country of origin for new arrivals, followed by China, Mexico, Canada and the Philippines (Zong & Batalova, 2016). It might be that the small group of Asian Indian participants in this study were themselves an immigrant to the United States and/or know, live or work with immigrants, thus not negatively affecting their view of immigration as bad or a threat.

Marriage and parenthood were two variables related to increased levels of Right Wing Authoritarianism. Participants who were married as compared to those who had never been married had slightly higher Right Wing Authoritarianism scores. While not statistically significant participants who were widowed had the highest Right Wing Authoritarianism scores and participants who were separated has the lowest. People with higher Right Wing Authoritarian scores tend to endorse and live by traditional value systems (Altmeyer, 1996; Duncan, Peterson & Winter 1997). Marriage, as opposed to cohabitating with a partner, might be demonstrative of these traditional value systems. One limitation to this question was that

participants were not given the option of indicating if they were cohabitating with a partner, only whether they have ever been married, widowed, divorced, separated or never married. Future studies that are interested in studying this variable should provide participants with more options than what was presented here. As with marriage, participants with children had much higher Right Wing Authoritarian scores than participants without children. Having children also increased the competitive threat immigrants pose to participants. Marriage and parenthood did not have an effect on any of the other scales.

The traditional left versus right political identification produced statistically significant results on many scales. Republicans had moderate Social Dominance Orientation scores, had the most unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants, felt the most competitive threat from immigrants, perceived the most realistic and symbolic threat from immigrants and supported the most restrictionist immigration policies. Republicans also had the highest Right Wing Authoritarian scores compared to other political groups. The conventional reasoning for this is that the political conservatives tend to support the status quo, conventional gender roles, and generally oppose radical change (Altemeyer, 1996; Smith & Winter, 2002). Schildkraut (2011) finds that Republicans define American identity which is ethnocultural in terms of WASP (White, Anglo-Saxon Protestants) with European descent who speak English. Thus, if Republicans are viewing immigrants as not possessing these qualities, it makes sense that they would have anti-immigration attitudes.

Democrats had the lowest Right Wing Authoritarianism score, the lowest Social Dominance Orientation scores had the most favorable attitudes toward immigrants. Democrats also felt the least competition from immigrants and the least realistic threat from immigrants. In respect to policy, Democrats had a moderate view of immigration policy. This harkens back to my

previous statement that perhaps the populace is not as divided on immigration policy as pundits would like us to believe Research has found that Democrats tend to view immigration as an important tool in shaping the country and Democrats tend to be more tolerant of differences that immigrants bring (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014).

A final demographic variable of interest is religion. Participants who self-identify as being religious and also attend organized services had the highest average Right Wing Authoritarian scores. There was also a moderate positive correlation between Right Wing Authoritarian scores and attending organized services. These results mirror results that Altemeyer (1996), found in which religious fundamentalists tend to score high on the Right Wing Authoritarian scale, and the majority of them are authoritarian followers (Altemeyer, 1996). Altemeyer (1996) also found that in those who consider themselves religious, religion is an important part of identity, which sets the stage for in-group and out-groups identification. Religion has been found to be an important variable in developing one's world view, attitudes, and political ideology (Knoll, 2009). Religious affiliation can have a direct effect on follower's views on political issues, including immigration. Cues from religious leaders, learning civic skills and what constitutes morality, as well as being recruited by other church members can all lead to political involvement and leanings (Knoll, 2009).

People who are not religious had the most favorable view of immigrants while those who are religious but do not attend services had the least favorable view. Perhaps those who are religious, but attend services have a slightly better view of immigrants because of the outreach services many faith-based organizations provide to both documented and undocumented immigrants. Conversely, those individuals who consider themselves religious but do not attend services are disengaged from most organized institutions and harbor a certain amount of skepticism.

This study found numerous demographic variables to be of interest. Variables that have traditionally correlated with attitudes towards immigrants, specifically participants' education level, and employment status were nonsignificant in this study. These singular variables may no longer hold the same predictive power they once did but rather intersect with other variables to predict attitudes. Conversely, variables such as religious observation and political ideology did predict both attitudes towards immigrants and policy choices. It might be that ideology and world view play a more important role in shaping one's views on immigration than tangible variables like education and employment have in the past. This is an important line of inquiry for future studies.

Limitations and Future Directions

This study sought to find out if the Dual Process Model could predict not only attitudes towards immigrants but towards immigration policy as well. Regression models and mediation analyses provided evidence of such, but ideally, a larger sample could have been used to employ structural equation modeling. Structural equation modeling would have provided the ability to say whether attitude precedes policy decisions within for the Dual Process Model in this study.

An increased sample size and a more diverse participant pool would have also helped to illuminate some issues surrounding this complex topic. Some variables hinted to some differences in the way people from diverse parts of the United States view immigration and policy. A more rigorous and purposeful recruitment of study participants should be considered in order to have a more robust participant profile. It would also be illuminating not just to study those participants who are citizens, but persons who are both authorized and unauthorized to be in the United States. These populations may provide a unique viewpoint about policy and its application.

Future studies should continue to test specific immigration policies while experimentally manipulating key elements of those policies to identify better those policies that serve the greater good versus those that are meant to hurt members of the community. In this study, two restrictionist immigration policies were used in the development of the vignettes. The choice to use restrictionist as opposed to pro-immigration policy came from a belief that participants would be more familiar with anti-immigration policy than they would be familiar with the pro-immigration policy. Future studies would benefit from testing that assumption and testing the choices participants make when encountering both pro and anti-immigration policies in a vignette type simulation as done in this study.

Looking forward, a replication of this study could help to identify if the way immigration is framed in the public discourse is contributing to the double additive pattern in the Dual Process Model. Future studies should also consider adding measures of a worldview when testing the Dual Process Model. By understanding the precursors to the development of Social Dominance or Right Wing Authoritarianism we may get a better understanding of why some people are threatened by immigrants while other are not but still harbor anti-immigration attitudes.

Finally, continued work on the validation and consistency of the Immigration Policy Scale should be done. Having a scale that accurately assesses participants' attitudes towards specific immigration policies can be an important tool in evaluating those policies that actually matter to the populace.

Final Remarks

Immigration has always been an important cultural and economic tool to the formation of the United States. For this reason, the likelihood that the United States will close its borders in

the near future is unlikely. Our country has always been a beacon of opportunity for individuals from all around the world, and new arrivals represent a diverse group of people from different cultures, religions, races, and ethnicities. It is important to understand how anti-immigration attitudes develop and what amplifies those attitudes in order to change the perception people have of new arrivals. This study demonstrates that threat from immigrants, whether actually experienced or anticipated can amplify already existing anxieties about immigration. Changing the culture and political discourse surrounding immigration would be one way to counteract anti-immigration attitudes. Rather than engaging in rhetoric and scapegoating, focusing on what may be causing concern to voters and enacting real policy to address those concerns, would be better for all. Disentangling immigration policy from political ideology could be a productive tool. As seen in this study, there is less support for policies like SB 1070 and more support for policies like the Dream Act. Furthermore, voters may be more supportive of inclusive immigration policy when the typical political tags are removed from policy choices.

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Table 1

Descriptive statistics and correlations between scales.

Scale	M	SD	RWA	SDO	ATI	ICS	RST	IPS
Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)	72.25	38.31	--					
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)	2.82	1.33	.418*	--				
Attitudes Towards Immigrants (ATI)	105.00	41.34	.624*	.515*	--			
Intergroup Competition Score (ICS)	26.10	10.42	.531*	.455*	.900*	--		
Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale (RST)	5.79	1.60	.470*	.353*	.816*	.825*	--	
Immigration Policy Score (IPS)	118.42	30.19	.540*	.452*	.845*	.779*	.736*	--

N= 315, * p<.01

Table 2

Linear Regression results of the Right Wing Authoritarian scale predicting answers to individual questions on the Immigration Policy Scale.

Question	Constant	B	SEB	β	t
Legally admitted immigrants who can't find jobs should be sent back to their country.	1.74	0.01	0.01	0.35	6.65*
All immigrants regardless of education level and country of origin should be required to pass an American cultural competency class.	2.93	0.02	0.01	0.38	7.15*
Members of immigrant communities should hold more public rallies to protest laws and policies that they think are unfair.	3.21	0.02	0.01	0.39	7.49*
Employers should be able to deduct housing costs from agricultural workers who are guest workers from other countries.	2.50	0.01	0.01	0.25	4.49*
Law enforcement agencies should NOT be allowed to post fake mandatory meeting flyers in order to get suspected undocumented workers to show up for work in order to be arrested.	1.72	0.02	0.01	0.40	7.60*
Both private and public employers should be required to hire employees who are bilingual.	4.48	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.59
Only people from countries that are culturally similar to the United States should be allowed to immigrate here.	1.35	0.01	0.01	0.37	7.04*
Upon being arrested but not convicted a person's fingerprints should be sent to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) to check if they are illegally in the country.	2.94	0.02	0.01	0.39	7.50*
Only certain people from certain countries in the world should be required to check in with immigration officials regardless of whether they are here to travel, study or work.	5.50	-0.01	0.01	-0.30	-5.56*

Question	Constant	B	SEB	β	t
Even though deportation proceedings are a civil matter, illegal immigrants should be provided with an attorney to represent them at their deportation hearing.	2.10	0.02	0.01	0.38	7.30*
The federal government should cut off all funding to any city that does not require proof that person is in the country legally before providing services.	1.80	0.02	0.01	0.51	10.46*
If arrested for a crime all people should be required to show proof of citizenship.	2.82	0.02	0.01	0.40	7.73*
English should be the official language of the U.S.	1.68	0.01	0.01	0.21	3.86*
Communities that have a large number of immigrant day workers should create sites where these people can gather and wait for work, rather than having them loiter in certain locations.	3.25	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.17
Legal immigrants who have been convicted of serious crimes should be sent back to their countries.	3.34	0.01	0.01	0.25	4.62*
Legal immigrants should be prevented from sending money back to their home country.	1.50	0.01	0.01	0.27	5.03*
All official U.S. rules, policies, and applications should be printed in more than one language so that everyone can read and understand them.	2.28	0.01	0.01	0.26	4.83*
The only effective means of keeping illegal immigrants out is to shoot them as they attempt to cross the border.	0.98	0.01	0.01	0.32	5.92*
If a child is a U.S. citizen but their immediate family is made up of undocumented immigrants, that child should not be allowed to receive social services like food stamps or Medicaid.	1.69	0.02	0.01	0.34	6.37*
Workplace complaints by undocumented immigrants, like sexual harassment, low wages, long hours, etc. should be investigated by the government.	1.91	0.01	0.00	0.26	4.74*
While applying to become a citizen, a legal permanent resident who commits a crime should be informed that if they plead guilty, they could be deported.	2.97	-0.01	0.00	-0.017	-2.98**

Question	Constant	B	SEB	β	t
The U.S. census bureau should be allowed to ask people if they are in the country legally so that we have a better idea of how many illegal people are in the country.	3.98	0.01	0.00	0.20	3.69*
If an illegal immigrant helps the police solve a crime, they should be allowed to become a U.S. citizen.	3.16	0.01	0.00	0.23	4.23*
Undocumented immigrant college students should be allowed to attend college and pay in-state tuition.	2.55	0.02	0.00	0.35	6.58*
Only citizen should receive medical services like the annual flu shot.	1.43	0.02	0.00	0.41	7.87*
Illegal immigrants should be allowed to get a driver's license, which would reduce the number of unsafe drivers on the road.	2.57	0.02	0.00	0.36	6.83*
It should be a crime for anyone to rent or sell property to an undocumented immigrant.	2.00	0.02	0.00	0.42	8.21*
If any employee of the U.S. government (postal worker, census taker) finds out that someone is in the country illegally, they should be required to report that person to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).	2.14	0.02	0.00	0.47	9.49*
The U.S. government should make an effort to train more doctors, engineers, and computer experts so that we do not have to allow so many of these immigrants into the country that has these skills.	2.73	0.01	0.00	0.22	4.04*
If a juvenile if arrested their fingerprints should be sent to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to see if they are in the country legally.	2.56	0.02	0.00	0.42	8.25*
Only children born to mothers' who are U.S. citizens should be considered citizens.	1.82	0.02	0.00	0.42	8.19*
Children should only be allowed to attend public school if they can demonstrate a basic understanding of English no matter how old they are.	2.25	0.02	0.00	0.36	6.79*
U.S. citizens should band together to boycott all products produced by companies/businesses employing illegal immigrants.	1.74	0.02	0.00	0.43	8.29*

Question	Constant	SEB	B	β	t
States should not be allowed to pass their own immigration laws.	2.94	0.01	0.00	0.09	1.51
The United States should have an open door immigration policy in which anyone who would like to come to the country legally can do so.	3.11	0.01	0.00	0.25	4.48*

* $p < .001$. ** $p < .05$: strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 slightly disagree, 4 slightly agree, 5 agree, 6 strongly agree. 1: strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 slightly disagree, 4 slightly agree, 5 agree, 6 strongly agree

Table 3

Linear Regression results of Social Dominance Orientation scale predicting answers to individual questions on the Immigration Policy Scale.

Question	Constant	B	SEB	β	t
Legally admitted immigrants who can't find jobs should be sent back to their country.	1.52	0.44	0.06	0.38	7.28*
All immigrants regardless of education level and country of origin should be required to pass an American cultural competency class.	3.25	0.29	0.07	0.24	4.38*
Members of immigrant communities should hold more public rallies to protest laws and policies that they think are unfair.	3.60	0.25	0.06	0.22	4.03*
Employers should be able to deduct housing costs from agricultural workers who are guest workers from other countries.	2.49	0.24	0.06	0.22	3.98*
Law enforcement agencies should NOT be allowed to post fake mandatory meeting flyers in order to get suspected undocumented workers to show up for work in order to be arrested.	1.68	0.50	0.07	0.36	6.83*
Both private and public employers should be required to hire employees who are bilingual.	4.23	0.12	0.06	0.11	1.98***
Only people from countries that are culturally similar to the United States should be allowed to immigrate here.	1.37	0.33	0.06	0.32	5.86*
Upon being arrested but not convicted a person's fingerprints should be sent to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) to check if they are illegally in the country.	3.36	0.29	0.07	0.23	4.16*
Only certain people from certain countries in the world should be required to check in with immigration officials regardless of whether they are here to travel, study or work.	5.18	-0.17	0.06	-0.16	-2.86**

Question	Constant	SEB	B	β	t
Even though deportation proceedings is a civil matter, illegal immigrants should be provided with an attorney to represent them at their deportation hearing.	2.00	0.45	0.06	0.37	7.01*
The federal government should cut off all funding to any city that does not require proof that person is in the country legally before providing services.	2.12	0.46	0.07	0.36	6.87*
If arrested for a crime all people should be required to show proof of citizenship.	3.15	0.32	0.07	0.26	4.74*
Communities that have a large number of immigrant day workers should create sites where these people can gather and wait for work, rather than having them loiter in certain locations.	3.16	0.02	0.06	0.02	.724
Legal immigrants who have been convicted of serious crimes should be sent back to their countries.	3.31	0.30	0.07	0.23	4.25*
Legal immigrants should be prevented from sending money back to their home country.	1.23	0.36	0.06	0.33	6.20*
All official U.S. rules, policies, and applications should be printed in more than one language so that everyone can read and understand them.	2.02	0.39	0.07	0.31	5.77*
The only effective means of keeping illegal immigrants out is to shoot them as they attempt to cross the border.	0.60	0.41	0.05	0.42	8.13*
If a child is a U.S. citizen but their immediate family is made up of undocumented immigrants, that child should not be allowed to receive social services like food stamps or Medicaid.	1.34	0.52	0.07	0.40	7.65*
Workplace complaints by undocumented immigrants, like sexual harassment, low wages, long hours, etc. should be investigated by the government.	2.09	0.22	0.07	0.18	3.17**
While applying to become a citizen, a legal permanent resident (green card holder) who commits a crime, should be informed that if they plead guilty, they could be deported.	2.93	-0.15	0.06	-0.14	-2.42**

Question	Constant	SEB	B	β	t
The U.S. census bureau should be allowed to ask people if they are in the country legally so that we have a better idea of how many illegal people are in the country.	3.93	0.21	0.06	0.20	3.58*
If an illegal immigrant helps the police solve a crime, they should be allowed to become a U.S. citizen.	3.27	0.18	0.06	0.17	3.09**
Undocumented immigrant college students should be allowed to attend college and pay in-state tuition.	2.46	0.44	0.07	0.33	6.24*
Only citizen should receive medical services like the annual flu shot.	1.22	0.53	0.06	0.42	8.19*
Illegal immigrants should be allowed to get a driver's license, which would reduce the number of unsafe drivers on the road.	2.62	0.39	0.07	0.31	5.66*
It should be a crime for anyone to rent or sell property to an undocumented immigrant.	2.27	0.40	0.07	0.30	5.61*
If any employee of the U.S. government (postal worker, census taker) finds out that someone is in the country illegally, they should be required to report that person to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).	2.54	0.43	0.07	0.32	5.91*
The U.S. government should make an effort to train more doctors, engineers, and computer experts so that we do not have to allow so many of these immigrants into the country that has these skills.	3.02	0.14	0.07	0.11	2.00**
If a juvenile if arrested their fingerprints should be sent to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to see if they are in the country legally.	2.80	0.40	0.07	0.31	5.74*
Only children born to mothers' who are U.S. citizens should be considered citizens.	2.35	0.32	0.07	0.23	4.26*
Children should only be allowed to attend public school if they can demonstrate a basic understanding of English no matter how old they are.	2.36	0.38	0.07	0.29	5.30*
U.S. citizens should band together to boycott all products produced by companies/businesses employing illegal immigrants.	2.09	0.36	0.07	.028	5.21*

Question	Constant	SEB	B	β	t
States should not be allowed to pass their own immigration laws.	3.00	0.07	0.07	0.06	1.01
The United States should have an open door immigration policy in which anyone who would like to come to the country legally can do so.	3.11	0.28	0.07	0.22	3.94*

* $p < .001$. ** $p < .051$: strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 slightly disagree, 4 slightly agree, 5 agree, 6 strongly agree. Please see Appendix XXXX for the correct language of the questions. 1: strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 slightly disagree, 4 slightly agree, 5 agree, 6 strongly agree

Table 4

Z-score results comparing Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as predictors of individual scores on the Immigration Policy scale.

Question	Z-score
Legally admitted immigrants who can't find jobs should be sent back to their country.	7.07
All immigrants regardless of education level and country of origin should be required to pass an American cultural competency class.	3.82
Members of immigrant communities should hold more public rallies to protest laws and policies that they think are unfair.	2.05
Employers should be able to deduct housing costs from agricultural workers who are guest workers from other countries.	3.78
Law enforcement agencies should NOT be allowed to post fake mandatory meeting flyers in order to get suspected undocumented workers to show up for work in order to be arrested.	6.79
Both private and public employers should be required to hire employees who are bilingual.	--
Only people from countries that are culturally similar to the United States should be allowed to immigrate here.	5.26
Upon being arrested but not convicted a person's fingerprints should be sent to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) to check if they are illegally in the country.	3.82
Only certain people from certain countries in the world should be required to check in with immigration officials regardless of whether they are here to travel, study or work.	-2.63
Even though deportation proceedings is a civil matter, illegal immigrants should be provided with an attorney to represent them at their deportation hearing.	7.07
The federal government should cut off all funding to any city that does not require proof that person is in the country legally before providing services.	7.23
If arrested for a crime all people should be required to show proof of citizenship.	4.24
English should be the official language of the U.S.	2.75

Question	Z-score
Communities that have a large number of immigrant day workers should create sites where these people can gather and wait for work, rather than having them loiter in certain locations.	--
Legal immigrants who have been convicted of serious crimes should be sent back to their countries.	4.10
Legal immigrants should be prevented from sending money back to their home country.	5.75
All official U.S. rules, policies, and applications should be printed in more than one language so that everyone can read and understand them.	5.37
The only effective means of keeping illegal immigrants out is to shoot them as they attempt to cross the border.	7.84
If a child is a U.S. citizen but their immediate family is made up of undocumented immigrants, that child should not be allowed to receive social services like food stamps or Medicaid.	7.07
Workplace complaints by undocumented immigrants, like sexual harassment, low wages, long hours, etc. should be investigated by the government.	2.97
While applying to become a citizen, a legal permanent resident (green card holder) who commits a crime, should be informed that if they plead guilty, they could be deported.	-2.63
The U.S. census bureau should be allowed to ask people if they are in the country legally so that we have a better idea of how many illegal people are in the country.	3.29
If an illegal immigrant helps the police solve a crime, they should be allowed to become a U.S. citizen.	2.79
Undocumented immigrant college students should be allowed to attend college and pay in-state tuition.	6.08
Only citizen should receive medical services like the annual flu shot.	8.38
Illegal immigrants should be allowed to get a driver's license, which would reduce the number of unsafe drivers on the road.	5.23
It should be a crime for anyone to rent or sell property to an undocumented immigrant.	5.37
If any employee of the U.S. government (postal worker, census taker) finds out that someone is in the country illegally, they should be required to report that person to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).	5.80

Question	Z-score
The U.S. government should make an effort to train more doctors, engineers, and computer experts so that we do not have to allow so many of these immigrants into the country that has these skills.	1.83
If a juvenile if arrested their fingerprints should be sent to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to see if they are in the country legally.	5.37
Only children born to mothers' who are U.S. citizens should be considered citizens	4.24
Children should only be allowed to attend public school if they can demonstrate a basic understanding of English no matter how old they are.	5.09
U.S. citizens should band together to boycott all products produced by companies/businesses employing illegal immigrants.	4.81
States should not be allowed to pass their immigration laws.	0.85
The United States should have an open door immigration policy in which anyone who would like to come to the country legally can do so.	3.82

NS=Non-Significant Z score- the predictive power of Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism are no different., - -Nonsignificant regression for this question on both Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism scales.

Table 5

Linear Regressions predictors on the dependent variable of the Attitudes Towards Immigrants scale

Predictor	Constant	B	SEB	β	t
SDO	59.853	15.998	1.505	.515	10.627*
RWA	56.336	0.673	.048	.624	14.14*
ICS	11.838	3.57	.098	.900	36.45*
RST	-16.850	21.048	.843	.816	24.97*
Symbolic Threats	17.372	16.823	.787	.770	21.37*
Real Threats	-16.652	19.606	.904	.775	21.68*

*p<.001

Table 6

Linear Regressions predictors on the dependent variable of the Immigration Policy Scale

Predictor	Constant	B	SEB	β	t
SDO	89.486	10.254	1.144	.452	8.96*
RWA	87.671	0.426	.037	.540	11.355*
ICS	59.525	2.256	.103	.779	21.964*
RST	38.138	13.868	.721	.736	19.243*
Symbolic Threats	60.392	11.141	.645	.698	17.269*
Real Threats	39.624	12.70	.759	.687	16.732*

*p<.001

Table 7

Linear Regressions predictions on the dependent variable of the Attitudes Towards Immigrants Scale and z score comparison of which scale is more influential in making predictions about attitudes towards immigrants.

Predictor	Constant	B	SEB	β	t	Which regression coefficient is more influential in making predictions about attitudes towards immigrants?
SDO	59.853	15.998	1.505	.515	10.627*	More influential than RWA ($z=10.18^*$) and ICS ($z=8.24^*$)
RWA	56.336	0.673	.048	.624	14.14*	
ICS	11.838	3.57	.098	.900	36.45*	More influential than RWA ($z=16.72^*$)
RST	-16.850	21.048	.843	.816	24.97*	More influential than SDO= ($z=2.93^*$), RWA= ($z=24.13^*$) and ICS ($z=20.59^*$)

The z score formula for comparing regression results is based on the formula by Patternoster et al. (1998), * $p < .001$

Table 8

Linear Regressions predictions on the dependent variable of the Immigration Policy Scale and z score comparison of which scale is more influential in making predictions about immigration policy.

Predictor	Constant	B	SEB	β	t	Which regression coefficient is more influential in making predictions about immigration policy?
SDO	89.486	10.254	1.144	.452	8.96*	More influential than RWA ($z=8.56^*$) and ICS ($z=6.96^*$)
RWA	87.671	0.426	.037	.540	11.355*	
ICS	59.525	2.256	.103	.779	21.964*	More influential than RWA ($z=26.55^*$)
RST	38.138	13.868	.721	.736	19.243*	More influential than SDO ($z=2.67^*$), RWA ($z=18.62^*$) and ICS ($z=15.94^*$)

The z score formula for comparing regression results is based on the formula by Patternoster et al. (1998), * $p<.001$

Table 9

Results of t-tests and descriptive statistics for scales between those who thought the police officer should ask the driver for identification and those who did not think the police officer should ask the driver for identification.

Scale	Gender						
	Should ask for ID			Should not ask for ID			
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t
RWA	92.40	37.05	113	60.99	34.24	202	7.56*
SDO	3.24	1.34	113	2.59	1.27	202	4.26*
ATI	131.88	35.77	113	89.97	36.37	202	9.86*
ICS	32.28	9.6	113	22.64	9.20	202	8.81*
RST	6.71	1.49	113	5.27	1.43	202	8.43*
IPS	140.53	23.87	113	106.05	26.04	202	11.61*

*p<.001

Table 10

Results of Chi-Square test and descriptive statistics on how much trouble the student got into by what should happen to the student upon learning she is not a citizen.

Trouble	What should happen to the student upon learning she is not a citizen?											
	Citizenship				Green Card				Deportation			
	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR
None	7.1	10	50%	1.4	79.2	87	39.2%	2.0	25.7	15	20.8%	-3.0
Minor	5.9	5	25%	-0.5	65.8	67	30.2%	0.3	21.31	21	29.2%	-0.1
Major	6.9	5	25%	-0.9	77.1	68	30.6%	-2.4	25	36	50%	3.1

Note: $\chi^2 = 13.00$ df = 4, p=01, percentages are column totals. E= expected count, O= observed count, AR= Adjusted Residuals

Table 11

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance Orientation and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on whether the student should be given citizenship, a pathway to citizenship or deported.

What should happen to the student?	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Citizenship	45.40	24.94	20	2.50	1.56	20	75.00	40.33	20
Greencard	69.56	37.99	222	2.65	1.21	222	98.28	37.32	222
Deportation	88.60	36.21	72	3.39	1.39	72	134.65	38.39	72
Total	72.39	38.30	314	2.81	1.31	314	105.14	41.33	314

Table 12

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat, and the Immigration Policy scales based on whether the student should be given citizenship, a pathway to citizenship or deported.

What should happen to the student?	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Citizenship	18.10	9.99	20	4.62	1.40	20	92.75	28.49	20
Green card	24.71	9.40	222	5.53	1.44	222	112.55	26.52	222
Deportation	32.85	10.23	72	6.95	1.52	72	144.18	25.25	72
Total	26.15	10.40	314	5.80	1.60	314	118.54	30.16	314

Table 13

Results of Chi-Square test and descriptive statistics for how participants answered the main question in vignette #1 by how the participant responded to the main question in vignette #2.

Vignette2: What should happen to the student?	Vignette 1: Should officer ask for identification?							
	Yes				No			
	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR
Citizenship	7.2	2	1.8%	-2.5	12.8	18	9%	2.5
Green card	79.9	60	53.1%	-5.1	142.1	162	80.6%	5.1
Deportation	25.9	51	45.1%	7	46.1	21	10.4%	-7

Note: $\chi^2 = 8.57$ df = 3, .p<05, percentages are column totals. E= expected count, O= observed count, AR= Adjusted Residuals

Table 14

Results of t-tests and descriptive statistics comparing male and female participants on each scale.

Scale	Gender					
	Male			Female		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
RWA	69.97	36.01	126	73.77	39.64	186
SDO	2.96	1.26	126	2.72	1.38	186
ATI	104.94	35.22	126	105.45	45.08	186
ICS	26.52	8.88	126	25.95	11.35	186
RST	5.97	1.36	126	5.68	1.74	186
IPS	118.94	27.33	126	118.43	31.93	186

Table 15

Frequency of the race of participants.

Participant race	Frequency	Percent
White	258	81.9
Black	20	6.3
Native American	0	0.0
Asian Indian	13	4.1
Mixed Race	12	4.1
Prefer not to say	11	3.5
Total	312	99.0

Table 16

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on participant race.

Participant Race	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
White	72.72	39.46	258	2.84	1.37	258	107.08	41.97	258
Black	80.90	36.60	20	2.71	1.22	20	92.70	35.83	20
Asian Indian	63.15	24.35	13	2.62	1.07	13	84.46	19.09	13
Mixed race	63.31	33.52	13	2.43	1.03	13	104.62	51.24	13
Prefer not to say	66.90	32.55	11	3.20	1.23	11	103.18	37.30	11
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.33	315

Table 17

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scales based on participant race,

Participant Race	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
White	26.76	10.52	258	5.89	1.63	258	119.94	30.15	258
Black	22.80	9.22	20	5.31	1.39	20	107.25	29.38	20
Asian Indian	19.23	5.15	13	5.01	0.81	13	112.31	20.81	13
Mixed race	22.77	11.83	13	5.43	2.05	13	118.00	38.97	13
Prefer not to say	27.45	10.10	11	5.55	1.21	11	110.82	29.32	11
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.19	3315

Table 18

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance

Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on participant marital status.

Participant Race	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Married	78.03	40.54	151	2.93	1.42	151	108.54	41.05	151
Widowed	85.00	30.18	8	2.78	1.01	8	111.50	48.54	8
Divorced	75.46	36.80	26	2.75	1.29	26	110.65	51.46	26
Separated	56.00	48.20	5	2.86	2.55	5	65.00	22.49	5
Never Married	63.44	34.61	117	2.69	1.20	117	100.45	39.39	117
Prefer not to say	79.13	34.84	8	2.98	1.02	8	104.63	28.23	8
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 19

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scales based on participant marital status.

Marital Status	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Married	26.56	10.17	151	5.78	1.51	151	119.87	28.29	151
Widowed	27.88	11.09	8	5.71	2.19	8	125.50	30.80	8
Divorced	29.38	10.97	26	6.35	1.76	26	126.62	34.19	26
Separated	21.60	6.88	5	4.33	0.74	5	93.20	18.16	5
Never Married	24.84	10.82	117	5.73	1.67	117	115.97	31.93	117
Prefer not to say	26.25	6.34	8	5.96	0.91	8	109.13	22.84	8
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.19	315

Table 20

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance

Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on participant parental status.

Do you have children?	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Yes	81.71	39.00	160	2.84	1.29	160	110.24	41.19	160
No	62.32	35.42	145	2.79	1.38	145	99.07	41.05	145
Prefer not to say	65.10	32.05	10	3.00	1.29	10	107.00	40.23	10
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 21

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scales based on participant parental status.

Do you have children?	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Yes	27.65	10.12	160	5.97	1.54	160	121.74	29.31	160
No	24.33	10.46	145	5.56	1.66	145	114.97	30.79	145
Prefer not to say	27.00	11.46	10	6.13	1.38	10	115.50	32.46	10
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.19	315

Table 22

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance Orientation and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on which political party a participant identifies with.

Political party	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	N	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Democrat	51.65	26.11	130	2.39	1.29	130	85.02	35.02	130
Republican	102.46	37.16	89	3.38	1.32	89	128.33	40.12	89
Libertarian	68.33	32.34	24	2.86	1.01	24	121.00	37.40	24
Green	65.44	49.95	9	2.63	1.19	9	95.44	41.27	9
Independent	81.63	31.31	16	2.61	1.38	16	107.44	41.29	16
Prefer not to say	57.40	27.90	10	2.77	1.47	10	101.30	30.23	10
No political affiliation	44.14	36.71	7	2.73	0.81	7	77.14	38.67	7
Not sure	83.63	30.72	30	3.20	1.21	30	118.14	31.86	30
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 23

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat, and the Immigration Policy scales based on which political party a participant identifies with.

Political party	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	N	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Democrat	21.69	9.53	130	5.21	1.52	130	106.33	27.28	130
Republican	31.16	9.84	89	6.47	1.63	89	134.16	27.94	89
Libertarian	30.04	9.48	24	6.40	1.36	24	127.71	28.66	24
Green	24.44	10.71	9	5.50	1.85	9	103.78	40.58	9
Independent	26.06	11.33	16	5.77	1.57	16	118.63	25.63	16
Prefer not to say	25.10	7.37	10	5.74	1.26	10	112.00	28.96	10
No political affiliation	18.29	8.16	7	4.89	1.47	7	100.29	32.92	7
Not sure	29.73	8.33	30	6.11	1.10	30	127.37	22.98	30
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.19	315

Table 24

Means and standard deviations for the symbolic and realistic subscales of the Realistic Symbolic Threat based on which political party a participant identifies with.

Political party	Scale					
	Symbolic			Realistic		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Democrat	4.59	1.84	130	5.63	1.50	130
Republican	6.00	1.95	89	6.82	1.63	89
Libertarian	5.67	1.45	24	7.00	1.83	24
Green	5.05	2.14	9	5.74	1.78	9
Independent	5.27	1.70	16	6.13	1.67	16
Prefer not to say	4.94	1.62	10	6.38	1.35	10
No political affiliation	4.04	1.68	7	5.59	1.56	7
Not sure	5.60	1.37	30	6.50	1.17	30
Total	5.21	1.89	315	6.20	1.63	315

Table 25

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on a participant's religious affiliation.

Are you religious?	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Yes, and I attend services.	100.13	44.59	62	3.02	1.36	62	110.42	45.29	62
Yes, but I do not attend services.	79.45	34.07	114	2.84	1.34	114	112.61	40.29	114
No	51.78	25.97	129	2.71	1.31	129	95.81	39.19	129
Prefer not to say	81.60	38.13	10	2.77	1.27	10	103.10	36.54	10
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 26

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat, the Immigration Policy, scales based on a participant's religious affiliation.

Are you religious?	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Yes, and I attend services.	26.94	11.05	62	5.84	1.74	62	119.56	31.55	62
Yes, but I do not attend services.	27.96	10.46	114	6.03	1.64	114	124.38	28.50	114
No	24.08	9.84	129	5.56	1.53	129	112.90	30.26	129
Prefer not to say	25.90	10.17	10	5.65	0.87	10	114.70	30.34	10
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.19	315

Table 27

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on whether participant indicated that they were Latino/a or not.

Latino/a	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Latino/a	62.61	36.13	18	2.52	1.09	18	95.33	38.45	18
Non-Latino/a	72.85	38.77	290	2.82	1.34	290	105.41	41.91	290
Prefer not to say	72.29	21.02	7	3.52	1.14	7	112.71	16.94	7
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 28

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scales based on whether participant indicated that they were Latino/a or not.

Latino/a	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Latino/a	24.17	9.57	18	5.63	1.70	18	103.44	29.18	18
Non-Latino/a	26.19	10.57	290	5.80	1.62	290	119.44	30.32	290
Prefer not to say	27.29	5.56	7	5.80	0.60	7	114.86	16.31	7
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.19	315

Table 29

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on whether participant indicated that they rent or own their residence.

Housing	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Own	75.81	38.88	179	2.82	1.34	179	106.60	41.35	179
Rent	66.98	38.37	118	2.78	1.34	118	103.00	41.44	118
Prefer not to say	71.44	36.70	18	3.08	1.24	18	102.17	42.17	18
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 30

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scales based on whether participant indicated that they rent or own their residence.

Housing	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Own	26.40	9.89	179	5.83	1.56	179	120.17	29.29	179
Rent	25.86	11.22	118	5.74	1.68	118	117.08	31.27	118
Prefer not to say	24.78	10.57	18	5.58	1.59	18	109.89	31.58	18
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.19	315

Table 31

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance Orientation and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on participant citizenship status.

Citizenship	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Born in the United States	71.60	38.42	288	2.79	1.33	288	105.53	41.55	288
Naturalized citizen	80.53	39.36	19	3.29	1.29	19	100.68	44.67	19
Born abroad to citizen parents	84.00	43.21	3	1.90	0.24	3	84.33	32.01	3
Prefer not to say	71.40	30.84	5	3.44	1.30	5	103.00	21.81	5
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 32

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scales based on participant citizenship status.

Citizenship	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Born in the United States	26.28	10.55	288	5.82	1.62	288	119.12	30.47	288
Naturalized citizen	24.89	10.34	19	5.42	1.50	19	107.84	26.35	19
Born abroad to citizen parents	20.33	5.13	3	5.93	2.18	3	132.00	36.66	3
Prefer not to say	24.00	3.00	5	5.46	0.73	5	110.40	19.24	5
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.19	315

Table 33

Means and standard deviation for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on participant education level.

Participant Education	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
High school Graduate	89.00	42.83	29	2.93	1.32	29	122.62	39.66	29
Some college but less than one year.	81.71	39.04	24	3.01	1.43	24	112.46	45.07	24
One or more years of college but no degree	61.55	35.85	47	2.91	1.36	47	101.89	43.39	47
Associate Degree	63.92	37.04	37	2.43	1.01	37	99.95	37.10	37
Baccalaureate Degree	73.74	40.11	103	2.87	1.36	103	104.73	41.67	103
Master' Degree	72.91	34.84	56	2.66	1.40	56	99.32	40.34	56
Professional Degree (JD, MD DVM)	73.43	41.24	7	3.22	1.51	7	54.97	20.78	7
PhD.	65.75	21.83	8	2.95	1.16	8	98.50	35.34	8
Prefer not to say	60.50	21.83	4	3.36	1.49	4	97.75	21.22	4
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 34

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scales based on participant education level.

Participant Education	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
High school Graduate	28.90	9.41	29	6.20	1.28	29	132.00	23.18	29
Some college but less than one year.	27.29	11.56	24	6.15	1.97	24	123.21	33.78	24
One or more years of college but no degree	26.06	9.94	47	5.60	1.54	47	114.66	32.80	47
Associate Degree	25.19	10.21	37	5.67	1.48	37	116.78	30.07	37
Baccalaureate Degree	25.79	10.74	103	5.77	1.71	103	119.54	30.34	103
Master' Degree	25.13	10.69	56	5.80	1.59	56	113.21	29.70	56
Professional Degree (JD, MD DVM)	30.43	13.09	7	5.04	1.90	7	123.29	32.39	7
PhD.	25.63	9.38	8	5.81	1.06	8	108.75	21.58	8
Prefer not to say	22.75	1.26	4	5.57	0.79	4	105.50	18.27	4
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.19	315

Table 35

Means and standard deviation for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on participant military experience.

Military experience	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Yes	77.37	39.63	19	3.21	1.29	19	123.32	44.97	19
No	72.01	38.67	285	2.79	1.34	285	103.83	41.53	285
Prefer not to say	69.64	27.13	11	3.11	0.97	11	103.64	18.73	11
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 36

Means and standard deviation for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scales based on participant military experience.

Military experience	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Yes	30.21	10.48	19	6.49	1.66	19	129.05	33.68	19
No	25.86	10.54	285	5.74	1.62	285	117.79	30.32	285
Prefer not to say	25.27	4.56	11	5.80	0.65	11	116.36	15.64	11
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.19	315

Table 37

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance

Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on participant employment status.

Employment Status	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Yes, in chosen profession	75.02	41.41	121	2.99	1.41	121	106.13	42.84	121
Yes, but not in chosen profession	68.69	34.30	102	2.82	1.35	102	105.65	39.89	102
No	73.95	41.34	73	2.56	1.22	73	101.34	42.69	73
Prefer not to say	67.26	24.01	19	2.78	0.98	19	108.32	35.74	19
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 38

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scales based on participant employment status.

Employment Status	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Yes, in chosen profession	26.37	10.57	121	5.85	1.66	121	119.26	30.32	121
Yes, but not in chosen profession	26.46	10.30	102	5.83	1.57	102	120.31	30.43	102
No	24.78	10.86	73	5.58	1.67	73	113.71	31.00	73
Prefer not to say	27.53	8.44	19	6.02	1.17	19	121.05	24.76	19
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.20	315

Table 39

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance

Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on whether a participant is registered to vote.

Are you registered to vote?	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	N	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Yes	71.39	38.37	277	2.81	1.36	277	105.38	42.42	277
No	82.29	37.98	31	2.97	1.01	31	102.23	32.11	31
Prefer not to say	62.14	34.65	7	2.71	1.61	7	102.00	37.82	7
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 40

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scales based on whether a participant is registered to vote.

Are you registered to vote?	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	N	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Yes	26.25	10.53	277	5.81	1.64	277	118.90	30.76	277
No	25.23	9.59	31	5.62	1.18	31	115.97	25.67	31
Prefer not to say	24.29	10.77	7	5.82	2.04	7	110.57	27.90	7
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 41

Means and standard deviations for the Right Wing Authoritarian, Social Dominance

Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Immigrants scales based on whether a participant knows someone who has been deported.

Have you known anyone who has been deported?	Scale								
	RWA			SDO			ATI		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
No	72.97	38.27	269	2.84	1.35	269	105.92	41.88	269
Yes	77.52	42.03	23	2.66	1.12	23	107.70	36.91	23
Not sure	56.80	37.78	15	2.69	1.44	15	87.07	42.52	15
Prefer not to answer	61.88	25.11	8	2.82	1.31	8	99.75	28.62	8
Total	72.25	38.31	315	2.82	1.33	315	105.00	41.34	315

Table 42

Means and standard deviations for the Intergroup Competition, Realistic Symbolic Threat and the Immigration Policy scales based on whether a participant knows someone who has been deported.

Have you known anyone who has been deported?	Scale								
	ICS			RST			IPS		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
No	26.30	10.50	269	5.80	1.62	269	119.06	30.13	269
Yes	26.91	10.11	23	6.03	1.56	23	120.74	31.86	23
Not sure	22.07	10.63	15	5.23	1.71	15	107.80	33.38	15
Prefer not to answer	24.50	7.71	8	5.69	0.90	8	110.25	18.93	8
Total	26.10	10.42	315	5.79	1.60	315	118.42	30.19	315

Table 43

Results of Chi-Square test and descriptive statistics for Marital Status by should the police officer ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency?

Marital Status	Should the police officer ask for proof of citizenship or legal residency?					
	Yes			No		
	Expected	Observed	%	Expected	Observed	%
Married	54.2	63	55.8%	96.8	88	43.6%
Non-Married	58.8	50	44.2%	105.2	114	56.4%

Note. $\chi^2 = 4.31$, $df = 1$, $p = .04$, percentages are column totals.

Table 44

Results of Chi-Square test and descriptive statistics for If the participant has children by should the police officer ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency?

Children	Should the police officer ask for proof of citizenship or legal residency?					
	Yes			No		
	Expected	Observed	%	Expected	Observed	%
Yes	57.4	69	61.1%	102.6	91	45%
No	55.6	44	38.9%	99.4	111	55%

Note. $\chi^2 = 7.43$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$, percentages are column totals.

Table 45

Results of Chi-Square test and descriptive Statistics for if the participant is a Latino/a by Should the police officer ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency?

Latino/a	Should the police officer ask for proof of citizenship or legal residency ?					
	Yes			No		
	Expected	Observed	%	Expected	Observed	%
Yes	6.5	1	0.09%	11.5	17	8.4%
No	106.5	112	99.1%	190.5	185	91.6%

Note. $\chi^2 = 7.63$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$, percentages are column totals.

Table 46

Results of Chi-Square test and descriptive statistics for participant Education level by Should the police officer ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency?

Education	Should the police officer ask for proof of citizenship or legal residency?							
	Yes				No			
	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR
High school	10.4	14	12.4%	1.5	18.6	15	7.4%	-1.5
Less than one year of college	8.6	10	8.8%	0.6	15.4	14	6.9%	-0.6
One or more yrs of college but no degree	16.9	9	8.0%	-2.6	30.1	38	18.8%	2.6
Associate Degree	13.3	11	9.7%	-0.8	23.7	26	12.9%	0.8
Bachelor Degree	36.9	43	38.1%	1.5	66.1	60	29.7%	-1.5
Master's Degree	20.1	16	14.2%	-1.3	35.9	40	19.8%	1.3
Professional Degree	2.5	5	4.4%	2.0	4.5	2	1.0%	-2.0
Doctorate Degree	2.9	4	3.5%	0.8	5.1	4	2.0%	-0.8
Prefer not to answer	1.4	1	0.9%	-0.5	2.6	3	1.5%	0.5

Note: $\chi^2 = 16.20$ do = 8, .p=.04, percentages are column totals. E= expected count, O= observed count, AR= Adjusted Residuals

Table 47

Results of Chi-Square test and descriptive statistics for which Political Party a participant identifies with by Should the police officer ask the driver proof of citizenship or legal residency?

Political Party	Should the police officer ask for proof of citizenship or legal residency?							
	Yes				No			
	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR
Democrat	46.6	33	29.2%	-3.3	83.4	97	48%	3.3
Republican	31.9	45	39.8%	3.4	57.1	44	21.8%	-3.4
Libertarian	8.6	11	9.7%	1.1	15.4	13	6.4%	-1.1
Green	5.8	7	3.5%	0.9	3.2	2	1.8%	-0.9
Independent	10.3	9	4.5%	-0.7	5.7	7	6.2%	0.7
No political affiliation	4.5	6	3.0%	1.2	2.5	1	0.9%	-1.2
Not sure	19.2	17	8.4%	-0.9	10.8	13	11.5%	0.9
Prefer not to answer	6.4	9	4.5%	1.7	3.6	1	0.9%	-1.7

Note: $\chi^2 = 21.81$ df = 7, $p < 0.01$, percentages are column totals. E= expected count, O= observed count, AR= Adjusted Residuals

Table 48

Significant correlations between demographic variables and scale variables with whether a police officer should ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency.

Should the police officer ask the driver for proof of citizenship or legal residency?	R
Age	.169
RWA Score	.392
SDO Score	.232
ATI Score	.486
ICS Score	.446
RST Score	.430
IPS Score	.548

All correlations are significant at the $p < .01$ level. N = 315

Table 49

Results of Chi-Square test and descriptive statistics for whether the participant is of Latino/a descent by what should happen to the student upon learning she is not a citizen.

Latino/a	What should happen to the student upon learning she is not a citizen?											
	Citizenship				Green Card				Deportation			
	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR
Yes	1.1	4	20%	2.8	12.7	9	4.1%	-2.0	4.1	5	6.9%	0.5
No	18.9	16	80%	-2.8	209.3	213	95.9%	2.0	67.9	67	93.1%	-0.5

Note: $\chi^2 = 8.89$ df = 2, p=01, percentages are column totals. E= expected count, O= observed count, AR= Adjusted Residuals

Table 50

Results of Chi-Square Test and descriptive statistics for political party by what should happen to the student upon learning she is not a citizen.

Political Party	Citizenship				Green Card				Deportation			
	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR
Democrat	8.2	14	70%	2.7	91.2	97	43.7%	1.5	29.6	18	25%	-3.2
Republican	5.7	1	5%	-2.4	62.9	53	23.9%	-2.7	20.4	35	48.6%	4.3
Libertarian	1.5	0	0%	-1.3	17	19	8.6%	0.9	5.5	5	6.9%	-0.3
Green	6	1	5%	0.6	6.4	6	2.7%	-0.3	2.1	2	2.8%	-0.1
Independent	1	0	0%	-1.1	11.3	12	5.4%	0.4	3.7	4	5.6%	0.2
No affiliation	0.4	2	10%	2.4	4.9	4	1.8%	-0.8	1.6	1	1.4%	-0.6
Not sure	1.9	1	5%	-0.7	21.2	25	11.3%	1.6	6.9	4	5.6%	-1.3
Prefer not to answer	0.6	1	5%	0.5	7.1	6	2.7%	-0.8	2.3	3	4.2%	0.5

Note: $\chi^2 = 8.89$ df = 14, p=01, percentages are column totals. E= expected count, O= observed count, AR= Adjusted Residuals

Table 51

Results of Chi-Square test and descriptive statistics for participant religious participation by what should happen to the student upon learning she is not a citizen.

Religion	Citizenship				Green Card				Deportation			
	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR
No	8.2	13	65%	2.2	91.2	91	41%	-0.1	29.6	25	34.7%	-1.2
Yes, but I do not attend services	7.3	5	25%	-1.1	80.6	79	35.6%	-0.4	26.1	30	41.7%	1.1
Yes and I do attend services	3.9	0	0%	-2.3	43.1	45	20.3%	0.6	14	16	22.2%	0.7
Prefer not to answer	0.6	2	10%	1.8	7.1	7	3.2%	0	2.3	1	1.4%	-1.0

Note: $\chi^2 = 12.70$ df = 6, $p < .05$, percentages are column totals. E= expected count, O= observed count, AR= Adjusted Residuals

Table 52

Significant correlation between demographic variables and scale variables with whether the student should be deported.

Should Person A be deported?	r
Age	.113*
RWA Score	.276**
SDO Score	.227**
ATI Score	.409**
ICS Score	.383**
RST Score	.412**
IPS Score	.485**

* p<.05 level. ** p<.01 N = 314

Table 53

Results of Chi-Square test and descriptive statistics for participant gender by if the student should be given a green card because she was under 18 when she came to the United States.

Gender	Because she was under 18 when she came to the United States.					
	Yes			No		
	Expected	Observed	%	Expected	Observed	%
Males	36.8	28	30.4%	51.2	60	46.9%
Females	55.2	64	69.6%	76.8	68	53.1%

Note. $\chi^2 = 6.03$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$, percentages are column totals.

Table 54

Results of Chi-Square test and descriptive statistics for participant employment status by if the student should be given a green card because she was under 18 when she came to the United States.

Employment	Because she was under 18 when she came to the United States.							
	Yes				No			
	E	O	%	AR	E	O	%	AR
Yes in chosen profession.	35.2	33	35.9%	-0.6	49.8	52	40%	0.6
Yes but not in chosen profession	29.8	20	21.7%	-2.9	42.2	52	40%	2.9
No	22	31	33.7%	2.9	31	22	16.9%	-2.9
Prefer not to answer	5	8	8.7%	1.8	7	4	3.1%	-1.8

Note: $\chi^2 = 15,27$ df = 3, $p < 0,01$, percentages are column totals. E= expected count, O= observed count, AR= Adjusted Residuals

Table 55

Significant correlation between demographic variables and scale variables with the reason the student should be given a green card is that the student was that she was under the age of 18 when she came to the United States.

Scale	R
ATI Score	-.215**
ICS Score	-.173**
RST Score	-.148*
IPS Score	-.234**

* p<.05 level. ** p<.01 N = 222

Table 56

Significant correlation between demographic variables and scale variables with the reason the student should be given a green card is that the student was 18 when she came to the United States and is a successful college student.

	R
ATI Score	.164*
RST Score	.176**
IPS Score	-.186**

* p<.05 level. ** p<.01 N = 222




Figure 3. Model testing the hypothesis that intergroup competition mediates the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and opinions about Immigration policy (IPS)*
 $p < .001.00$




Figure 4. Model testing the hypothesis that Intergroup Competition (ICS) mediates the relationship between Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Immigration Policy (IPS) for participants with high RWA scores * $p < .001$.




Figure 5. Model testing the hypothesis that Intergroup Competition(ICS) mediates the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Attitudes Towards Immigrants (ATI) * $p < .001$.




Figure 6. Model testing the hypothesis that Intergroup Competition (ICS) mediates the relationship between Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Attitudes Towards Immigrants (ATI) for participants with high RWA scores * $p < .001$.




Figure 7. Model testing the hypothesis that Realistic Symbolic Threat scale (RST) mediates the relationship between Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Immigration Policy (IPS) * $p < .001$.




Figure 8. Model testing the hypothesis that symbolic threat subscale of the Realistic Symbolic Threat Scale (RST) mediates the relationship between Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Immigration Policy (IPS). * $p < .001$.




Figure 9. Model testing the hypothesis that the Real threat subscale mediates the relationship between Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and immigration policy (IPS). * $p < .001$.




Figure 10. Model testing the hypothesis that Realistic-Symbolic Threat scale (RST) mediates the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and opinions about Immigration Policy (IPS) for all participants in the study * $p < .001$.




Figure 11. Model testing the hypothesis that symbolic threats mediates the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and opinions about Immigration Policy (IPS) for all participants in the study * $p < .001$.




Figure 12..Model testing the hypothesis that Real threats mediates the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and opinions about Immigration Policy (IPS) for all participants in the study * $p < .001$.




Figure 13. Model testing the hypothesis that Realistic-Symbolic threats (RST) mediates the relationship between Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Immigration policy (IPS)

. * $p < .001$.




Figure 14. Model testing the hypothesis that Symbolic threats mediates the relationship between Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Immigration policy (IPS). * $p < .001$.




Figure 15. Model testing the hypothesis that Real threats mediate the relationship between Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Immigration policy (IPS). * $p < .001$




Figure 16. Model testing the hypothesis that Real-symbolic threats mediates the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Attitudes Towards Immigrants (ATI) $p < .001$.




Figure 17. Model testing the hypothesis that symbolic threats mediate the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Attitudes Towards Immigrants (ATI) $p < .001$.




Figure 18. Model testing the hypothesis that Real threats mediate the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Attitudes Towards Immigrants (ATI) * $p < .001$.

Appendix A

Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of agreement/disagreement by circling the appropriate number from -4 to +4. Your first responses are usually the most accurate.

If you feel exactly and precisely neutral about an item, write down a "0."

You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of a statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree ("-4") with one idea in a statement but slightly agree ("+1") with another idea in the same item. When this happens, please combine your reactions, and write down how you feel on balance (a "-3" in this case).

1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protesters are usually just loud mouths showing off their ignorance.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

2. Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

3. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

4. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

5. It's always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in peoples' minds.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

6. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

8. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

Disagree

Agree

9. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

10. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

11. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

12. The old fashioned ways and the old fashioned values still show the best way to live.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

13. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority's view by protesting for women's abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

14. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

15. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion and ignoring the normal way things are supposed to be done

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

16. God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

17. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

18. A woman's place should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

19. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the rotten apples who are ruining everything.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

20. There is no one right way to live life; everybody has to create their own way.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

21. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy traditional family values.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

22. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut up and accept their group's traditional place in society.

-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
Very Strongly Disagree		Moderately Disagree		Neutral		Moderately Agree		Very Strongly Agree

Appendix B

Social Dominance Orientation Scale

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of agreement/disagreement by circling the appropriate number from 1 to 7. Your first responses are usually the most accurate.

1. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

2. Group equality should be our ideal.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

3. It is OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

5. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

8. We would have fewer problems if groups were treated more equally.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

9. It would be good if groups could be equal.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

10. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

12. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral		Strongly Agree	

13. We should increase social equality.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral		Strongly Agree	

14. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral		Strongly Agree	

15. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral		Strongly Agree	

16. No one group should dominate in society.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

Appendix C Attitudes Towards Immigrants

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of agreement/disagreement by circling the appropriate number from 1 to 7. Your first responses are usually the most accurate.

- 1. The quality of education suffers in schools where there are too many immigrant children.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

- 2. Immigrants are more often involved in criminality than average.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

- 3. Social programs should be implemented to provide immigrants with skills needed to succeed in the United States.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

4. Mixing cultures together in the United States is likely to generate a lot of tension and conflict.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

5. Some immigrants are too emotional and hateful, and they don't fit in well in the United States.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

6. There is a limit to the number of people that the United States can admit as immigrants.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

7. American employers seek to hire immigrants rather than native born Americans.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

8. The American people need to become aware of the many ways in which immigrants suffer from prejudice.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

9. The United States should open its doors to immigrants from all parts of the world.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

10. The religious practices of many immigrants threaten our way of life.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

11. Immigrants contribute more to our social systems than they take.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

12. The United States needs to tighten its immigration requirements.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

13. There are too many immigrants from the wrong sorts of places being admitted to the United States these days.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

14. You can usually tell whether people are immigrants by the way they look.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

15. Opportunities for affordable housing are lowered by the presence of immigrants.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

16. Immigrants take jobs away from Americans.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

17. If immigrants wanted to improve their lives, they would get jobs and get off welfare.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

18. Immigrants are often given preferential treatment by the authorities.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

19. It is irritating to see all these immigrants in the United States who can't speak English.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

20. I personally find the presence of people of another nationality disturbing.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

21. The authorities should make every effort to improve the situation of immigrants.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

22. Immigrants in our country should be helped to live independent and successful lives.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

23. It is about time the United States closed its borders to all immigrants.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

24. Immigrants don't care what happens to anyone other than people from their home country.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

25. To become fully accepted members of the American society, immigrants must give up their own culture.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

26. Many immigrants do not have the drive and determination to learn new skills.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

27. We should do what we can to help immigrants adjust to the American way of life.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

28. We should not waste taxpayers' money on helping immigrants.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

29. Immigrants in the United States pose a threat to my personal security.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

30. Immigrants are more loyal to their country of origin than to the United States.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

Appendix D

Intergroup Competitiveness Scale

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of agreement/disagreement by circling the appropriate number from 1 to 7. Your first responses are usually the most accurate.

1. It would be to our advantage for immigrants to get more resources.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

2. If immigrants make economic gains, people like me will be worse off.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

3. Immigrants are NOT getting enough resources.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

4. Immigrants should have more influence in our society.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

5. Resources that go to members of immigrant groups are likely to take away resources from people like me.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

6. Giving immigrants special breaks is likely to make things more difficult for people like me.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

7. If immigrants get more influence, it will be to our disadvantage.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

8. Immigrants should be given help and support.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly
Agree

Appendix E

Realistic & Symbolic Threats

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of agreement/disagreement by circling the appropriate number from **1 to 10**. Your first responses are usually the most accurate.

1. Immigrants should learn to conform to the rules and norms of American society as soon as possible after they arrive.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

2. Immigration is undermining American culture.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

3. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding work are basically quite similar to most Americans.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

4. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding moral and religious issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

5. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding family issues and socializing children are basically quite similar to those of most Americans.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

6. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding social relations are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

7. Immigrants should not have to accept American ways.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree		Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

8. Immigrants get more from this country than they contribute.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree		Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

9. The children of immigrants should have the same right to attend public schools in the United States as Americans do.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree		Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

10. Immigration has increased the tax burden on Americans.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree		Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

11. Immigrants are not displacing American workers from their jobs.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

12. Immigrants should be eligible for the same health-care benefits received by Americans.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

13. Social services have become less available to Americans because of immigration.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

14. The quality of social services available to Americans has remained the same, despite immigration.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree		Agree		Strongly Agree

15. Immigrants are as entitled to subsidized housing or subsidized utilities (water, sewage, electricity) as poor Americans are

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Appendix F

Immigration Policy Questions

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of agreement/disagreement by circling the appropriate number from 1 to 6. Your first responses are usually the most accurate

1. Legally admitted immigrants who can't find jobs should be sent back to their country.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

2. All immigrants regardless of education level and country of origin should be required to pass an American cultural competency class.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

3. Members of immigrant communities should hold more public rallies to protest laws and policies that they think are unfair.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

4. Employers should be able to deduct housing costs from agricultural workers who are guest workers from other countries.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

5. Law enforcement agencies should NOT be allowed to post fake mandatory meeting flyers in order to get suspected undocumented workers to show up for work in order to be arrested.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

6. Both private and public employers should be required to hire employees who are bilingual.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

7. Only people from countries that are culturally similar to the United States should be allowed to immigrate here.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

8. Upon being arrested but not convicted a person's fingerprints should be sent to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) to check if they are illegally in the country.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

9. Only certain people from certain countries in the world should be required to check in with immigration officials regardless of whether they are here to travel, study or work.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

10. Even though deportation proceedings is a civil matter, illegal immigrants should be provided with an attorney to represent them at their deportation hearing.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

11. The federal government should cut off all funding to any city that does not require proof that person is in the country legally before providing services.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

12. If arrested for a crime all people should be required to show proof of citizenship.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

13. English should be the official language of the United States.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

14. Communities that have a large number of immigrant day workers should create sites where these people can gather and wait for work, rather than having them loiter in certain locations.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

15. Legal immigrants who have been convicted of serious crimes should be sent back to their countries.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

16. Legal immigrants should be prevented from sending money back to their home country.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

17. All official U.S. rules, policies, and applications should be printed in more than one language so that everyone can read and understand them.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

18. The only effective means of keeping illegal immigrants out is to shoot them as they attempt to cross the border.

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

19. If a child is a U.S. citizen but their immediate family is made up of undocumented immigrants, that child should not be allowed to receive social services like food stamps or Medicaid.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

20. Workplace complaints by undocumented immigrants, like sexual harassment, low wages, long hours, etc. should be investigated by the government.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

21. While applying to become a citizen, a legal permanent resident (green card holder) who commits a crime, should be informed that if they plead guilty, they could be deported.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

22. The U.S. census bureau should be allowed to ask people if they are in the country legally so that we have a better idea of how many illegal people are in the country.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

23. If an illegal immigrant helps the police solve a crime, they should be allowed to become a U.S. citizen.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

24. Undocumented immigrant college students should be allowed to attend college and pay in-state tuition.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

25. Only citizen should receive medical services like the annual flu shot.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

26. Illegal immigrants should be allowed to get a driver's license, which would reduce the number of unsafe drivers on the road.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

27. It should be a crime for anyone to rent or sell property to an undocumented immigrant.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

28. If any employee of the U.S. government (postal worker, census taker) finds out that someone is in the country illegally, they should be required to report that person to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

29. The U.S. government should make an effort to train more doctors, engineers, and computer experts so that we do not have to allow so many of these immigrants into the country that has these skills.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

30. If a juvenile is arrested their fingerprints should be sent to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to see if they are in the country legally.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

31. Only children born to mothers' who are U.S. citizens should be considered citizens.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

32. Children should only be allowed to attend public school if they can demonstrate a basic understanding of English no matter how old they are.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

33. U.S. citizens should band together to boycott all products produced by companies/businesses employing illegal immigrants.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

34. States should not be allowed to pass their own immigration laws.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

35. The United States should have an open door immigration policy in which anyone who would like to come to the country legally can do so.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree

Appendix G

Vignette #1

Manipulation of race/ethnicity: Participants will either read a vignette in which Person M is from Mexico, Ireland or Korea.

Person M was driving home late at night when they were pulled over by a police officer for a broken tail light. The police officer asked Person M for their license, registration and insurance information. Person M hands the officer the car's registration and insurance, which is not in their name but in the name of their spouse. Person M then tells the officer that they lost their license earlier in the week and was planning on getting a new one that weekend. Instead of a license, Person M supplies the officer with their work ID that has their picture, job title (Assistant Director of Marketing), work address, and signature on it. In response, the officer asks Person M if they have any other official identification; like a passport, birth certificate, green card. Person M does not. The police officer then asks Person M for their SS# which Person M says they cannot remember. Finally, the officer asks Person M for their birthdate.

While the officer runs Person M's information, he casually comments that he likes the music playing in the car and asks what kind of music it is. Person M says "oh it is Ranchera, like Mexican Mariachi music." The officer smiles at Person M and comments that he will have to check it out. Person M responds that it was their grandmother who turned them onto it. The officer asks Person M if their grandmother is Mexican. Person M smiles and responds by saying that yes their grandmother is from Mexico and she is so happy that Person M listens to Ranchera. The officer asks if Person M has ever been to Mexico. Person M says yes I was born there, but it has been a very long time since I have been back. At this point, dispatch comes back stating that Person M and their car have a clean record.

What should the officer do next?

- 1. Ask Person M for proof of U.S. citizenship/Legal residency.**
 - a. If a participant answers NO- they will direct to answer question three.**
 - b. If a participant answers YES- they will be directed to answer question two.**
- 2 Why should the police officer, in this case, ask Person M for proof of being a U.S. Citizen/Legal Resident?**
 - a.** The police officer should ask all people this information at routine traffic stops. If participants select this answer, they proceed to question 3.
 - b.** The police officer should ask all people for this information at routine traffic stops if they suspect a person is an immigrant. If participants answer this question affirmatively, they will be asked to circle the reasons why the officer should be suspect.
 1. Person M did not have a valid driver's license
 2. Person M did not have any other official identification

3. Person M did not remember their SS# when asked
4. The car's registration and insurance were not in Person M's name.
5. During their conversation Person M mentions that they were born in Mexico.
6. Other- please explain_____

2. As stated in the vignette, Person M did not have any type of official identification, but all information about them and the car came back as being okay. How should the police officer now proceed?

- a. Give Person M a verbal warning for driving without a license and having a broken tail light.
- b. Issue a ticket to Person M for driving without a license and a broken tail light.
- c. Arrest Person M for driving without a license, and a broken tail light.

i. If a participant answers with this response- they will be asked to circle the reasons why

1. Person M was driving without a license, and this is illegal.
2. Person M did not have any other official identification.
3. Person M did not remember their SS# when asked.
4. The car's registration and insurance were not in person M's name.
5. The police officer should suspect that Person M is an immigrant and should take them into custody to check this out ***
6. Other_____

Vignette #2:

Manipulation: Person A's background will be manipulated in the vignettes. Participants will either read the following paragraph or the following paragraph with the starred information added at the end.

Person A is 18 years old and has just started their first year of college. After their first semester of college Person A successfully made it onto the Dean's list for maintaining an A average in their classes. Person A is interested in social work, specifically providing counseling services to active and former military members and their families. Person A is active in a support group for military service men and women that Person A's church sponsors and feels that this is a good field to stay in. Person A recently applied for a part-time position with veteran affairs. After completing their paper work, Person A was visited by an agent from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), who informed Person A that they were in the United States without proper authorization. When questioned, person A told the agent that they came to the United States with their parents when they were a small child from Mexico and that they have never traveled outside of the United States. Person A has never been in trouble with the law.

****Person A has never been in serious trouble with the law. As a teenager they did get into trouble with the police and their parents for truancy and under aged drinking. Since starting college person A has had no contacts with the police.**

*****Person A has never been in serious trouble with the law. As a teenager they did get into trouble with the police and their parents for truancy and under aged drinking. Since starting college person A has continued to engage in minor criminal activities and was arrested for a DUI (Drinking under the influence).**

What should happen to Person A next?-. Participants will select from the three choices, deportation, green card, citizenship and then be asked the reason behind their decision.

After making their choice, participants will be asked what other information they would have liked to have had in order to make their decision and how that additional information may have changed their choice.

Person A should be deported

- a. Person A should be immediately deported without a hearing in front of an immigration judge because they did not enter the country legally.
- b. Person A should be immediately detained by the ICE agent while awaiting a hearing in front of an immigration judge to decide if they should be deported.
- c. Person A should be electronically monitored via an ankle bracelet by the ICE agent while awaiting a hearing in front of an immigration judge to decide if they should be deported.
- d. Other reason, please explain_____

Person A should be given a green card (pathway to citizenship)

- a. Person A should be provided with a green card (pathway to citizenship) in order to become a citizen since they were under the age of 18 when they entered the United States without authorization.
- b. Person A should be provided with a green card (pathway to citizenship) in order to become a citizen since they were under the age of 18 when they entered the United States, and is now a successful college student.
- c. Person A should be provided with a green card (pathway to citizenship) in order to become a citizen since they were under the age of 18 when they entered the United States, is now a successful college student and plans on working with the military once completing college.
- d. Other reason, please explain_____

Person A should be given immediate citizenship

- a. Person A should be given citizenship since they were under the age of 18 when they entered the United States.
- b. Person A should be given citizenship since they were under the age of 18 when they entered the United States and is a successful college student.
- c. Person A should be given citizenship since they were under the age of 18 when they entered the United States , is now a successful college student and plans on working with the military once completing college.
- d. Other reason, please explain _____

Appendix H

Demographic Questions

Below are a series of questions about you. Please answer the questions to the best of your abilities circling the correct answer where applicable or filling in the information on the blank line. Thank you.

1. What is your gender? Male Female Other _____
2. How old are you? _____
3. Are you of Hispanic, Latino or Spanish in origin?
 - a. If yes which country of origin?
4. What is your race?
 - a. White
 - b. African American or Black
 - c. Native American
 - d. Asian Indian
 - e. Other
5. What is your ancestry or ethnic origin; for example; Italian, Haitian, Norwegian, Lebanese, Polish, Jamaican _____
6. Do you speak another language besides English at home?
 - a. If yes- which language? _____
7. What zip code do you live in? _____
8. How long have you lived there? _____
9. Do you rent or own your residence? _____
10. Are you a U.S. citizen
 - a. Yes born in the USA
 - b. Yes born in Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands, Northern Marianas
 - c. Yes, born abroad to U.S. citizen parents or parent
 - d. Yes, naturalized citizen
 - i. What year did you come to the USA _____
 - ii. Year of citizenship _____
 - e. Not a U.S. citizen

i. What year did you come to the USA? _____

11. What is the highest level of education you have currently completed?

- a. High school
- b. Some college credit but less than 1 year of college credit
- c. 1 or more years of college but no degree
- d. Associate Degree (AA or AS)
- e. Bachelor's Degree (BA or BS)
- f. Master's Degree (MA, MS, MEng, Med, MSW, MBA)
- g. Professional Degree (Md, DDS, DVM, LLb, JD)
- h. Doctorate Degree (PhD, EdD).

12. What is your current marital status?

- a. Married
- b. Widowed
- c. Divorced
- d. Separated
- e. Never Married

13. Do you have any children?

- a. If yes, how many? _____
 - i. Do these children live with you? _____

14. Have you served on active duty in U.S. Armed Forces, military reserves of National Guard?

- a. Yes, now on active duty
- b. Yes, on active duty within the last 12 months but not now.
- c. Yes, on active duty in the past but not during the last 12 months.
- d. No
 - i. If yes, which branch? _____

15. Are you currently employed? Yes No

a. If you answered yes- where do you work? _____

i. Is this your chosen profession? Yes No

b. If you answered no- what was your last job? _____

i. What that job in your chosen profession? Yes No

16. Have you known anyone that has been deported from the United States?

Yes No Not Sure

17. Are you registered to vote? Yes No Not Sure

18. Which political party do you most identify with? _____

19. Do you consider yourself religious? Yes No

If you answered yes- which religion do you affiliate yourself with? _____

Appendix I

CITI Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative

Human Research Curriculum Completion Report Printed on 9/21/2010

Learner: Lorraine Phillips (username: kaylazoe2000)

Institution: City University of New York (CUNY)

Contact Information Department: Doctoral Program in Criminal Justice

Phone: 347-276-1893

Email: lphillips@jjay.cuny.edu

Graduate students: this learner group is designed for masters and doctoral level students engaged in research or research practica, regardless of whether the research is Social and Behavioral, or Biomedical.

Stage 1. Basic Course Passed on 05/18/10 (Ref # 4427130)

Required Modules	Date Completed	Score
The City University of New York (CUNY) Module	05/18/10	no quiz
History and Ethical Principles - SBR	05/18/10	4/4 (100%)
Defining Research with Human Subjects - SBR	05/18/10	5/5 (100%)
The Regulations and The Social and Behavioral Sciences - SBR	05/18/10	4/5 (80%)
Assessing Risk in Social and Behavioral Sciences - SBR	05/18/10	3/5 (60%)
Informed Consent - SBR	05/18/10	4/5 (80%)
Privacy and Confidentiality - SBR	05/18/10	3/3 (100%)
Records-Based Research	05/18/10	1/2 (50%)
Research with Children - SBR	05/18/10	3/4 (75%)
Research in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools - SBR	05/18/10	3/4 (75%)
Internet Research - SBR	05/18/10	4/4 (100%)

For this Completion Report to be valid, the learner listed above must be

affiliated with a CITI participating institution. Falsified information and unauthorized use of the CITI course site is unethical, and may be considered scientific misconduct by your institution.

Paul Braunschweiger Ph.D.
Professor, University of Miami
Director Office of Research Education
CITI Course Coordinator